Despite the insistence of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lu Kang (陸慷) that the restoration of diplomatic ties between China and the Gambia — a former ally of Taiwan that unilaterally broke off ties in 2003 — “targets no one,” it is obvious that the move was designed to give Taiwan a poke in the eye.
Beijing is signaling that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is no longer useful to it; but also trying to ramp up the pressure on president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
While DPP lawmakers said that the incident demonstrated the failure of Ma’s policy of “flexible diplomacy” — the basis of his so-called “diplomatic truce” with China — Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers have interpreted it as China’s way of attempting to intimidate Tsai.
If Tsai neglects to mention the so-called “1992 consensus” in her May 20 inauguration speech, then Beijing will woo Taiwan’s diplomatic allies away en masse, KMT lawmakers said.
During a hearing of the legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, National Security Bureau Director-General Yang Kuo-chiang (楊國強) hypothesized three specific sanctions China could impose on Taiwan if it is dissatisfied with Tsai’s inauguration speech: shutting down existing negotiation channels, prohibiting Chinese tourists from visiting Taiwan and taking diplomatic action.
“The warning to the new government is thick with meaning,” the bureau said in a report submitted to the legislature yesterday. “It is intended to pressure president-elect Tsai Ing-wen to respond in her May 20 inaugural speech in a way that falls in line with China’s expectations.”
So, should Tsai take heed and avoid reiterating her rejection of the “1992 consensus” in the speech?
The answer is simple: If Taiwanese were worried about the prospect of China shutting down cross-strait negotiation channels, prohibiting Chinese tourists from visiting Taiwan, snatching away Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, or any other of the stale, reactionary threats they have become accustomed to, they would not have voted for Tsai in the first place.
The nearly 6.9 million voters who gave Tsai her mandate in January knew well that Tsai and the DPP never recognized the existence of the “1992 consensus,” which Ma and the KMT claim refers to a tacit understanding reached between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party that both Taiwan and China acknowledge there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
Tsai’s cross-strait stance is that she would maintain the “status quo,” which she defines as “the ‘status quo’ of Taiwan’s liberal democracy and cross-strait peace.”
If Taiwanese cared about kowtowing to Beijing, they could have simply voted for the KMT’s Eric Chu (朱立倫).
That they did not means they disapprove of Ma’s Sinocentric policies and his submissive lapdog attitude toward Beijing.
With the public behind her, Tsai can stand strong against Beijing’s intimidation.
All Tsai’s inaugural speech needs to be concerned with is the upholding of Taiwan’s national interests and dignity, and her only priority should be pleasing her masters — the Taiwanese public, not Beijing.
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