The resignation yesterday of Masaki Saito, Japan’s de facto ambassador to Taiwan, marks a new chapter in ailing ties between Tokyo and Taipei. The question is whether this represents a chance for the relationship to start afresh between the Taiwanese government and a new Japanese administration, or augurs a further deterioration.
Saito’s position became increasingly untenable earlier this year after he suggested that Taiwan’s international status is unresolved. The fact that this was true did not lessen the awkwardness of his injection into the debate on Taiwan’s sovereignty and identity. With a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government in power, and no shortage of KMT legislators ready to assail Japan over the smallest perceived slight, Saito learned the hard way that diplomacy and truth-telling are rarely soulmates.
The once-intimate cultural connection between Taiwan and its former colonial master is rapidly weakening, partly because of the gradual disappearance of the old generation who were raised to speak and write Japanese, and partly because few among the younger generation are learning Japanese. The latter has been accentuated at times by the hostility of governments under KMT control, most memorably the Taipei City Government under Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) between 1998 and 2006.
Politically, likewise, this is no longer an era in which independence activists turn to Japan for solace. The historical relationship between Taiwanese independence activism and Japan, which sheltered key figures such as Su Beng (史明) and Thomas Liao (廖文毅) over the decades, is history.
The KMT, however, is mindful of this history and bears a long grudge; for its part, the Democratic Progressive Party seems to be at a loss at how to make use of the Japan card, assuming that one still exists. Either way, the relationship between Taipei and Tokyo was always going to offer new challenges after the end of a productive period under presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), a Japanese speaker, and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
These challenges have been exacerbated by Ma’s vulnerability to controversies generated or inflamed by KMT hardliners. Under pressure at key moments, Ma tends to sit in the shadows, tolerating the hardliners’ poisonous language and infantile symbolic acts, emerging from the darkness only occasionally to quibble about ephemera with moderates.
When the fight is done, Ma will appear, all smiles, but by that time the sober observer knows where his sympathies lie — and that he has no appetite for direct confrontation. It is a bizarre mix of the personal and the aloof, and it helps to explain why Su Chi (蘇起), National Security Council secretary-general and Ma’s political minder, has had to clean up after his boss’ mess and mediate with the Japanese or deflect extremist sentiment as required, and why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so frequently appears nonplussed on relations with Japan.
Ma’s refusal to directly chide extreme elements in the KMT for their attacks on Japan has proved most disappointing, and has fueled the perception that while he may not condone the crude methods and language of certain Nipponphobic colleagues, at a deeper level he shares their distaste for Taiwan’s Japanese history and resentment at its geopolitical stake in Taiwan’s future. This, together with all of the petty bickering, has squashed the efforts that Ma put into improving his image in Japan — including a tour before becoming president.
While Saito’s removal will be regarded as a victory by Taiwan’s pro-China crowd, the months-long number that was done on him by the government (ostracization) and the KMT caucus (ugly personal attacks and demands for resignation) will likely not be forgotten in Tokyo. It will take careful, and sincere, behavior on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ma himself for Saito’s successor to feel any more welcome, and for ties to improve.
Taiwan should reject two flawed answers to the Eswatini controversy: that diplomatic allies no longer matter, or that they must be preserved at any cost. The sustainable answer is to maintain formal diplomatic relations while redesigning development relationships around transparency, local ownership and democratic accountability. President William Lai’s (賴清德) canceled trip to Eswatini has elicited two predictable reactions in Taiwan. One camp has argued that the episode proves Taiwan must double down on support for every remaining diplomatic ally, because Beijing is tightening the screws, and formal recognition is too scarce to risk. The other says the opposite: If maintaining
India’s semiconductor strategy is undergoing a quiet, but significant, recalibration. With the rollout of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0, New Delhi is signaling a shift away from ambition-driven leaps toward a more grounded, capability-led approach rooted in industrial realities and institutional learning. Rather than attempting to enter the most advanced nodes immediately, India has chosen to prioritize mature technologies in the 28-nanometer to 65-nanometer range. That would not be a retreat, but a strategic alignment with domestic capabilities, market demand and global supply chain gaps. The shift carries the imprimatur of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, indicating that the recalibration is
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), during an interview for the podcast Lanshuan Time (蘭萱時間) released on Monday, said that a US professor had said that she deserved to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following her meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Cheng’s “journey of peace” has garnered attention from overseas and from within Taiwan. The latest My Formosa poll, conducted last week after the Cheng-Xi meeting, shows that Cheng’s approval rating is 31.5 percent, up 7.6 percentage points compared with the month before. The same poll showed that 44.5 percent of respondents
China last week announced that it picked two Pakistani astronauts for its Tiangong space station mission, indicating the maturation of the two nations’ relationship from terrestrial infrastructure cooperation to extraterrestrial strategic domains. For Taiwan and India, the developments present an opportunity for democratic collaboration in space, particularly regarding dual-use technologies and the normative frameworks for outer space governance. Sino-Pakistani space cooperation dates back to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, with a cooperative agreement between the Pakistani Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, and the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry. Space cooperation was integrated into the China-Pakistan