The meeting in Beijing between former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) was the first summit between leaders of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since Xi took office earlier this year. Prior to Wu’s departure for Beijing, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) called him in for a special meeting. Wu presumably received his blessing to communicate Ma’s stance on cross-strait relations with Xi.
For years, the CCP has been making concessions toward the KMT, but it is starting to make its impatience known. China has begun pressing Ma to start repaying Beijing for its covert assistance in winning him his second term in office, and is demanding that some progress be made on initiating cross-strait political talks. Ma had no option but to respond to these demands, but to Taiwan’s detriment, he has evidently gone too far in what he has offered.
The biggest difference between this summit and previous ones is that past cross-strait discussions have been conducted under the so-called “1992 consensus,” whereas this time, they took place within the “one China” framework (一中架構). The “1992 consensus” was purportedly that China and Taiwan belong to one China, but that each side had differing interpretations as to what “China” means. When the phrase “one China” was used in the abstract context of the “1992 consensus,” it was not really remarked upon in Taiwan or internationally. However, now that Ma has seemingly abandoned the idea of the “consensus,” the international community may well interpret the two sides’ apparent acceptance of the “one China” framework as an indication that Ma and the KMT have resolved to embrace unification.
If Taiwan as well as the international community recognize the “one China” framework, then Taiwan’s very sovereignty and claim to nationhood cease to exist. By accepting the “one China” framework, Ma has shown that he opposes Taiwanese independence. China can now breathe a sigh of relief: Ma has taken the bait, the general principle has been established and, for China, Taiwan is now essentially in the bag.
Taiwan and China are set to agree to sending representatives to and establishing representative offices in each other’s countries. Ma has said that these offices would operate on the understanding that cross-strait relations are not state-to-state relations, but are rather based on a special relationship. That these representative offices are to be established is undeniably a major development, but it is difficult to say whether it is going to be good or bad for Taiwan.
With Hong Kong, China initially set up Xinhua news agency’s Hong Kong branch as a kind of outpost, and then renamed it the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. This paved the way for bringing the former British territory into its fold. On the surface, this liaison office was merely China’s representative office in Hong Kong, but to all intents and purposes, it had dominion over the Hong Kong government, and Beijing used it to control the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong affairs. Over time, the business community and the public came to take note of the mood of the liaison office.
Will Taiwan go the way of Hong Kong after China’s representative office opens here? This is extremely likely, given the Ma administration’s attitude to Taiwan’s sovereignty and its lackadaisical approach to running the country. Taiwan, then, has just bought passage on the Unification Express. Unless the opposition parties — the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union — can stand up to this, or the public gives the KMT a rap on the knuckles via the ballot box, cross-strait relations are on the verge of an irreversible process that will not only be disastrous for democracy in Taiwan, but also for democracy in China.
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
RSS