When the World Health Assembly (WHA) sent an invitation to Taiwan to join this year’s meeting in Geneva, it stipulated one condition: that attendance be in line with the “one China” principle. This, for a mere five days of meetings.
In April 2005, then-Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰), without the approval of then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), went to China to meet then-general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) to formulate the Lien-Hu communique and discuss issues such as Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. The upshot of these talks was that Taiwan would be able to participate as long as it adhered to the so-called “1992 consensus” and the “one China” principle, and participated under the name “Taiwan, province of China.”
One month later China signed a memorandum of understating (MOU) with the WHO.
In May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office, and the Lien-Hu communique was immediately implemented. In May 2009, Taiwan implicitly acknowledged and accepted the MOU, in order to attend the five-day WHA meeting under the name “Taiwan, province of China.” Thus, the sovereignty and rights of the entire nation — in a process decided upon in private negotiations between the KMT and the CCP, and not approved by the general public — were further swallowed up by Beijing.
The Lien-Hu communique gave us what Ma now calls the “WHA model”; it is the outcome of a major loss of sovereignty brought about by negotiations carried out behind closed doors. This is what Ma terms flexible diplomacy — a process from Lien to Ma that has seen Taiwanese resorting to bowing their heads and kowtowing, actions that give little or no thought to the nation’s dignity, and for what? Five days’ participation in an international conference. Are we really to bear the repercussions of the actions of these two individuals?
How many UN member states can compete with Taiwan in the fields of medical research, science and technology, medical education and healthcare? The WHO is trying to accommodate China in all things, but when it comes to medical standards, doctors produced by China’s education system are not always seen as being of the highest caliber: In fact, many are seen as quacks. China likes to think of itself as a major power, but to hold the health rights of Taiwanese hostage to politics in this way would be seen by people from civilized nations as shameful.
Let us look at this from another perspective. The WHO learned much from Taiwan’s experience of dealing with the SARS crisis in 2003. The Centers for Disease Control in the US and Taiwan have worked together on sharing medical information for many years. There has also been substantial cooperation on environmental health between the US, the EU, Taiwan and Japan for a long time. All of this makes one wonder whether Taiwan needs the WHO, or whether it is the WHO that needs Taiwan.
What Taiwanese need is respectful participation. Taiwan’s healthcare achievements can make a considerable contribution to the UN, to the world and to humankind. For many years now it has sent countless outstanding healthcare professionals to third world nations, including Africa, to help out poor nations and to make the world a better place.
What the WHO needs is Taiwan; what it does not need is to do Beijing’s bidding and exert pressure on Taiwan. If we will not be treated with respect when we go, why go at all?
Winston Dang is a former head of the Environmental Protection Administration and chair professor at the Taipei Medical University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS