The two-day cross-strait talks that ended yesterday in Fuzhou, China, are said to be the last high-level cross-strait meetings that will take place under President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) watch. China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman Chen Deming (陳德銘), in a speech delivered during the talks, remarked — in a comment aimed at a specific audience — that the future of cross-strait relations “would not be plain sailing,” lending weight to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) comment that if the so-called “1992 consensus,” is not accepted, “the earth will move and the mountains will shake.”
With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) having a better-than-even chance of winning next year’s presidential election, Chen’s statement is more like a shot across the bow for that party — possibly the future administration, which has avoided discussing its stance on the “1992 consensus” — than a threat directed at Taiwan’s voters.
Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who visited Shanghai last week, said before he traveled to China that he “understands and respects” — without going to the extent of “accepting” — the “1992 consensus.” The Chinese authorities recognized Ko’s vague terms, and gave the Taipei-Shanghai forum the green light. It is said that Ko’s understanding of the “1992 consensus,” along with his statement that the two sides of the Strait are “one family,” has put a lot of pressure on the DPP, which staunchly opposes any “one China” rhetoric.
However, is this really the case? If Beijing can accept Ko’s vague statements and his “2015 new standpoint,” it indicates that Ko has created a model of cross-strait interactions that lies outside the bounds of the nation’s two-party spectrum.
The DPP might be worried that Ko’s flexibility over cross-strait ties could see him lean too far toward Beijing, but as Ko is managing to communicate with China without having to align himself with “one China” rhetoric, it is those who see themselves as the guardians of the “1992 consensus” who should be in a cold sweat.
Cross-strait communication should not be monopolized by a single party.
After the Sunflower movement occupied the Executive Yuan in protest over secretive agreements signed between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), Beijing must now be aware that giving the KMT the exclusive right to conduct cross-strait business does not promote the interests of the CCP in the long term: It benefits the KMT, which can dole out business perks as favors, but the CCP will be dragged down by the KMT when the latter fails.
Since winning over Taiwan, rather than working with the KMT, is Beijing’s top priority, there is no reason for the CCP to put all its eggs in one basket.
To achieve its aims, Beijing must engage in a tug-of-war, and success requires calculated rhetoric, diplomatic adroitness and sensitivity. However, what Beijing needs most in Taiwan is popular support, which is proportionate to political power in a democratic country. That is something that Beijing — no matter how bitterly — must bow to, especially as there is likely to be a change in the governing administration next year.
Chen’s warning is more of a bluff than a show of resolve. During the DPP’s eight years in power, cross-strait economic and trade exchanges did not decelerate, let alone halt, therefore the CCP, it could be argued, is the party that would now want to reap the political benefits out of cross-strait commerce.
No agreement was reached in the last cross-strait negotiations to be held under Ma on Chinese travelers being allowed to transit through Taiwan, a deal much anticipated by some in Taiwan. It is said that China might use the issue against the next administration as a bargaining chip, which, insofar as it is for “bargaining,” is apparently to be used in negotiations, not in the void of no formal exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
A failure by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to respond to Israel’s brilliant 12-day (June 12-23) bombing and special operations war against Iran, topped by US President Donald Trump’s ordering the June 21 bombing of Iranian deep underground nuclear weapons fuel processing sites, has been noted by some as demonstrating a profound lack of resolve, even “impotence,” by China. However, this would be a dangerous underestimation of CCP ambitions and its broader and more profound military response to the Trump Administration — a challenge that includes an acceleration of its strategies to assist nuclear proxy states, and developing a wide array
Twenty-four Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers are facing recall votes on Saturday, prompting nearly all KMT officials and lawmakers to rally their supporters over the past weekend, urging them to vote “no” in a bid to retain their seats and preserve the KMT’s majority in the Legislative Yuan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had largely kept its distance from the civic recall campaigns, earlier this month instructed its officials and staff to support the recall groups in a final push to protect the nation. The justification for the recalls has increasingly been framed as a “resistance” movement against China and
Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), former chairman of Broadcasting Corp of China and leader of the “blue fighters,” recently announced that he had canned his trip to east Africa, and he would stay in Taiwan for the recall vote on Saturday. He added that he hoped “his friends in the blue camp would follow his lead.” His statement is quite interesting for a few reasons. Jaw had been criticized following media reports that he would be traveling in east Africa during the recall vote. While he decided to stay in Taiwan after drawing a lot of flak, his hesitation says it all: If
Saturday is the day of the first batch of recall votes primarily targeting lawmakers of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The scale of the recall drive far outstrips the expectations from when the idea was mooted in January by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘). The mass recall effort is reminiscent of the Sunflower movement protests against the then-KMT government’s non-transparent attempts to push through a controversial cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014. That movement, initiated by students, civic groups and non-governmental organizations, included student-led protesters occupying the main legislative chamber for three weeks. The two movements are linked
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