The Criminal Code has been the topic of much debate since a verdict was handed down in the case against former Executive Yuan secretary-general Lin Yi-shih (林益世), especially Article 121, which covers bribery and mentions “demands, agrees to accept, or accepts a bribe or other improper benefits for an official act.”
Executing an “official act” presupposes that the person holds an official position. Taking a bribe is punishable because such an act causes the public to lose trust in the nature and purpose of that position, which has a major impact on policy implementation. Taking bribes in exchange “for an official act” does not require the to have already taken effect and it has nothing to do with whether the act violates the duties that come with the position.
If the judge solicits a bribe from a defendant, that judge commits a criminal offense simply by soliciting the bribe, regardless of whether the judge has issued a verdict or given the law an arbitrary interpretation. However, if a judge who is not involved in the trial at hand or another civil servant asks the defendant for a bribe in order to influence the trial judge on the defendant’s behalf, while damaging to the image of their official position, such behavior does not constitute the execution of “an official act.”
In terms of a civil servant taking bribes to mediate in matters that do not fall within the scope of their powers, it is probably necessary to clarify the premises for the punishment of such behavior and the application of relevant regulations, but we cannot let the ambiguous “actual influence” concept replace the current standard for determining that a bribe has been taken, ie, the requirement that it be done in the execution of an official act.
If we do not do so, anyone can have their own interpretation of what “actual influence” means, and that will destroy the implications of Article 1 of the Criminal Code, which says that an action is only punishable if punishment was expressly prescribed by the law at the time when the action occurred.
In addition, violating the human rights of someone involved in a case will destroy public trust in a fair and unbiased enforcement of the law. This is why public trust in the judiciary and the rule of law was the first victim when the “actual influence” concept was established during the trial of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). The case against Lin has brought renewed attention to this issue.
However, Lin’s case differs from that of Chen’s, since it is possible to infer his guilt even without the use of the “actual influence” concept. Lin was a legislator, and if a legislator were to use his or her rights to monitor and question government officials to solicit a bribe, that would constitute taking a bribe for the execution of an official act.
As to whether monitoring and questioning the Ministry of Economic Affairs lay within the scope of Lin’s powers as Cabinet secretary-general, and whether the ministry made personnel adjustments at state-run China Steel Corp on Lin’s request has nothing to do with whether a criminal offense was committed. The question of whether China Steel is a state-run or a private company is also completely irrelevant to determining whether a bribe was taken.
There was a mistake in the verdict when Lin’s role was defined as that of someone who took bribes while acting as a go-between. The result was that the debate focused on whether Lin had wielded actual influence over government institutions’ or civil servants’ official decisions or discharge of official duties.
This was clearly a mistake that requires review and discussion.
However, it would be more worthwhile to discuss if legislators should give serious consideration to whether civil servants should be punished for “mediation.” If they should, laws should be written to resolve the issue, and legislators should not procrastinate over the issue.
Hsu Tze-tien is an associate professor in the College of Law at National Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
On Monday, the day before Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) departed on her visit to China, the party released a promotional video titled “Only with peace can we ‘lie flat’” to highlight its desire to have peace across the Taiwan Strait. However, its use of the expression “lie flat” (tang ping, 躺平) drew sarcastic comments, with critics saying it sounded as if the party was “bowing down” to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Amid the controversy over the opposition parties blocking proposed defense budgets, Cheng departed for China after receiving an invitation from the CCP, with a meeting with
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) is leading a delegation to China through Sunday. She is expected to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Beijing tomorrow. That date coincides with the anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which marked a cornerstone of Taiwan-US relations. Staging their meeting on this date makes it clear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends to challenge the US and demonstrate its “authority” over Taiwan. Since the US severed official diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, it has relied on the TRA as a legal basis for all
A delegation of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) officials led by Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) is to travel to China tomorrow for a six-day visit to Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing, which might end with a meeting between Cheng and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). The trip was announced by Xinhua news agency on Monday last week, which cited China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao (宋濤) as saying that Cheng has repeatedly expressed willingness to visit China, and that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Xi have extended an invitation. Although some people have been speculating about a potential Xi-Cheng
The ongoing Iran conflict is putting Taiwan’s energy fragility on full display — the island of 23 million people, home to the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing, is highly dependent on imported oil and gas, especially that from the Middle East. In 2025, 69.6 percent of Taiwan’s crude oil and 38.7 percent of liquified natural gas were sourced from the Middle East. In the same year, 62 percent of crude oil and 34 percent of LNG to Taiwan went through the Strait of Hormuz. Taiwan’s state-run oil company CPC Corp’s benchmark crude oil price (70 percent Dubai, 30 percent Brent)