Washington's visitors from Beijing this month are laying down markers on the whole gamut of issues connected with cross-strait relations: the "one China" principle, of course; the inadequacy of the "small three links"
Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen
Beijing's most urgent purpose for sending emissaries and making public statements are the forthcoming decisions on US arms sales to Taiwan and in particular the decision on AEGIS destroyers, which it hopes to block. The issue is getting considerable public attention at this time and Beijing (and many China experts in the US) has tried to make it a bellwether for the new administration's policy toward the PRC.
Just in the last week alone, there have been significant public discussions on this subject. Two well-known and respected China experts from two different think tanks included the subject in their separate analyses. Two members of Congress spoke of it in speeches to two other think tanks and Washington was being visited by an important policy official from Beijing who clearly wanted to talk about arms sales as well as other issues.
In an analysis done for the Asia-Pacific Forum Newsletter, Allen Romberg of the Stimson Center, laid out a very balanced description of the present state of cross-strait relations. He made several good points, including some on the arms sales issue. He thought Beijing's refusal to establish dialogue with the Chen government increased the pressure on Bush to do something for Taiwan. I agree. But he also thought the US should put off for the time being decisions on the more sensitive arms -- as defined by the PRC -- to see whether the recent more moderate words on both sides might lead to some progress.
In a Brookings Institute Policy Brief, Kenneth Lieberthal, whose paper was about the broader subject of "US Policy Toward China," also included his views on cross-strait issues and arms sales. He seems to accept the PRC position that the AEGIS destroyer systems, because "they are natural stepping stones to anti-missile defenses that are organically linked to US systems ... reconstitute" the US-Taiwan Defense Treaty. He calls for an agreement between the two sides of the Strait (no further increase -- not withdrawal -- of missiles facing Taiwan in ex-change for no additions to Taiwan's anti-missile capability). Then he suggests that no sale of "controversial" systems to Taiwan should be made this year while an agreement is explored.
We also heard speeches by two very influential members of Congress, one a Republican member of the House, one a Democrat member of the Senate, with quite a different perspective on the arms sales issue. Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Henry Hyde, thought sales of arms to Taiwan that had been withheld would be made this year. Importantly, he considered these necessary responses to the PRC's deployment of missiles opposite Taiwan.
Senator Max Baucus, who is well-known for his balanced position regarding US relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, made some unusually strong statements on the subject of arms sales. He charged that the PRC refused to commit to a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, and was expanding its missile and conventional forces opposite Taiwan. He too believed less PRC provocation would diminish pressure on the US to sell arms. Without this fundamental change by the PRC, he said, the US will permit the sale of arms to Taiwan.
Against this background of open debate in the US on the subject of arms sales to Taiwan came Deputy Director Zhou Mingwei (周明偉) of the important Taiwan Office of the State Council in Beijing. His visit had been given advanced media billing, which emphasized his important posi-tion, his next generation leadership prospects, his US experience, and his polished demeanor.
It came as a surprise, there-fore, that his meetings in New York before he came to Washington received considerable media attention -- in a way that had not been expected. His presentation and responses had been hard line, and perhaps most important, included the panic-button word "war." The rationalization that preceded him in the Washington media was that he had been speaking to "pro-unification Chinese Americans," that is, spinning his words to please his audience. It was thought, by China's friends, that Zhou would be more "diplomatic" in Washington.
He was. He was also as personable and bright as had been expected. But his message was the same. In fact, some of it, such as that the people of Taiwan can make a choice as long as it is unification, or the PRC rejects dialogue with the Chen government because they don't trust him, simply do not sell well with a US audience -- a choice of one and refusal to enter dialogue are seen as a denial of democracy. Other comments, like everybody believes in "one China" and "one China" makes it impossible for Taiwan to have its own international space, seemed overly cute. But none of the above is new, just more unambiguously stated -- something the US has difficulty doing.
It is interesting how the debate on arms sales to Taiwan is so open in both the US and Taiwan (but not in the PRC). This is partially due to the democratization of Taiwan. But it is also due to US concern over PRC procurement of sophisticated weaponry, the PRC's own greater capability to develop such weaponry and the deployment of missiles facing Taiwan. The latter in particular has nothing to do with normal modernization of their military, but is only a preparation for offensive operations against Taiwan. Still, the PRC chooses to publicly press the new US president to make a choice -- say no to permitting the sale of arms to Taiwan, thereby creating a major problem for him with the Con-gress, whose support he badly needs on important domestic issues, or permit the sale and have to cope with a competitive but important relationship. The president is more likely to show strength in foreign policy and gain support for his domestic program.
We should not yet again put off a decision on the sale of AEGIS destroyers just to see what the PRC will do. We have done this before and have not seen any progress with China on a whole range of issues. We also seem to de-emphasize that even the more sophisticated equipment under consideration is defensive. The fact that it might thwart the PRC offensive objective is hardly a reason not to permit the sale. Perhaps we can make a decision that demonstrates that we will permit the sale of such equipment, but how the production line proceeds (it will take several years) could be influenced by a disassembling of PRC offensive capabilities across the Strait.
The rest of the region will be watching with keen interest how we handle this PRC challenge. It would be better if we do not, again, provide the PRC with the initiative, but put the pressure on them to contribute broader regional stability.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed here are his own.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS