After the movement against the signing of the cross-strait service trade agreement, President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) policy of “first addressing economic issues, then discussing politics” or “only economics, not politics” in cross-strait negotiations seems to have lost steam.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) is keen to win the public’s trust and cross-strait policy is certainly going to be a major factor. There is now an opportunity for the government and the opposition to consider trying to establish a legally recognized committee for cross-strait peace and development, creating a platform for communication and exchange between the governing and opposition parties. This would enable Taiwan to forge a consensus and strengthen the nation’s leverage in cross-strait negotiations.
First, Ma must forget about his personal legacy and pushing for a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Beijing has already made it clear where it stands and that it does not consider such a meeting during this fall’s APEC summit in China appropriate. If the meeting takes place in a forum other than the APEC summit, the questions of how Ma is to be addressed and what issues will be on the agenda are sure to be the subject of heated debate. If there is a meeting, the likelihood is that it will be a one-off, and have more symbolic value than anything else.
Second, the development of cross-strait relations has been affected by the Sunflower movement. There is little chance of a swift passage of the agreement by the legislature, and the cross-strait trade in goods agreement and negotiations on other issues are also sure to be delayed.
The problem is that a solution to cross-strait political conflicts or the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international institutions has yet to be found.
The gap between the actual power Taiwan and China wield, together with the lack of a consensus in Taiwan on cross-strait issues, mean that Ma has neither the courage nor the leverage to engage Beijing. There is, then, no solution to the current predicament in cross-strait relations.
If there is to be development in cross-strait relations, the two sides must not only establish mutual trust and understanding, they also need to find a way through the thorny issue of Taiwan’s participation in international affairs.
It is important to establish trust and consensus between the nation’s governing and opposition parties. As head of the government, Ma has to promote interaction between his party and the opposition. In practice, this will require think tanks and consultants affiliated with each side to set up a mechanism for dialogue, meeting at intervals on cross-strait issues and making the first steps toward trust and consensus-building between the government and opposition.
If they are to establish a legal platform for communication and exchange, the process cannot be influenced by competition between the parties. Former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) called many times for a committee tasked with cross-strait peace and development which would consist of members of the governing and opposition parties.
He recommended that the committee be established in the legislature subordinate to the Presidential Office, as a platform for exchanging ideas between the opposition and the government, and sounding out the opinions of civic groups. The composition and operation of the committee would be defined by law and the members should include representatives from the government and political parties, businesspeople, workers’ representatives and others of influence.
There could be a range of working parties with separate tasks under the general oversight of the committee, including a group focused on cross-strait dialogue and negotiations, covering politics, military issues, the economy, technology, society, culture and education. There could also be a cross-strait exchanges work group focusing on government, political parties, society, the economy and culture. Another could focus on cross-strait cooperation and supervision, concentrating on the carrying out and monitoring of a range of cross-strait agreements.
These working parties would be supported by Mainland Affairs Committee officials and other government departments, which would provide the necessary intelligence and analysis.
The committee would not replace the existing cross-strait government policy formation mechanism and neither would it reduce the president’s power regarding cross-strait strategy. It would definitely not be a platform which required the opposition to endorse the governing party’s cross-strait policy: The committee would be a means for communication and interaction between governing and opposition parties, as well as between industry, government and academia.
A consensus would not always be reached by the participants: The hope would be that a consensus between civic groups, the government and the opposition could be reached through communication and exchange.
Every time the committee meets, it should issue a joint statement, clearly expressing the issues on which there was agreement and the issues on which the opinions of committee members diverged. A statement describing the stance on cross-strait policy issues it had reached should also be produced.
Such a legally appointed mechanism would, on the one hand, promote mutual trust and consensus-building between the governing and opposition parties and strengthen Taiwan’s hand in cross-strait negotiations. On the other hand, it would allow the governing and opposition parties, under the nation’s watchful gaze, to form a competitive cross-strait policy, and help to gradually dilute the existing tensions within Taiwan’s democracy.
Tung Chen-yuan is a professor in National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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