The rise of China’s power is not limited to its economy: It also involves its military, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) making significant advances in the past decade in technology, training and strategic planning.
These developments include a massive buildup of missiles across the Taiwan Strait designed to discourage any move toward de jure independence for Taiwan. They also include the expansion of the Pacific Fleet, complete with new operation bases, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines with first-strike capabilities.
All this raises concerns about Beijing’s true intentions as it tries to reassure the international community that it’s rise is peaceful. However, these concerns have been heightened by two recent developments.
One is China’s growing aggressiveness in pressing territorial disputes with neighbors such as Japan and India.
The other is emerging signs that the PLA may be increasing its influence over state affairs. When US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was denied a request to visit Beijing in June, he blamed elements within the PLA for blocking the invitation, which he said the civilian leadership had likely wanted to make.
The Gates snub also followed a three-minute “rant” in May by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei (關友飛) to 65 visiting US officials in Beijing, in which he said that US arms sales to Taiwan proved that Washington viewed China as an enemy.
US diplomats attempted to portray Guan’s remarks as at odds with the thinking of the rest of the Chinese government. However, some said his comments represented mainstream views within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What, then, lies behind the mixed signals from the Chinese military and civilian leadership?
One thing commentators agree on when discussing the often -mysterious relations between the CCP and one of the world’s largest military forces is that they exhibit none of the instability witnessed in Latin American and Africa in the last century as authoritarian regimes repeatedly fell victim to military coups. Indeed, the CCP and the PLA have shown a remarkable similarity of purpose over the years.
York Chen (陳文政), a former senior adviser at the National Security Council in Taipei, said the relationship between the CCP and the PLA was unique.
The two are so intermingled, Chen said, that senior military leaders are party representatives and party officials are members of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
In Latin America, though, the military banked on different political parties depending on their interests, he said.
Though there might be factional differences between the CCP and the PLA, they never escalated into open confrontation, Chen said.
Kou Chien-wen (寇健文), a professor of political science at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, said the relationship between the PLA and the CCP was similar to that between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Republic of China troops in the old days.
“The military is an interest group living on the party,” he said.
The PLA remains loyal to the CCP for three reasons, Kou said.
The first is the unique relationship developed when the revolution started. Political and military leaders were “dual elites,” he said, meaning they had the identity of both soldier and civilian.
While some early political leaders such as Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) had combat experience, soldiers were later appointed administrative positions. It took between 40 and 50 years to see the older generation retire, during which time the military developed the habit of submitting to the party, Kou said.
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