Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) sent congratulatory telegrams to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) at the opening and closing of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress, and Xi replied upon the reconfirmation of his leadership. It goes without saying that the two parties repeatedly mentioned the “1992 consensus.”
However, unlike on previous occasions, Xi sent his reply as Chinese president to Wu directly, and there is speculation that this in itself entailed a special message. We can perhaps make some interpretations of the direction of China’s Taiwan policy through recent developments in cross-strait and international affairs.
First, the CCP’s modus operandi to date has been to insist upon its principles and pressuring adversaries to alter theirs. Despite President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) offers of goodwill and sincerity to Beijing, Xi might not be interested in resuming cross-strait negotiations or taking the Tsai administration as a counterpart until she agrees to accept the “1992 consensus,” which claims that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to “one China” under the “one China” principle.
China has strength on its side. If Taiwan’s international space continues to shrink, Xi has no reason to reinstate cross-strait relations. Tsai’s call for a new model of interaction is not in line with the vision of the 19th CCP National Congress.
Second, Beijing will continue to support the KMT and suppress the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It will try to stabilize Wu’s leadership so the KMT will not collapse and the pan-blue camp will not descend into chaos.
Wu is largely following the course set by former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). Born in Taiwan, Wu has a lot of political experience and can be extremely flexible. Compared with other prominent KMT members or fundamentalists, he has a greater influence in central and southern Taiwan, and is more likely to be accepted by Taiwanese voters.
Beijing might well feel more comfortable with former KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), the New Party and the Chinese Unity Promotion Party, but it might not be able to accomplish anything with them.
Third, as democracy becomes a norm in Taiwan, the political pendulum will swing back and forth. Despite the DPP’s present domination of the government, it has failed to give full play of its role, and Tsai’s honeymoon is over.
If Beijing can help the KMT to retain its momentum, it would not be impossible that the party could regain power by capitalizing on the DPP’s flaws, just as it did in 2008.
Beijing, then, might choose to deny the Tsai administration the political oxygen of improved cross-strait relations, and might block the public sector while luring the civil sector as part of its united front efforts.
Fourth, from its experience with Ma, Beijing has learned that, despite growing skepticism from Taiwanese over the KMT’s decision to work closely with China, collaboration between the two parties is welcomed by the international community, especially the US.
It is worth remembering that the US generally has had no problems with Ma’s policy of “maintaining the ‘status quo’” across the Taiwan Strait. There is, therefore, no need for Beijing to work out a new model of cross-strait relations with the Tsai administration, at least not before next year’s local elections.
The DPP had an unprecedented number of its candidates elected in the 2014 elections. The chance of it breaking that record next year is slim. If the elections prove disappointing for the pan-green camp, Tsai will likely lose legitimacy and influence.
In addition, Beijing is waiting to see how the 2020 presidential election turns out — specifically whether the DPP will lose power, and which faction within the next ruling party would gain power — as anything can happen.
Fifth, despite Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s electoral success in last month’s elections, and the prospect of him continuing his foreign policy into the foreseeable future, US President Donald Trump remains an unpredictable element.
The US government in the Trump era seems much less aware of the complications of the Taiwan issue. Concerns have been raised about Trump’s business instincts and his family’s business interests in China, which could mean Taiwan is at risk of being as a bargaining chip.
Since Trump took office, “American values” have been prioritized over universal values, while the death of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波) and China’s detention of Taiwanese human rights advocate Lee Ming-che (李明哲) have sparked little reaction from the international community.
For Xi, this is a great chance to expand China’s international influence and to further corner Taiwan. As Beijing works on promoting its “One Belt, One Road” and “one generation and one stratum” initiatives, Taiwan is facing threats from without and within, which could become the new normal.
Tsai on Saturday left for a trip to the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands. Although the trip is not entirely pointless, it is of limited help in solving the nation’s diplomatic plight, which is not really Taiwan’s fault.
During his eight years as president, Ma had avoided any diplomatic measures that could upset China. While Tsai has opted for a more aggressive diplomatic approach, Ma-era policies have made this less effective than it should be.
Taiwan needs more conviction in becoming an independent nation. It also needs to strengthen its military and develop more shared interests with the international community. All these will prepare Taiwan for the change it wants when the time eventually comes.
Speaking of the cross-strait standoff, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (李顯龍) has said that the best people across the Strait can hope is that “things do not get worse,” adding that “things can go wrong.”
The Chinese are building up their armed forces, including aircraft carriers, in case things one day go wrong, he said, adding that he hoped “that day can be put off.”
The key for the Tsai administration is to create more time and space for Taiwan to work out a solution while in the standoff.
Taiwanese should also ask themselves whether they are willing to stick to the goal of independence despite continued attempts by China to belittle Taiwan and to harm its economy.
Beijing is likely to continue its carrot and stick approach. If it manages to help the KMT get back in power, and the two develop closer ties, would there be any room left for Taiwanese to choose a different future other than unification?
Xi’s unification strategies are not only a challenge for Tsai, but also a test for every Taiwanese.
Translated by Eddy Chang and Tu Yu-an
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