China’s top officials are to gather in Beijing on Wednesday for the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a twice-a-decade political meeting that is likely to see President Xi Jinping (習近平) further bolster his position as one of the most powerful leaders in modern Chinese history.
What is the party congress?
On the face of it, the congress is a high-profile summit of the CCP’s great and good. The official task of the 2,287 carefully screened delegates selected to attend this year’s event is to ponder and approve new policies and elect the people who are to lead China for the next five years.
Illustration: Yusha
In reality, however, experts have said this year’s congress — the 19th since the party’s foundation in Shanghai in 1921 — is all about one man: Xi.
“The most significant thing ... is that it is most likely simply to confirm Xi Jinping’s preeminence — almost like a coronation,” said Elizabeth Economy, the director for Asia studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.
Since taking power at the last such gathering, in November 2012, Xi has established himself as one of China’s most dominant leaders since Mao Zedong (毛澤東); a 64-year-old strongman who party officials hail as their “core.”
Xi is expected to use this congress, which marks the start of his second and supposedly last five-year term, to further fortify his position by stacking the party’s upper echelons with loyalists. Five of the seven spots on China’s top ruling council, the Politburo Standing Committee, are theoretically up for grabs, as are 11 of the wider politburo’s 25 seats and roughly half of the spots on the 205-member Central Committee.
The question then is what Xi will do with that power.
Most expect a continuation of his hardline domestic policies and assertive international posture, which has seen Beijing aggressively push territorial claims in the South China Sea and position itself as a champion of globalization. An optimistic few continue to hope that, having strengthened his political position, Xi might reveal himself as a political or economic reformer.
What might this year’s congress tell us about China?
As the curtain falls on Xi’s first term, his political supremacy is beyond doubt. Asked to name China’s five most powerful people this week, Jeff Wasserstrom, a China expert at the University of California, told CNN: “Xi, Xi, Xi, Xi, and Xi.”
However, this week’s highly scripted event will offer important clues as to just how much power Xi has managed to amass, with many experts predicting that he will upend two decades of precedent in two highly significant ways.
First, Xi might decline to promote a successor, indicating that he intends to remain in the top party post for a third, or perhaps even fourth term. According to party norms, China’s top two leaders are usually publicly anointed at a congress five years before they take power. Xi emerged as China’s presumed future leader at the 17th National Congress, in 2007, but so far no likely successor has appeared; one man seen as a possible successor was recently toppled in a politically charged corruption investigation.
Columbia University professor of political science Andrew Nathan said there is a growing consensus that Xi will seek to stay in power beyond the end of his second term, in 2022: “The way he is tightening up on everything and making a cult of personality, it feels like he is going to be in it for the long run.”
Second, some believe Xi will use the congress to write a new Xi Jinping-related body of ideology — perhaps called Xi Jinping Thought or Theory — into the party constitution. That would put Xi in nearly the same political league as the revolutionary leader, Mao, and would be another sign that he is intent on extending his rule beyond the customary decade.
“Instead of being first among equals, Xi would simply be first,” Economy said.
What happens during the congress?
As with so much about elite Chinese politics, the precise calendar for the congress remains a mystery. What is known is that Xi will start proceedings during a pomp-filled ceremony on Wednesday at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, the cavernous Mao-era nerve center of CCP rule, in Tiananmen Square.
Xi will use his opening address to outline the party’s priorities for the next five years. Around one week later, probably on Oct. 25, he will wrap up the conference with a brief closing speech. Xi will also introduce his new leadership line-up to China and the world.
Observers will be closely monitoring the fate of Wang Qishan (王岐山), the country’s anti-corruption tsar and Xi’s right hand. Wang’s age — he is 69 — means that according to CCP norms, he should step down. However, some predict Xi will bend that informal age limit and allow Wang to continue spearheading the fight against corruption, a crusade Xi has used to eliminate a number of key rivals.
Others will be looking to see if one of China’s few senior female politicians manages to secure a spot on the country’s top ruling council for the first time.
How does the congress affect everyday life?
For Beijing’s 21 million smog-choked residents, the congress is likely to prove a breath of fresh air: Steel mills and factories around the city have been ordered to cut their output to ensure that the congress is held under spectacular blue skies.
For CCP critics, the congress is a less welcome occasion.
Security agents, already engaged in one of the most severe crackdowns in decades, have ordered a number of outspoken dissidents to leave the capital for the duration of the summit. A nationwide police offensive is reportedly underway to silence potential troublemakers right across the country. Even moderate activists have been ordered not to give interviews to foreign journalists.
“We can talk afterwards,” one lawyer told reporters this week after abruptly cancelling a meeting in Beijing.
Security in the already heavily policed Chinese capital has also been dramatically stepped up, with authorities reportedly cancelling all police leave and bringing in thousands of officers from across the country.
Chinese censors will also be working overtime to ensure newspapers and social media networks push nothing but the party line. One leaked censorship directive instructed all media outlets to publish nothing but stories from China’s official Xinhua news agency.
“Do not spread or give credence to rumors,” it added.
Additional reporting by Wang Zhen
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