At the beginning of a new era, most normal countries have to formulate a new vision for the future. In this “country” called Taiwan, not only is a new national vision needed, but a vision for a new nation — and it is not about fireworks and raising flags.
Last year, President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration replaced the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) as the governing party, while also gaining a majority in the legislature for the first time; the public has high expectations.
The Tsai administration faces considerable challenges. Success or failure will depend on whether Taiwan is able to shake off the shackles of history and carve out a new and dignified future for itself.
Tsai is a cautious operator who seeks to bolster Taiwan’s international standing by maintaining the “status quo” while striking a balance in the tug-of-war between the US and China. Enterprising Taiwanese businesses know that “maintaining the status quo” means falling behind. A business that simply aims to maintain its current position will stagnate — let alone an entire country.
Maintaining the “status quo” is simultaneously a protective amulet and a curse for Taiwan. Taiwan does not belong to China, therefore maintaining the “status quo” runs counter to Beijing’s wishes since, by default, it implies the continuation of Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. The significance and value of maintaining this freedom is a no-brainer for Taiwanese, but the only way the roots of democracy and liberty can be strengthened is for Taiwan to become a bona fide, normal country.
For Taiwan to be recognized as a normal country, there are objective conditions that must be met and these are centered around legal realities. It is not a question of emotion or logic. The subjective judgement that Taiwan is a good country is irrelevant. There exists a blind spot in cultural discourse in Taiwan, which reflects the level of thinking and self-awareness of Taiwanese toward their island as a nation.
The crux of the problem still lies in the different ways Taiwanese choose to identify themselves. In 1949, Chinese exiles from the remnants of the Republic of China (ROC) fled to Taiwan. Those fellow travelers, who still identified with the ROC — in particular many KMT members — ignored the fact that the nation Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) used to lead no longer existed and clung on to the idea of the “Republic of China on Taiwan.”
Although the majority of Taiwanese — even those who came to Taiwan after 1949 — recognized that Taiwan is not part of China, the confusing ROC national identity continued to exist. It was therefore by no means inevitable that the election of Taiwan’s first directly elected president, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), in 1996 would establish a new national sovereign identity. The conservative and improvised nature of Taiwan’s democratization process lacked structure and impetus, which meant that it was impossible to build a national civic consciousness that was essential to the foundation of a new country.
Taiwan has yet to cast off its old self and, through civic consciousness, establish a new national identity. It is not simply a question of economics, but also of culture: There must be a spiritual as well material substance to Taiwan’s new identity.
Tsai needs to infuse her administration with a reformist zeal to build a new Taiwan. Her administration needs to think not just in terms of social transformation, but also of rebuilding the country. Having been through the partial reform of the Lee era and the setbacks of former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) reformist administration, Tsai’s government has been given the momentous task of finishing the job.
Lee Min-yung is a poet.
Translated by Edward Jones
Taiwan should reject two flawed answers to the Eswatini controversy: that diplomatic allies no longer matter, or that they must be preserved at any cost. The sustainable answer is to maintain formal diplomatic relations while redesigning development relationships around transparency, local ownership and democratic accountability. President William Lai’s (賴清德) canceled trip to Eswatini has elicited two predictable reactions in Taiwan. One camp has argued that the episode proves Taiwan must double down on support for every remaining diplomatic ally, because Beijing is tightening the screws, and formal recognition is too scarce to risk. The other says the opposite: If maintaining
India’s semiconductor strategy is undergoing a quiet, but significant, recalibration. With the rollout of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0, New Delhi is signaling a shift away from ambition-driven leaps toward a more grounded, capability-led approach rooted in industrial realities and institutional learning. Rather than attempting to enter the most advanced nodes immediately, India has chosen to prioritize mature technologies in the 28-nanometer to 65-nanometer range. That would not be a retreat, but a strategic alignment with domestic capabilities, market demand and global supply chain gaps. The shift carries the imprimatur of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, indicating that the recalibration is
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), during an interview for the podcast Lanshuan Time (蘭萱時間) released on Monday, said that a US professor had said that she deserved to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following her meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Cheng’s “journey of peace” has garnered attention from overseas and from within Taiwan. The latest My Formosa poll, conducted last week after the Cheng-Xi meeting, shows that Cheng’s approval rating is 31.5 percent, up 7.6 percentage points compared with the month before. The same poll showed that 44.5 percent of respondents
China last week announced that it picked two Pakistani astronauts for its Tiangong space station mission, indicating the maturation of the two nations’ relationship from terrestrial infrastructure cooperation to extraterrestrial strategic domains. For Taiwan and India, the developments present an opportunity for democratic collaboration in space, particularly regarding dual-use technologies and the normative frameworks for outer space governance. Sino-Pakistani space cooperation dates back to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, with a cooperative agreement between the Pakistani Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, and the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry. Space cooperation was integrated into the China-Pakistan