Judicial Yuan president nominee Hsu Tzong-li (許宗力) on Oct. 13 said that cross-strait relations are “special state-to-state relations” akin to the relationship between West and East Germany. His comment, which echoed then-president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) description of cross-strait relations in 1999, was a major sign that, despite three transitions of presidential power over the past 20 years, there has been no real breakthrough regarding Taiwan’s national status.
Like Lee, Hsu understands Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC). His view on Taiwan’s national status, based on the law, if not politics, is understandable when compared with that of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). However, West and East Germany were originally one country that was torn apart after World War II, a situation more similar to that of North and South Korea. And while the East German constitution was separatist and treated itself as the continuation of Germany, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany — West Germany’s constitution — left room for future unification of the two sides, which both had seats in the UN. Likewise, North and South Korea are both members of the UN, and they both view themselves as a split nation without completely severing their ties from each other.
On the other hand, the problem with the ROC on Taiwan is entirely different: From the time it was founded in China in 1911 until 1949, what was the relationship between the ROC and Taiwan? How can that relationship be explained and how are problems that arise from this issue to be handled?
If the ROC government in exile had tried to do more than just colonize Taiwan in 1949, or if it had managed to keep its membership in the UN in 1971 — instead of refusing any solution on the grounds that “gentlemen cannot stand together with thieves,” leaving Taiwan in a vulnerable situation — perhaps Taiwanese would find meaning in the ROC’s “status quo.” If that had been the case, problems that have persisted since the Chinese Civil War probably would have long ago also been solved — and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC might as well have agreed to build embassies and exchange ambassadors.
As things stand, the PRC still refuses to recognize the ROC on Taiwan as a country, and it continues to try to annex it to complete its revolution. While the KMT’s leaders play along, how can they not see that the PRC only wants to manipulate them? Apparently, many of them would rather fawn on Beijing than honor Taiwan’s democratic lifestyle.
The “special state-to-state relations” is in reality a humble and pragmatic political strategy Taiwanese have used to run the “ROC.” While they might not have been entirely happy with it, at least it provided a foundation for future modifications, which can take place gradually.
However, the top echelons of the KMT have never liked the idea. Believing that the ROC is already in the PRC’s pocket, they feel threatened by the political implications of the “special state-to-state relations” possibly allowing Taiwan to be a country that is not China — in other words, that is not the PRC. These people — unable to break free from their colonial mindset, obsessed with the idea of “one China” and caring little about “each side [of the Taiwan Strait] having its own interpretation” — have been bashing Lee ever since he was a KMT member. Now that the Democratic Progressive Party is running the nation, the increasingly desperate KMT certainly has no good things to say about it.
Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) ruled Taiwan as if it was a Chinese colony. His successor, former president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), tried to show goodwill by saying that he considered himself Taiwanese, but the best gift he gave Taiwan was Lee.
There have been many interpretations of the “special state-to-state relations” dictum and its legal implications for the PRC and Taiwan, but what about the many paradoxes in the relations between Taiwan and the ROC that remain unexamined today?
Lee Min-yung is a poet.
Translated by Tu Yu-an
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