The results of the nine-in-one local elections will be out on Saturday, but what is more important is not which candidates win — rather it is the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) tricks to trigger ethnic tensions that are most worrisome.
During the past few weeks, many non-KMT candidates, such as independent Taipei mayoral candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) and the Democratic Progressive Party’s Greater Taichung mayoral candidate, Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍), have been presenting policy platforms and their visions for the city in which they are running for mayor; meanwhile, the KMT has been fanning ethnic tensions.
First, it was incumbent KMT Taichung Mayor Jason Hu (胡志強) who said that if he loses the election, the Republic of China (ROC) would collapse. Then it was former premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) saying that if KMT Taipei mayoral candidate Sean Lien (連勝文) loses, the ROC would be gone. Finally, Sean Lien’s father, former vice president Lien Chan (連戰), said that the only way to defend the KMT and the ROC is to have his son elected mayor of Taipei.
Certainly, the majority of voters do not believe that the ROC would collapse if a certain candidate or candidates lose, but such statements may be appealing to those who followed the KMT regime to Taiwan after losing the war against the Chinese Communist Party, as well as some of their descendants.
Lien Chan and Hau went on to accuse Ko of being the descendant of Japanese imperial officials, as Ko’s father and grandfather were born during the Japanese colonial period and educated under the Japanese colonial school system. Ko’s grandfather served as an elementary-school teacher during the Japanese colonial period.
Both Lien Chan and Hau said that a person of such lineage is not suitable to be the mayor of the capital.
The unspoken message is clear: Since 90 percent of the population are those whose families have lived in Taiwan since before the KMT regime took power in 1945, most of them have family members who were educated in the Japanese colonial school system and even served in certain public positions. Therefore, only Mainlanders who came to Taiwan with the KMT after 1945, or their descendants, are suitable candidates to become the mayor of Taipei.
On Saturday, Sean Lien himself said during a rally that, if elected, he would change the name of the street in front of Taipei City Hall from Shifu Road (市府路) — literarily “City Hall Road” — to “Jingguo Road” (經國路) to commemorate the late authoritarian president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) for his “contributions to Taiwan.”
Obviously, the move is targeting senior KMT members and supporters, who are mostly Mainlanders, since they are more emotionally attached to Chiang.
It took decades, after tensions and conflicts, for the different ethnic groups in the country to be in the more harmonious relationship present today. Looking back at how horrible the conflicts were and how far we have traveled, it is absolutely regrettable that the KMT is agitating ethnic divisions for its own gain in the election. No matter who wins the election, the public will be the losers, as it may take some time for ethnic relations to recover after the election.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
RSS