Ever since Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) took office in December last year, the topic of whether he will acknowledge the so-called “1992 consensus” has become increasingly important in regard to the Taipei-Shanghai City Forum.
So far, China has not stated that it plans to terminate the forum if Ko refuses to accept the validity of the consensus. If China took such an unreasonable stance it might risk compromising the forum.
Since the forum was first organized, parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have not set any sort of political premise. In the same way, exchanges between other cities and counties in China and Taiwan never seem to have any special political premise.
After the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 13 seats in the nine-in-one elections last year — and Ko claimed Taipei — approximately 73.2 percent of Taiwan’s population, including Taipei, came under the governance of the pan-green camp. If the forum were canceled, it would effectively declare the end of all cross-strait city exchanges, as pan-green mayors and county commissioners find the “1992 consensus” unacceptable.
In fact, since Ko took office, he has demonstrated goodwill toward China on numerous occasions. He advocated the continuation of diverse and multi-layered cross-strait city exchanges through mutual familiarity, understanding, respect and cooperation based on current cooperation. He also recently suggested that people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should love, trust and forgive each other and even went so far as to support Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) “cross-strait family” statement.
LESS POPULAR
When Ko first attended the Taipei City Government’s Mainland Affairs Task Force Meeting, he did not mention “special state-to-state relations,” nor did he mention Taiwanese independence or criticize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Perhaps China believes that Ko may concede even more, and openly stick to the “1992 consensus” as a premise for proceeding with the city forum.
This is not the Taipei mayoral election, so Ko, along with the interests of Taipei and Taipei residents, will not be too heavily affected regardless of whether the forum goes ahead. On the other hand, it is widely recognized by Taipei residents that the city exchanges were hijacked by China’s political premise, and as a result China will become even less popular among Taipei residents.
CREATE MOMENTUM
During the period when I served on the Mainland Affairs Council, not one member of the Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits could have any sort of contact, because the administration of then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) refused to recognize the “1992 consensus,” although exchanges between officials at the director level and higher at the council and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office were possible.
China believes that a consensus was reached at the meetings between the foundation and the association in 1992, and that was why follow-up talks between the two were held. Therefore, the 1992 consensus is the premise for the interaction between the foundation and the association, but does not involve any other aspects of cross-strait exchanges.
Although the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have differing viewpoints on the existence and content of the “1992 consensus,” at least China’s actions are understandable. This premise limits exchanges between the foundation and the association, but not does not prevent interactions between cities and residents on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Even now, DPP-controlled cities and counties have a significant number of exchanges with China, including participation in international events, without any political premises.
China is probably most concerned about the possibility that Ko will not accept the “1992 consensus” and still be able to continue the city exchanges.
It is possible that such circumstances could expand and create momentum for DPP-controlled local governments to reject the “1992 consensus.” This could lead the Taiwanese to mistakenly think that the DPP despite entirely rejecting the “1992 consensus” would be able to maintain cross-strait exchanges after returning to government.
China’s concerns are understandable. However, predicating twin-city exchanges on recognition of the “1992 consensus” will not only impact all cross-strait city exchanges, but will also cause cross-strait relations to lose valuable flexibility.
PROBLEM-STRICKEN
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) recognizes the “1992 consensus,” but developments in cross-strait relations have stagnated, or in some instances regressed. If cross-strait relations lack new ideas, they are bound to come to a halt or even regress regardless of which party wins next year’s election. Supporting or opposing the “1992 consensus” will not make a significant difference.
One very possible outcome is that the DPP will reject the consensus and still win next year’s presidential election. If that happens, there is a possibility that cross-strait governmental and organizational exchanges will be interrupted and that the cross-strait peace development framework that has been promoted by China will collapse.
Could it be that China hopes to see the peace development framework fail? Ko’s practices may provide a solution to problem-stricken cross-strait relations.
ONGOING STALEMATE
First, if the DPP takes power, the impact and limitations put on interactions between the Taiwanese and Chinese governments and between the foundation and the association will not have an impact on cross-strait exchanges in general.
Second, Ko does not have the burden of a Taiwanese independence party platform and can express goodwill toward China through a stance such as Xi’s “cross-strait family.” If China continues this style of interaction, it could possibly guide the DPP toward change in this direction, which could even unlock the two-way stalemate and establish a new platform of friendly cross-strait interactions.
China will not assess Ko’s decision on the “1992 consensus” from the viewpoint of a single city, but rather, its concerns involve the DPP controlling 13 of Taiwan’s cities and counties and the possibility of the DPP taking control of the central government after next year’s election.
However, cross-strait relations need to break through the ongoing stalemate, which will reduce the potential impact of changing political circumstances next year.
Both sides need a new model for interaction. China should be more tolerant when faced with Ko’s goodwill to maintain some flexibility in the development of cross-strait relations.
Tung Chen-yuan is a distinguished professor at National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Translated by Zane Kheir
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