Not only must the agricultural sector cope with production problems caused by natural disasters, such as typhoons and torrential rain, it must also worry about the risk of price drops caused by imports or imbalances in marketing and distribution channels.
These hazards make it difficult for farmers to maintain a stable income. Climate change and an increasingly deregulated economy will bring even greater risks to farmers and impact long-term investment and sustainable operations.
The best way to deal with agricultural risk is agricultural insurance. By shouldering part of its cost, farmers receive better protection against natural disasters than they do through disaster aid or price subsidies.
Since the government supports agricultural insurance, it can redirect traditional production subsidies toward insurance premiums and change the subsidy policy structure, so that the goal of supporting farmers’ income becomes clearer and can be more easily achieved. At the same time, agricultural insurance can be seen as a policy tool to modernize the sector and improve its production structure and operational approach.
The government has been testing agricultural insurance in recent years. In a two-pronged approach using both commercial and policy insurance, it has developed many insurance products that compensate for actual losses, income guarantees, weather parameters and so on. These types of insurance cover almost 20 kinds of agricultural and aquatic output, such as pears, pineapples, rice, bananas, mangoes, aquaculture, groupers and more. Farmers are beginning to purchase insurance, and it now covers about 9 percent of agricultural land.
Agricultural insurance is common in many other countries, and while Taiwan has been slow in adopting the practice, efforts with pilot cases are leading to improvements and results, and change is happening.
A few problems can be anticipated. For example, there is a lack of risk-sharing mechanisms, which would increase the financial risk to the government and farmers.
There is also no agricultural insurance fund, which would make it difficult to achieve financially stable insurance services, and the lack of development of different kinds of agricultural insurance would have an impact on insurance scope and diversity, while the scarcity of independent, complete data and damage surveys would increase the government burden further.
Finally, there is a lack of programs for training personnel and promoting the initiative. In addition, the relationship between agricultural insurance, existing production subsidies and disaster relief, as well as their respective responsibilities, must also be clarified.
These issues cannot be resolved at the current testing stage, mainly because there is no legal foundation.
The Cabinet submitted a draft agricultural insurance act to the legislature on July 22, but as the current legislative session is the last before January’s elections, legislators are busy campaigning and have given little attention to reviewing bills.
Reviews of bills that are not passed this session would not continue in the next, which is tantamount to returning it to the Cabinet, which would have to resubmit it. This would impact the long-term planning and operation of agricultural insurance.
The draft agricultural insurance act must be passed during the current legislative session in order to offer farmers real income guarantees and to bring the contributions by the incumbent legislators to a successful and historic end.
Yang Min-hsien is a professor at Feng Chia University and former president of the Rural Economics Society of Taiwan.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Having lived through former British prime minister Boris Johnson’s tumultuous and scandal-ridden administration, the last place I had expected to come face-to-face with “Mr Brexit” was in a hotel ballroom in Taipei. Should I have been so surprised? Over the past few years, Taiwan has unfortunately become the destination of choice for washed-up Western politicians to turn up long after their political careers have ended, making grandiose speeches in exchange for extraordinarily large paychecks far exceeding the annual salary of all but the wealthiest of Taiwan’s business tycoons. Taiwan’s pursuit of bygone politicians with little to no influence in their home
In a recent essay, “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” a former adviser to US President Donald Trump, Christian Whiton, accuses Taiwan of diplomatic incompetence — claiming Taipei failed to reach out to Trump, botched trade negotiations and mishandled its defense posture. Whiton’s narrative overlooks a fundamental truth: Taiwan was never in a position to “win” Trump’s favor in the first place. The playing field was asymmetrical from the outset, dominated by a transactional US president on one side and the looming threat of Chinese coercion on the other. From the outset of his second term, which began in January, Trump reaffirmed his
Despite calls to the contrary from their respective powerful neighbors, Taiwan and Somaliland continue to expand their relationship, endowing it with important new prospects. Fitting into this bigger picture is the historic Coast Guard Cooperation Agreement signed last month. The common goal is to move the already strong bilateral relationship toward operational cooperation, with significant and tangible mutual benefits to be observed. Essentially, the new agreement commits the parties to a course of conduct that is expressed in three fundamental activities: cooperation, intelligence sharing and technology transfer. This reflects the desire — shared by both nations — to achieve strategic results within
It is difficult not to agree with a few points stated by Christian Whiton in his article, “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” and yet the main idea is flawed. I am a Polish journalist who considers Taiwan her second home. I am conservative, and I might disagree with some social changes being promoted in Taiwan right now, especially the push for progressiveness backed by leftists from the West — we need to clean up our mess before blaming the Taiwanese. However, I would never think that those issues should dominate the West’s judgement of Taiwan’s geopolitical importance. The question is not whether