The nature of CCP purges
It is interesting that the media writes about numerous reasons former Chongqing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary Bo Xilai (薄熙來) is at the center of the latest purge of the CCP. One thing seems to be very apparent: The last time a significant internal purge happened in the CCP (excluding the results of 1987) was in the 1970s.
Why did the 1970s purge happen? Because of the political vacuum formed by the death of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and his disastrous policies, in which power was consolidated under Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平). During this consolidation, competing interests were purged for the sake of “China.” Once consolidated, Deng set China’s political course. The interesting thing is how far into the future he set it.
Deng basically chose who was going to run China right up until Chinese Premier Hu Jintao (胡錦濤). Notice the similarity? The purge in the 1970s brought Deng to power. His political and economic policies resulted in him becoming a sort of deity within the CCP.
Now, we have Hu leaving this year and taking his place is [expected to be] Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平). This has resulted in Deng’s “children” trying to find their own way in the world and Xi is the proverbial flag flapping in the wind, which they are trying to keep upright. It is highly likely that Xi will fall.
However, if the party cannot manage the political-economic environment in an effective way, we may see a rise in the influence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the CCP as tensions with China’s neighbors increase. Deng seemed to not be quite as admired by the PLA as he was by his party.
The purge of the past year marks the exit of the ghost of Deng. The result is a power vacuum that has muddied the political waters just as Mao’s exit did. Deng, like Mao, could not control politics beyond his corporeal limits. His arm reached only as far as Hu. Deng’s status ensured that no one dared challenge his “pious” proclamations — tantamount to a “will” — even posthumously. However, Xi was not appointed by Deng and so there is opportunity for strong ambitions, which Bo probably tried to take advantage of.
Bo is likely getting punished because he saw that a significant amount of the power was up for grabs. There are significant reasons this could be true: First, Deng only set the big picture until Hu; second, the CCP is not really communist anymore, as the market has become “god,” and finally, the unintended consequences of Deng’s reforms have made the world a much less certain place for decisionmakers within the CCP.
The result is that there is no clear heavenly sanctioned political roadmap in place within the party at the moment. Deng is less real than he once was. He is now more myth and legend, although his apostles still live. His stabilizing presence is weakening and there is likely less trust among China’s important actors. Will we be seeing the search for a new deity made in the image of Deng?
Stability is the mantra of the CCP. There is likely a real need for a stable roadmap within the leadership as there are no public mechanisms to decide China’s future leaders. There are only closed doors. The result is likely a purge that goes far beyond this year and Bo’s immediate circle.
To understand Bo’s actions, we need to recognize that they are the result of the CCP using Deng’s legacy as a crutch, of communist ideology being at a crossroads and, more importantly, of him not recognizing that political ambitions are never best served when action is unrestrained — something the justice system seems to be structured to facilitate rather than constrain.
Bo will probably not be executed because of Deng’s distaste for this type of purge and Bo’s family legacy within the CCP. That is only if the CCP frames his crimes as political rather than exploiting his office for criminal activity, which is unlikely.
However, Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai (谷開來), is dead even before being executed. In China, like in most male-dominant societies, Gu’s gender renders her inferior from the start and works against her, especially as she displays ambition, power and influence.
Her husband will probably receive a degree of mercy, but Gu will likely be framed in a manner similar to how Jiang Qing (江青), Mao’s fourth wife and leader of the Gang of Four, was framed in the 1970s.
Philippe Mckay
Pingtung
A failure by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to respond to Israel’s brilliant 12-day (June 12-23) bombing and special operations war against Iran, topped by US President Donald Trump’s ordering the June 21 bombing of Iranian deep underground nuclear weapons fuel processing sites, has been noted by some as demonstrating a profound lack of resolve, even “impotence,” by China. However, this would be a dangerous underestimation of CCP ambitions and its broader and more profound military response to the Trump Administration — a challenge that includes an acceleration of its strategies to assist nuclear proxy states, and developing a wide array
Eating at a breakfast shop the other day, I turned to an old man sitting at the table next to mine. “Hey, did you hear that the Legislative Yuan passed a bill to give everyone NT$10,000 [US$340]?” I said, pointing to a newspaper headline. The old man cursed, then said: “Yeah, the Chinese Nationalist Party [KMT] canceled the NT$100 billion subsidy for Taiwan Power Co and announced they would give everyone NT$10,000 instead. “Nice. Now they are saying that if electricity prices go up, we can just use that cash to pay for it,” he said. “I have no time for drivel like
Twenty-four Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers are facing recall votes on Saturday, prompting nearly all KMT officials and lawmakers to rally their supporters over the past weekend, urging them to vote “no” in a bid to retain their seats and preserve the KMT’s majority in the Legislative Yuan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had largely kept its distance from the civic recall campaigns, earlier this month instructed its officials and staff to support the recall groups in a final push to protect the nation. The justification for the recalls has increasingly been framed as a “resistance” movement against China and
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) reportedly told the EU’s top diplomat that China does not want Russia to lose in Ukraine, because the US could shift its focus to countering Beijing. Wang made the comment while meeting with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas on July 2 at the 13th China-EU High-Level Strategic Dialogue in Brussels, the South China Morning Post and CNN reported. Although contrary to China’s claim of neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, such a frank remark suggests Beijing might prefer a protracted war to keep the US from focusing on
RSS