Twenty young politicians who came of age during the student movements of the 1980s and 90s are going to run in the year-end legislative elections. Will they become a "generational politics" phenomenon in Taiwan? It is an issue worth discussing.
These ex-student activists, plus the other young legislative candidates who don't share a background in student movements, together comprise the generation that grew up during the transition period in which the martial law regime gradually disintegrated. Imagine if the majority of these young politicians were able to get the nominations of their respective parties and coast to victory. For the first time, they would hold more than 15 percent of seats in the Legislative Yuan. Apart from seats in the legislature, the "transition-period generation" has already begun to take positions as political appointees, government aides, and civil servants since the transition of political power.
The "transition-period generation" is distinct from the previous two generations that experienced the process of democratization in Taiwan. Because there have been three important historical stages in Taiwan's process of democratization, the heroes of reform have been classified as belonging to three political generations. The first political generation was the "228 Generation," with representative figures that included Peng Ming-min (
The second political generation is the "Formosa Generation." The DPP's current leadership should be classified in this generation. Of course there are some differences in seniority and experience among them, but of the Kaohsiung Incident (美麗島事件) prisoners, defense lawyers, and even "tangwai" (黨外, non-KMT) activists that comprise this generation, all had already formed their political views by the 1970s and early 1980s. Historically speaking, they can be classified as belonging to the same generation. They were the main force behind democratization in Taiwan.
The "transition-period generation" refers to Taiwanese who either participated in political movements or formulated their political views between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, around the time that martial law was lifted, the authoritarian power structure was being loosened and social power was beginning to burst forth. After this generation," an even younger political generation took shape, though no formal name exists for it, as yet.
The "transition-period generation" occupies a unique position in Taiwan's political and social transition. Coming of age during the lifting of martial law, this generation shares the previous generations' experience of autocracy and isolation and understands the difficulties of the democratization process. Their views are miles apart from the newest, youngest political generation -- a group which takes democracy for granted.
The "transition-period generation" has, however, shared the youngest generation's experience of growing up in "post-scarcity" society. Thus, in terms of cultural tastes, this generation is more able to strike a responsive chord with the diverse younger generation. And in this sense the "transition-period generation" differs from the two previous generations, who matured during the "scarcity" of the 1960s.
This is perhaps a "bridge" generation. Because of the requirements of the democratization process and political transition, it has scurried to fill the gap between the older and younger generations. If, however, the "transition-period generation" satisfies itself with nimble positioning, and doesn't seek to foster communication and build leadership, it will eventually just fade away. In the eyes of its predecessors, this generation has always been seen as "little gofers," while the younger generation regards its members as "stick-in-the-muds."
The transition-period generation should indeed serve as a "bridge" generation. To put it bluntly, it must inherit the legacy of Taiwan's history and democratization and lead Taiwan to tackle the new political challenges brought by global trade and economics, the international framework built by the major powers and the widening gap between rich and poor.
In order to assume the role of "bridge," the transition-period generation must prepare to lead. Apart from running as legislators, this generation should also work hard to become leaders of public political opinion and offer its own reform agenda. Current efforts in this area are insufficient. Legislative candidates from the transition-period generation must have personal aspirations higher than just getting elected.
Jou Yi-cheng was formerly director of the DPP's Youth Department and is currently enrolled in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Translated by Scudder Smith
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