On Sept. 2, Elbridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development, wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal called “The US and Taiwan Must Change Course” that defends his position that the US and Taiwan are not doing enough to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from taking Taiwan. Colby is correct, of course: the US and Taiwan need to do a lot more or the PRC will invade Taiwan like Russia did against Ukraine.
The US and Taiwan have failed to prepare properly to deter war.
The blame must fall on politicians and policymakers in charge of both countries since 1999 when the PRC’s rise coincided with its massive investment in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). American administrations failed to follow its commitment in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and Taiwan has not implemented its own commitments to self-defense.
The US has not met its commitments in the TRA related to the PRC threat. Below are the relevant sections.
“SEC. 3. (a) … the US will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
“(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan...”
“(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the US arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”
For decades, the US has denied, slow-rolled, cancelled or prevented several weapons orders for a variety of reasons. Luckily, in the past other countries such as Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and UK filled in some gaps. Recent US military training initiatives in the 2023 and 2024 National Defense Authorization Acts have been beneficial.
Other relevant TRA sections are:
Section 2 (b): “It is the policy of the US to make clear that the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”
This paragraph means that if the PRC pursues war against Taiwan, the US will sever its relationship with Beijing. The US has never publicly threatened to use this hammer against the PRC.
Section 2(b) continues: “It is the policy of the US to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
The PRC has been conducting coercive activities since at least 2021. The PLA Air Force, Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia have conducted aggressive actions around Taiwan and its offshore islands, as well as against US Indo-Pacific allies.
The TRA and whatever “understandings” the US had with the PRC was a classic contingent agreement. More specifically, the US position was contingent on the PRC not doing anything coercive or aggressive, not to mention “violent.” Ironically, the legal doctrine rebus sic stantibus is appropriate here. The terms means “change in circumstances” — and therefore an earlier agreement made under circumstances as they were at the time of the agreement is no longer valid. Ironically, this was a legal principle the PRC wielded against the UK when the Hong Kong Treaties were under discussion in the 1970s and 1980s.
Taiwan needs to demonstrate a more serious engagement in their defense.
Successive Taiwan administrations have allowed the armed forces to wither and did it either intentionally or by negligence. For example, Taiwan’s budget has not risen significantly to meet the threat.
Taiwan has faced the threat of a PRC invasion since 1949. In 1979, Taiwan invested 7.58 percent of its GDP in defense, but by 1999 that had declined to below 3 percent.
After 1999, Taiwan’s defense budget consistently fell below 3 percent of GDP even though every government after 1999 claimed a target of 3 percent. Taiwan’s defense budget for 2024 is approximately 2.45 percent of its GDP and will maintain a similar rate in 2025 even though actual funding will rise 7.7 percent.
In terms of actual monetary investment in defense, in 1999, the PRC rapidly increases its total defense budget from US$20.5 billion or approximately double Taiwan’s defense budget (US$8.7 billion) in 1999 to in 2023, the PRC’s defense budget (US$296 billion) is eighteen times Taiwan’s defense budget (US$16.6 billion) in 2023. In other words, in 24 years Taiwan doubles its defense budget while the PRC increases their defense budget by fifteen times.
Taiwan should look at the example of Israel of a country surrounded by hostile rich neighbors. Israel has continuously invested in its defense from a high of 30.46% of its GDP in 1975 and a low of 4.5 percent in 2022. In 2023, Israeli GDP defense spending rose to 5.3 percent and will rise to 6.6 percent in 2024 due to the multi-front war.
Taiwan and the US have failed each other. We are deep in the danger zone of the “Decade of Concern” — that period of increased likelihood of a PRC invasion of Taiwan from 2020 to 2030. Since 2021, I have been making the same clarion call that Elbridge Colby has made. However, the US and Taiwan are reticent about pushing the emergency button. With a lot of creative thinking by both governments, many actions can be taken to frustrate the CCP’s planned invasion of Taiwan.
Below are some clear recommendations for each government that should immediately be implemented until a balance of power is restored by Taiwan and the US in accordance with the TRA. Taiwan and the US should determine a cost sharing agreement for these actions.
The US should greatly increase military assets near or in Taiwan. When the DOD recently directed the USS Abraham Lincoln to head to the Middle East to help deter Iran from attacking Israel, the US should have deployed several fighter squadrons to forward bases in Japan and the Philippines to compensate for up to 90 aircraft that a US Navy aircraft carrier can sustain.
It should also conduct combined US-ROC exercises with all allied nations in the region near or in Taiwan. For example, conduct USAF bomber and USAF/USMC/USN fighter forward basing combined and joint exercises.
It should also develop and conduct counter “grey zone” actions and counter PLA/CCP aggression by conducting reciprocal actions such as crossing the mid-line (Davis Line) with US military fighter jets and include ROC Air Force fighters as appropriate.
It would also be advisable to permanently station US Navy and Coast Guard (USCG) assets in international waters off the coast of Taiwan such as AEGIS capable ships to help balance the PLA missile threat, and convert retiring US Navy warships to USCG ships to match CCG ships.
Further, it should deploy THAAD to Taiwan or at least to the Diaoyutais (釣魚台, known in Japan as the Senkakus) and to the northern Philippines islands to provide enhanced missile defense coverage of Taiwan.
The US should assist Taiwan to build submarine bases on the east side of the island to provide more protection for their new submarines and to service allied submarines.
If warranted, it should deploy nuclear weapons in or near Guam, Taiwan, and other locations. The several times the PRC threatened to invade Taiwan in the 1950s, this worked.
Taiwan should budget a minimum of 5 percent of its GDP every year to prepare the Taiwanese population for war by using a whole of society resilience and resistance approach. War is not just the province of the military. Taiwan’s large foreign reserves (almost US$580 billion as of August 2024 and #5 in the world) could help fund this endeavor.
It should also conduct combat training for the 1.8 million reservists for 30-60 days per year. The current program of a two-week annual training period for a few reservists is inadequate. It could purchase more land to build sites to conduct training for the reservists and greatly increase the number of US and other allies’ military personnel training the ROC military, much like NATO did for the Ukrainian military from 2017 until today.
Taiwan should teach, train, and exercise the population to be resilient during war and how to resist the PLA. For example, have the government teach and adapt the “Resistance Operating Concept” with Taiwanese democratic characteristics to the entire adult population of Taiwan and begin teaching it in high school. Community resilience preparation (training, exercises, weapons familiarization, communication equipment, food, water, health/medicine, and sheltering) will prevent Taiwan from collapsing during a PLA attack.
Taiwan should produce and purchase massive numbers of anti-ship (including sea mines), anti-missile, anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-drone weapon systems and secure depots and storage sites to be able to sustain themselves during a potential blockade and/or invasion.
Finally, it should request US military equipment that is being decommissioned or being phased out by the US and other countries to Taiwan such as the Japanese E-2Cs (being replaced by E-2Ds) or US Navy ships to be scrapped. This recommendation would apply to other countries such as the Philippines that also need weapon systems such as submarines (Japan could transfer its older submarines), E-2C aircraft, and other weapon systems.
Let us do the right thing — make Taiwan safe from CCP aggression.
The Taiwanese enjoy their freedom, but the strategic failure to not aggressively deter the CCP will only lead to the nightmare of what Russia is doing to Ukraine.
Let us restore deterrence. Abraham Lincoln provides us the guidance needed: “The best way to predict your future is to create it.”
Guermantes Lailari is a retired US Air Force Foreign Area officer specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, missile defense, and strategy. He holds advanced degrees in international relations and strategic intelligence. He was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow in 2022, a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University and National Defense University in 2023, and is a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in 2024.
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