Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) rarely wins applause, but she has got some for her recent meeting with Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平).
Her greatest accolade has come from former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) chairman Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良), who said Hung’s trip to Beijing and her agreement with Xi to oppose Taiwanese independence and promote unification assures China’s rulers that they have allies in Taiwan, so that they will not give up hope.
For China, Hsu’s words are close to its heart. The China Review News Agency said that he had “broken the code of cross-strait relations.”
What that really means is that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has saved face and is willing to go on waiting patiently.
However, Hung and the KMT have far deeper, unspoken troubles.
What Hsu said is really the so-called “door god theory” — meaning that Hung and the KMT are acting as “door gods,” exchanging friendly nods with the CCP.
Having set itself up as Taiwan’s No. 1 comprador, the KMT now has the second job of “door god.”
It may not be a glorious role to play, but at least it gives the out-of-power party some kind of residual value.
The “door god theory” is by no means new. When former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) was in office, the KMT, which still saw itself as the legitimate ruler of China, kept pressing him to make declarations about “Chinese unification.” It was trying to kill three birds with one stone — tying Lee down, brainwashing people in Taiwan and setting China’s mind at rest.
However, no matter how many times Lee was forced to talk about “Chinese unification,” nobody in China believed him and no one in Taiwan did either.
It was not because of Lee’s talk of “Chinese unification” that Beijing was “willing to wait.”
China’s decisions about whether or not to play rough had more to do with what it was actually capable of doing, as well as international factors and Taiwan’s own will and muscle power.
Taiwanese are often willing to take a kind view of KMT politicians.
For instance, they may think that if the KMT has no chance to be in power, it will not go over to the Chinese side, or that even if it is in power, it will not sell out Taiwan.
However, by its actions the KMT has proven both these notions wrong.
Former vice president and KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) has suffered numerous political defeats, including his failed presidential bids in 2000 and 2004, and in his despair he did indeed go over to China.
Even after former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) won the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, restoring the KMT’s party-state rule, Lien still went to Beijing to review military parades.
Ma then moved closer to China than any KMT leader in Taiwan had ever down before, finally meeting Xi in Singapore in November last year.
Thankfully, he only shook hands with Xi and did not actually kneel at his feet.
However, having taken over leadership of the KMT, Hung lost no time in kowtowing to Xi, while big groups of “loyal party members” have gone to Beijing to receive instructions from China’s paramount leader.
If China needs Hung and the KMT as “door gods” in Taiwan, then Taiwanese voters should nail them to the temple door where “door gods” belong. They should never be voted back onto the political altar.
James Wang is a media commentator.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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