As an undercover operative for Somalia’s al-Shabaab militia, Nasteh spied on the insurgent group’s senior commanders to ensure their loyalty, and planned bombings and assassinations in government-controlled territory.
However, late last year, the government officials he once hunted became his handlers after the 26-year-old joined a slowly growing stream of defectors to the UN-backed Somalian administration.
A Western-backed push by Somalian officials to encourage al-Shabaab defections has lured commanders, the former head of intelligence and a major regional warlord, security officials and defectors said, offering a rare window into secretive efforts to undermine the al-Qaeda-linked insurgency from within.
Illustration: Mountain people
Senior defectors provide operational intelligence — such as how al-Shabaab makes armored vehicle bombs — and insights into its leadership.
Most importantly, those defectors sow suspicion among al-Shabaab’s leaders and encourage further defections by contacting former comrades, the government said.
The message: defectors are welcomed, not punished. One former commander relocated abroad with his family; another now holds a senior position in the security services.
Many have simply returned home, Somalian officials said.
Others, like Nasteh, are becoming intelligence assets after saying that they are disillusioned with the Muslim insurgency, accusing it of un-Islamic practices.
“They were killing clerics,” he said during an interview via video link from a safe house, naming three Muslim clerics he claimed were killed by the movement. “They were killing without consultation, it was just the guys at the top deciding.”
The amnesty has angered some Somalians, who say those who commit crimes should be punished.
Critics have said the government has failed to penetrate the insurgency’s core — the top three defectors had all fallen out of favor with al-Shabaab’s inner circle.
The stakes are high: Al-Shabaab, which wants to overthrow the Somalian government and impose Muslim law, has killed hundreds of civilians across east Africa and thousands of Somalians in a decade-long insurgency.
The full effect of the defections is unclear, although al-Shabaab was needled into denouncing one former top commander, Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansur, as an apostate after he publicly urged his clansmen to fight the insurgency.
Robow joined the government in August last year.
Government officials have said only negotiation can end Somalia’s 26-year-old civil war — especially given the ragged state of the military.
“Those who have been rehabilitated can be ambassadors back to their communities,” said Mogadishu Mayor Abdirahman Osman, a former Somalian minister of information. “We know military pressure helps, but it is not the endgame.”
Defections start with a telephone call — from an al-Shabaab fighter to his soldier cousin, or a former student to his teacher. Somalia’s clan relationships mean everyone knows someone on the other side.
“Their only request, usually, is not to go to jail. Most don’t need to be resettled or sent anywhere,” said one Somalian who helped arrange defections and asked not to be named.
The al-Shabaab member is passed to someone working with the government — often known to them personally — and told he would be welcomed if he rejects the insurgency, renounces violence and accepts the Somalian government. Clan elders act as guarantors.
The defector then plans his escape, which can take months. Al-Shabaab has tried to prevent defections by requiring senior members to get travel passes, two defectors said, forcing some to take circuitous routes through the bush.
“I didn’t tell my wife... I didn’t eat. I barely slept. I left all my books [and] threw away all my SIM cards that they knew,” said a former district-level head of education, describing his week-long escape by motorbike.
Deserting is irrevocable, because al-Shabaab jails or executes defectors, Somalian officials said.
So far, none of the 45 mid and high-level defectors have reneged on their agreement, they said, adding that 22 of those defected since January last year.
Al-Shabaab said the defections were exaggerated and more than 50 soldiers — including senior commanders — had surrendered to the insurgency in the past three months.
“The apostate Somalian regime often resorts to fabricated reports in a desperate attempt to manipulate public opinion and hide its mounting security failures in the capital, and the endemic corruption hampering all its institutions,” said Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, the insurgency’s military operations spokesman.
“As for the so-called deserters, most of them were already working as spies for the apostate regime. Once their cover was blown, they fled [al-Shabaab] territories for fear of being executed... Others were successfully apprehended before they could flee and were put to trial,” he said.
Osman said the claim that 50 soldiers had surrendered was absurd.
The defectors are varied. Some originate in the insurgency’s proselytizing wing; others are military commanders, or from logistics, medical, intelligence, tax collection and judiciary functions. Once a defector reaches government territory, he is to be debriefed by Somalian intelligence, which can take weeks.
Redacted debriefs shown to reporters included details of how al-Shabaab welds armor plates inside the cabs of vehicle bombs to prevent soldiers from stopping them by shooting the driver. The suicide bomber enters through the roof and tinted windows hide the metal plates.
Other details included a preference for renting houses with floorboards rather than cement floors so weapons could be hidden; the numbers and makeup of assassination teams; and widespread recriminations among fighters over a bombing on Oct. 14 last year that killed more than 500 civilians in Mogadishu.
Nasteh said his main work for al-Shabaab’s Amniyat secret police was spying on leaders to stop them from violating rules by skimming money or favoring their clan, and planning assassinations in government territory.
“You study a person — his home, his work, his associates, his routes. If he’s not accessible using a pistol, or a land mine, then you use a car bomb,” the slender, softly-spoken young man said.
The government’s push to help defectors in a more organized way began in 2014 after splits in the insurgents prompted top radical leader Hassan Dahir Aweys to defect. However, he remains under house arrest as he has not renounced violence.
Close behind was Zakariya Ahmed Ismail Hersi, a former intelligence chief who once had a US$3 million US bounty on his head, and Mohamed Said Atom, the militants’ former head in the northern region of Puntland.
Somalia has no law granting amnesty for defections, but there is a Cabinet-level policy that all regional states accept.
Many defectors are working alongside the government they once fought. Hersi is deputy head of intelligence at the Somalian National Intelligence and Security Agency. Atom was relocated to Qatar. Robow, his militia intact, is exhorting Somalians to fight al-Shabaab.
All defected after losing favor with al-Shabaab.
“A lot of these guys have got blood on their hands all the way up to the elbows, but they can rise to a very high level [in government]” a Western adviser said.
Harmonie Toros, senior lecturer at the University of Kent, said the government needs a political strategy.
“The strength is that it [defections] demonstrates to a certain degree that there are senior members of al-Shabaab who are not crazy radicals, that we can talk to,” she said. “The risk is if you pull all the moderates out, you only leave the ideologues.”
Academics and Somalians have said the government must show its strength, not just the other side’s weakness.
That is hard with a tiny budget, constant infighting and massive corruption, but there has been progress.
A Somalian involved in helping defectors said his country’s political instability was the biggest challenge, but at least they were helping destabilize the other side.
“The government and insurgency can both be heading downwards,” he said, making a dipping motion with his hands. “But people will still come across if they feel the insurgency is going down faster.”
Additional reporting by Feisal Omar
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