Time heals all wounds
Justice for victims, their families and society is changing our system so that those of us who commit crimes are reformed and reintegrated back into society as safe members. The death penalty does not prevent crime.
Canada and Europe have no death penalty, and they have less crime than the US where there is the death penalty.
We are rightfully outraged at the horrible murder of “Little Lightbulb” (小燈泡). The crime was extremely violent, and the victim extremely innocent. We are all violated and we all innately want to protect children. And in this instance, we failed to do so.
However, killing her killer is not the answer. Killing him is revenge, not justice.
There will always be murderers among us, even in a nation as safe as Taiwan. And capital punishment will always be easy when someone we love is taken from us.
This terrible crime has wounded us. And punishing the man who wounded us will not heal the hole in our collective heart. We will only heal when we forgive him. And even after forgiving him, we will not heal immediately.
Wounds heal on their own time. And sometimes they leave scars. And those scars remind us of our pain and our healing.
Andres Chang
Taipei
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