Many of Taiwan's politicians have watched the movie 13 Days recently, but perhaps none of them have read the book Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, written by Robert F. Kennedy. If they are willing to spend some time reading the book after seeing the movie, they will be able to learn something more.
The Cuban missile crisis occurred almost 40 years ago, and there are innumerable books recording this piece of history. The most factual is definitely Thirteen Days, written by the younger brother of late US president John F. Kennedy. Meanwhile, the one that gives the most comprehensive analysis is Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis by Graham T. Allison of Harvard University. Both books are classics.
Regardless of whether Taiwan's politicians prefer to learn from the movie or from the books, what they need to learn the most from the missile crisis is President Kennedy's policy-making model, especially his methods of crisis management.
Although Kennedy and his confidantes were preeminent figures, they sustained a crushing defeat in the Bay of Pigs incident. When reviewing the matter, they found that the failure mainly resulted from an inappropriate policy-making model, especially because no objections were raised during the decision-making process.
Therefore, when handling the missile crisis, Kennedy completely changed his policy-making style. Some of the most distinguished characteristics are as follows:
First, although Kennedy organized a crisis committee, he avoided presiding over meetings for fear that those holding opposing opinions might hesitate to challenge his viewpoints or refrain from debating their ideas too vigorously.
Second, with or without his presence, all of those involved in policy-making discussions were viewed as equals, regardless of rank or authority.
Third, the Bay of Pigs incident failed because all agreed unanimously, despite whatever difference of opinion they might have had in the policy-making process. However, facing the missile crisis, Kennedy not only made the pro-war members and "doves" challenge each other to correct the other side's posi-tions, but also had a senior Republican act as the "Devil's advocate" to deliberately put forth opposing viewpoints.
Although many factors contributed to the peaceful end of the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy's policy-making model was undoubtedly the key point. The model does not offer brilliant insights, but it is easier said than done. Heads of states around the world who can actually practice Kennedy's style are few and far between.
In fact, during the 13 days of the missile crisis, Kennedy also read a book to learn how to run a country. The book he read was The Guns of August by historian Barbara W. Tuchman.
In the book, Tuchman says that World War I was triggered by misjudgments and misunderstandings. Tuchman argues that it could have been stopped but was not. During the missile crisis, Kennedy often cited the book as an example and took World War I as a reference point. He said he did not want to make the wrong decisions and later be criticized by historians in a book titled "The Missiles of October."
Leaders of Taiwan's political parties have rarely thought about policy-making models. Even when they do, they are not above one-man or oligarchic policy-making patterns. The so-called collective decision-making model exists in name only. If they can learn a smattering from Kennedy's handling of the 13-day crisis, Taiwan politics would certainly be greatly benefitted.
Wang Chien-chuang is president of The Journalist magazine.
Translated by Jackie Lin
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS