Does an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) involve sovereignty? According to President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, the answer is apparently not a definite “yes.”
On May 29, 2010, in a statement released in response to Japan’s proposed plan to expand its ADIZ westward, which would leave it overlapping parts of Taiwan’s ADIZ, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it found Japan’s decision unacceptable, as it would affect Taiwan’s airspace and national sovereignty.
Fast-forward to Tuesday and the Ma government’s stance has changed noticeably.
In his first public comment on China’s East China Sea ADIZ that includes the disputed Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), which both Taiwan and Japan also claim sovereignty over, Ma said Beijing’s move does not involve “airspace” or “territorial sovereignty.”
In other words, in the eyes of the Ma government, an ADIZ was a matter of national integrity and sovereignty three years ago, but not now.
This striking difference is not only absurd, but baffling for many, who wonder whether it may be yet another example of the cowardly Ma government lacking the backbone to stick up for the nation’s authority and dignity when it comes to dealing with Beijing.
Furthermore, many cannot help but wonder what constitutes treason if a head of state blatantly harbors double standards that appear tantamount to assisting Beijing in violating Taiwan’s sovereignty.
In fact, as long ago as December 2007, then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) sounded a warning over China’s possible move to designate a new ADIZ. In remarks with then-visiting US Representative Eni Faleomavaega, who at the time doubled as the chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment, Chen specifically noted that “we consider China’s plans an attempt to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. They will pose a great threat to peace and stability in the Strait and damage the status quo. We hope the US and Japan will jointly tackle this serious issue.”
Ma is fond of comparing himself with Chen and claims to have more international vision than his predecessor. However, we need to look at how pathetically Ma has failed in the defense of the nation’s sovereignty.
Following China’s declaration of its new ADIZ, Japan aligned itself with the US in condemning the move and refusing to comply with Beijing’s rules for aircraft flying through the zone. South Korea and Australia subsequently expressed their grave concern over the matter, condemning China.
Taiwan, under Ma’s leadership, however, has been relatively quiet, and the government has failed to assert the nation’s dignity.
Not a single word of condemnation nor protest was uttered by the Ma administration, just quiet rhetoric expressing regret.
The high-profile welcome for China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman Chen Deming (陳德銘) has been in stark contrast. This no doubt creates an impression within the international community that Taiwan is aligning itself with Beijing rather than the democracies of Japan, South Korea and the US.
Ma often claims that tensions across the Strait have been “dramatically reduced” under his presidency, thereby “contributing to regional stability and prosperity.”
However, if this so-called reduction in cross-strait tension is achieved purely through failure on the part of the government to defend Taiwan’s dignity and sovereignty, what good is this fraudulent cross-strait “peace”?
Despite Ma’s trumpeting of the Republic of China’s sovereignty in his speeches, he has wimped out on the international stage.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS