Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) was elected president of Taiwan on Saturday. Despite eager anticipation among the public, she is not able to take office immediately; President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is to remain in office for another 124 days — until May 20 — and the long transition between the election and the handover is likely to raise public concerns.
If a major domestic crisis or cross-strait crisis breaks out during the four-month-long transition, should the outgoing president and his caretaker government be responsible for dealing with the matter, or should responsibility fall on the president-elect? This is an issue that could easily deteriorate into a war of words as each camp makes its own interpretation.
Despite the seriousness of the issue, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) recently proposed that a new Cabinet be formed by the legislative majority following the election, using it as a cheap political topic to maneuver the campaign climate ahead of the election. Still, Ma, the person who had the power to make such an appointment, has said nothing.
Some in the pan-green camp are calling on the Ma administration to act as a true caretaker government and hand over all power following the election, including presidential authority over diplomatic, national defense and cross-strait affairs. However, anyone who knows Ma is probably not so naive as to believe that he would circumscribe his own powers. Others have suggested that with a DPP legislative majority, the party should pass an act regulating the transition of government power so the Ma administration can no longer avoid the problem. However, these suggestions are a bit late and cannot change the current situation.
Since there are no rules and since there is little hope that Ma would hand over power, Tsai, the DPP and Taiwanese can only wait and hope for the best.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that people should wait passively for the presidential inauguration. Instead, they should actively make preparations for possible variables, including how to handle potential challenges to national security during the transition period.
First, it is necessary to establish a well-experienced transition team on national security. The first step is to take advantage of the DPP’s legislative majority and demand that the Ma administration let the president-elect and her top aides share the same national security information and briefings as the incumbent administration has access to.
A reaction to a national security crisis should be a cross-party affair. Some predictable risks include irrational moves by Beijing, a resurgence of the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea, growing tension in the Korean Peninsula, reckless moves by international terrorist organizations, changes in Taiwan’s diplomatic ties, economic fluctuations in China and another global financial crisis. If any of these crises occurs during the transition period when the government’s operations are fragile, the public would expect the president-elect to act effectively, and the media are certain to keep a close eye on Tsai.
Although we should respect the constitutional system, the president-elect should propose suggestions and the outgoing president should respect the president-elect and set a precedent for the transition of power by having an essential discussion with her or top aides authorized by her.
In particular, cross-strait relations would be an extremely sensitive issue. If the Ma administration insists on continuing to push for Chinese tourist flight transfers in Taiwan, the signing of a cross-strait trade in goods agreement, the exchange of liaison offices, allowing Taiwan’s 12-inch wafer factories to set up operations in China and perhaps even another meeting between Ma and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), that would be crossing the line for a caretaker government and disrespecting the president-elect.
More seriously, it would incite political confrontation, which would be unfavorable for a peaceful and smooth transition.
For the president-elect, the transition period might be both a risk and an opportunity. It is risky because the US, Japan and other nations are likely to show their concerns about the direction of Tsai’s national policies and intensive, post-election “shuttle diplomacy” is to be expected.
By establishing a professional national security team, she can speak and act cautiously, while on the other hand, she can take the initiative to deepen dialogue and communication with diplomatic allies and non-allies. That would familiarize her with her duties and avoid fumbling after taking office.
Moreover, Tsai should not speak carelessly before receiving sufficient information and briefings from the national security agencies in order to avoid misunderstandings.
More importantly, past experience shows that there are likely to be many “messengers” traveling back and forth across the Taiwan Strait during the transition period and the messages delivered could be inconsistent. Tsai’s team must be disciplined and only do what they are authorized to do and make necessary clarifications instantly.
Finally, Tsai should stabilize the morale of national security and diplomatic officials during the transition period, while another important issue is to clarify the priority of national security issues.
Liu Shih-chung is deputy secretary-general of the Tainan City Government.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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