China’s actions toward two of this nation’s diplomatic allies, the Vatican and Palau, this week sparked concern, amid reports that Beijing is using a tactic it has tried against Taiwan: restricting or barring tour groups from visiting.
Such a move is clearly aimed at influencing the two states to shift diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, but using a stick rather than a carrot is a counterintuitive way to make friends.
Chinese tourist visits to the Vatican and Palau have soared over the past few years, even though neither is on the China National Tourism Administration’s list of places approved for Chinese tour groups, but the campaign is likely to affect the Pacific Ocean nation more, given that its economy is far more reliant on tourism than the Holy See.
Analysts have said that the directive against Palau also comes amid heightened US-China tensions over the South China Sea and the Pentagon’s efforts to reinforce its defense relationship with Palau and secure access to airfields in the western Pacific Ocean.
Such actions are part and parcel of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) strident foreign policy.
Beijing, which has long criticized the US, UK, EU and others for “interfering” in other nations’ domestic issues, has been doing the same thing for a long time — most recently with regard to Cambodia, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and even the US.
On Monday, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) told his Cambodian counterpart, Prak Sohhon, that Beijing is backing Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s efforts to eliminate rivals ahead of next year’s general elections, although he did not couch it in those terms.
He was quoted as saying that China supported Cambodia’s “efforts to protect political stability” — just days after the last serious opposition force in Cambodia was judicially dissolved
Of course, Beijing’s money and support have kept the regime in power for three decades.
On Thursday, a top Chinese general told the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces that Beijing wanted closer ties between their militaries to “help protect regional peace and security,” especially along the border between the two nations.
His visitor in turn thanked China for its support in helping Myanmar ensure domestic stability.
The generals’ meeting in Beijing came just days after China announced a three-stage plan to solve the Rohingya crisis, which is costing Myanmar diplomatic support amid worldwide criticism of its ethnic cleansing campaign in Rakhine State.
Zimbabwe’s “coup in everything but name” appears to have been green-lit by Beijing, which has invested heavily in the nation, helping to prop up former Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s regime.
Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander General Constantino Chiwenga and then-ousted Zimbabwean vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa flew to Beijing to meet with government officials just days before the military placed Mugabe under house arrest last week.
The men have old ties to China, having studied at the Nanjing Military School, and have been involved in many deals with Chinese investors and government bodies.
Chinese Ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai (崔天凱) in August sent a letter to senior US lawmakers that warned of “severe consequences” if legislation was passed to strengthen US-Taiwan ties, which was labeled inappropriate and counterproductive.
Counterproductive and counterintuitive could be used to describe many of Xi’s actions.
China has long used a divide and conquer strategy to counter any effort by other nations to collectively oppose its ambitions, whether by supporting Taiwan, halting its expansion in the South China Sea or supporting Chinese striving to build a more civil society.
It is time to stop thinking of China’s actions in a piecemeal fashion — Bejing certainly does not.
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