In December 2008 in Athens, a “special security officer” shot dead a young student, igniting demonstrations, strikes and riots. Young people were at the forefront of the protests, in a country with a long tradition of youth participation in social and political movements. Several commentators at the time spoke of a “youth rebellion.”
In late 2009 it became clear that Greece had been living through a period of false prosperity and was in effect bankrupt.
The country fell into the tender embrace of the troika — the EU, the IMF and the European Central Bank.
Illustration: Kevin Sheu
Following severe austerity measures in 2010 and 2011, there were again mass demonstrations and strikes, culminating in the “movement of the squares” — protests against the destruction of private and social life.
Young people were again prominent, lending enthusiasm and spirit to the movement.
Then there was nothing.
As economic and social disaster unfolded in 2012 and last year, the youth of Greece became invisible in social and economic life.
The young have been largely absent from politics, social movements and even from the spontaneous social networks that have dealt with the worst of the catastrophe.
On the fifth anniversary of the events of 2008, barely a few hundred young people demonstrated in Greek urban centers.
There was no tension, no passion, no spirit, just tired processions repeating well-known slogans. Where were the 17-year-olds from five years ago?
Similar patterns can be observed in several other European countries, though perhaps not to such an extreme degree.
What is the youth of Portugal doing as the country’s social structures continue to collapse? Where is the youth of France as the country drifts further into stagnation and irrelevance? Where has the youth of Britain been while the coalition government has persevered with austerity?
The answer seems to be that European youth has been battered by a “double whammy” of problematic access to education and rising unemployment, forcing young people to rely on family support and curtailing their independence.
Uncertain about the future and worried about jobs and housing, the youth of Europe shows no confidence and trust in established political parties.
Significant sections have already been attracted to the nihilistic ends of the political spectrum, including varieties of anarchism and fascism. The left, traditionally a home for the radical strivings of young people, has lost its appeal.
Take education. As the Greek crisis deepened, large numbers of students were forced to accelerate, or even interrupt, their studies.
There are no relevant official indicators of these trends but anecdotal evidence abounds and fits with other aggregate statistics.
In 2008 Greek households spent on average 17 percent of their disposable income on education and low-income families more than 20 percent.
This was already a high proportion reflecting the importance traditionally placed on education in Greek society.
As the crisis unfolded over the next five years, the proportion doubled, making education an unbearable burden.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reported that in 2011, 15 percent of people aged 15 to 29 were not in education, employment or training.
In Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain this proportion was at 20 percent, and the latest EU data indicates that in 2012 things became worse in the three southern countries.
Conditions are even harsher with regard to work. Youth unemployment in Europe is a little short of 25 percent, already a huge number, while in Greece and Spain it has reached extraordinary figures, in the vicinity of 60 percent.
Collapsing youth employment is clearly not the result of more young people seeking jobs, since the number of young people in Europe as a proportion of the population is declining fast. Youth unemployment is rising because the economies of Europe are failing to generate significant numbers of jobs.
For those under the age of 25, there are no jobs in the southern countries and few decent jobs in the north. Mass youth unemployment is the reality across Europe, and things are far from rosy even in Germany, the supposed winner of the past few years.
The double whammy appears to have sapped the rebellious energy of the young, forcing them to seek greater financial help from parents for housing and daily life. This trend lies at the root of the current paradox of youth in Europe.
There is little extreme poverty, and the young are relatively protected and well-trained, but their labor is not valued, their dreams of education are denied and their independence is restricted.
As a consequence, frustration has grown. Yet it cannot find an outlet in mainstream parties including the left, which strikes many young people as far too timid. Even in Greece, where the official opposition of Syriza — the party of the left — is preparing for government, young people are looking askance at a party that seems unwilling to take radical action.
Matters cannot continue indefinitely along these lines. Frustration is mounting among both young people and their parents.
However, if those who make policy refuse to acknowledge the problem, major change could be delayed for a long time. The result would be a massive accumulation of sullen anger across Europe, with unpredictable outcomes. Those who care for social development had better take notice.
Costas Lapavitsas’ latest book is Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All. Alex Politaki is a journalist.
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
During the “426 rally” organized by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party under the slogan “fight green communism, resist dictatorship,” leaders from the two opposition parties framed it as a battle against an allegedly authoritarian administration led by President William Lai (賴清德). While criticism of the government can be a healthy expression of a vibrant, pluralistic society, and protests are quite common in Taiwan, the discourse of the 426 rally nonetheless betrayed troubling signs of collective amnesia. Specifically, the KMT, which imposed 38 years of martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, has never fully faced its
RSS