Social movement leaders have been complaining lately that they are unable to influence the government.
This is not the way the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) used to be when its politicians would adopt the views of social movements.
DPP politicians nowadays express their respect for social movements, but do not adopt their views.
One reason for this is that there are too many experts and too many different opinions in the pan-green camp, so politicians do not know which course to take.
There is also another, more important factor, which is the changing nature of the pan-green camp, which is completely different from what it used to be.
During the dangwai, (黨外, “outside the party”) period and the early days of the DPP, the pan-green camp’s political base was very small, and was centered around political ideology. Supporters were idealists who did not act out of self-interest, and the politicians were respectful of their supporters and adopted their views.
In contrast, the pan-blue camp’s political base was built on networks, and its supporters expected things in return from the politicians they supported.
At the time, the pan-green camp described the pan-blue camp as an alliance of interests. In addition to material goods, these so-called interests also included non-material benefits, such as privileges, face and so on.
As the DPP has grown stronger, the number of supporters has multiplied many times over, most of them coming from the pan-blue camp.
These former pan-blue campers were not able to suddenly give up their active pursuit of interests and start pursuing ideals.
These new supporters also contributed to the transformation of the pan-green camp from its members’ pursuit of ideals to their pursuit of interests, and this has changed their relationship with DPP politicians.
In the early days, DPP politicians respected their supporters, but now it has become a matter of supporters currying favor.
As most supporters pursue special interests, the pan-green camp has become more similar to the pan-blue camp, but the latter is open about its pursuit of interests, while the former not only does not dare be open about it, but continues to talk about virtue and morality while eying its special interests, which are not necessarily material.
This has led to a culture of currying favor with politicians, and anyone who wins an election immediately becomes part of the elite.
In the DPP’s early days, supporters publicly praised democratic fighters, but nowadays they flatter those in power.
In the pan-green camp, many people are obsessed with getting on the right side of the party elite and even with their assistants.
At a recent pan-green camp reception, an ironic scene occurred when democratic activists — who were often carried away by police during the Martial Law era — were placed on the fringes of the reception, while the elites’ assistants — who have contributed nothing to the nation — were seated at the main table.
Someone joked that if President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) had not been able make it to the reception, anyone who brought her dog there would have been seated at the main table. It is not the politicians that have changed, it is the pan-green camp as a whole.
Chen Mao-hsiung is a retired National Sun Yat-sen University professor and chairman of the Society for the Promotion of Taiwanese Security.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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