After years of rapprochement, agreements and high-level talks, one could hardly blame the Chinese public for thinking that the efforts initiated by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) would eventually lead to a final, political resolution to the conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
On the Chinese side, there were hopes during the early days of Ma’s first term in office that once the relatively easy negotiations on trade issues were done with, the two sides would quickly initiate political dialogue on Taiwan’s status and perhaps sign a peace accord of some sort. The more optimistic even hoped that the first steps could be taken while Hu was still chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and failing that, still in the office of the president.
That time came and went, and Hu went home empty-handed. Ma was re-elected last year on a platform that promised more of the same — and more of the same is exactly what the Chinese got. Negotiations continued, but remained focused on economics, investment, trade, tourism and education.
Now Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is in office and chairman of the CCP, and it would be reasonable to expect that he hopes to surpass the achievements of his predecessor on the Taiwan “question.” In fact, the rising nationalist sentiment in China will make it difficult for Xi to ignore issues such as “reunification” and the restoration of China’s “honor.”
However, Xi is in for a bit of trouble. As former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Richard Bush said in Taipei yesterday, there are serious “conceptual differences” between Taiwanese and Chinese on the issue of political talks. Among other things, those “conceptual differences” include a democratic system, freedom of expression, a vibrant civil society and an irrepressible desire to maintain one’s way of life — not to mention rising Taiwanese identification and support for de jure independence.
There is more bad news for Xi. Unlike the CCP, Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must compete in elections if it wants to remain in power. And with the next presidential election less than three years hence, Ma will be unable to dramatically alter the course of his engagement with China. Even though the Constitution bars Ma from running for a third consecutive term, his successor — and perhaps even his replacement as KMT chairman, should his low popularity and a string of corruption scandals result in his ouster — would undoubtedly apply tremendous pressure on Ma not to sabotage their chances of being elected in 2016 by acting against the wishes of the majority.
What this means is that even if Ma intended to “sell out” Taiwan, his own party would rebel against him, knowing full well that such a betrayal of public trust would be political suicide for the party.
Under the tyranny of those “conceptual differences,” engaging in political talks with Beijing would be the ultimate example of acting against the wishes of the majority. Unless it decides to send tanks into the streets and uproot Taiwan’s hard-won democratic system, the KMT will not be able to go much beyond what public preferences dictate and will instead be compelled to reflect the safest common denominator within the Taiwanese polity. And that is the so-called “status quo.”
In the name of the nation’s 23 million people, we therefore apologize to Xi, who will have to look elsewhere if he wants to outdo the successes of his predecessor.
China badly misread Japan. It sought to intimidate Tokyo into silence on Taiwan. Instead, it has achieved the opposite by hardening Japanese resolve. By trying to bludgeon a major power like Japan into accepting its “red lines” — above all on Taiwan — China laid bare the raw coercive logic of compellence now driving its foreign policy toward Asian states. From the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas to the Himalayan frontier, Beijing has increasingly relied on economic warfare, diplomatic intimidation and military pressure to bend neighbors to its will. Confident in its growing power, China appeared to believe
After more than three weeks since the Honduran elections took place, its National Electoral Council finally certified the new president of Honduras. During the campaign, the two leading contenders, Nasry Asfura and Salvador Nasralla, who according to the council were separated by 27,026 votes in the final tally, promised to restore diplomatic ties with Taiwan if elected. Nasralla refused to accept the result and said that he would challenge all the irregularities in court. However, with formal recognition from the US and rapid acknowledgment from key regional governments, including Argentina and Panama, a reversal of the results appears institutionally and politically
In 2009, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) made a welcome move to offer in-house contracts to all outsourced employees. It was a step forward for labor relations and the enterprise facing long-standing issues around outsourcing. TSMC founder Morris Chang (張忠謀) once said: “Anything that goes against basic values and principles must be reformed regardless of the cost — on this, there can be no compromise.” The quote is a testament to a core belief of the company’s culture: Injustices must be faced head-on and set right. If TSMC can be clear on its convictions, then should the Ministry of Education
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) provided several reasons for military drills it conducted in five zones around Taiwan on Monday and yesterday. The first was as a warning to “Taiwanese independence forces” to cease and desist. This is a consistent line from the Chinese authorities. The second was that the drills were aimed at “deterrence” of outside military intervention. Monday’s announcement of the drills was the first time that Beijing has publicly used the second reason for conducting such drills. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is clearly rattled by “external forces” apparently consolidating around an intention to intervene. The targets of
RSS