The nature of CCP purges
It is interesting that the media writes about numerous reasons former Chongqing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary Bo Xilai (薄熙來) is at the center of the latest purge of the CCP. One thing seems to be very apparent: The last time a significant internal purge happened in the CCP (excluding the results of 1987) was in the 1970s.
Why did the 1970s purge happen? Because of the political vacuum formed by the death of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and his disastrous policies, in which power was consolidated under Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平). During this consolidation, competing interests were purged for the sake of “China.” Once consolidated, Deng set China’s political course. The interesting thing is how far into the future he set it.
Deng basically chose who was going to run China right up until Chinese Premier Hu Jintao (胡錦濤). Notice the similarity? The purge in the 1970s brought Deng to power. His political and economic policies resulted in him becoming a sort of deity within the CCP.
Now, we have Hu leaving this year and taking his place is [expected to be] Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平). This has resulted in Deng’s “children” trying to find their own way in the world and Xi is the proverbial flag flapping in the wind, which they are trying to keep upright. It is highly likely that Xi will fall.
However, if the party cannot manage the political-economic environment in an effective way, we may see a rise in the influence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the CCP as tensions with China’s neighbors increase. Deng seemed to not be quite as admired by the PLA as he was by his party.
The purge of the past year marks the exit of the ghost of Deng. The result is a power vacuum that has muddied the political waters just as Mao’s exit did. Deng, like Mao, could not control politics beyond his corporeal limits. His arm reached only as far as Hu. Deng’s status ensured that no one dared challenge his “pious” proclamations — tantamount to a “will” — even posthumously. However, Xi was not appointed by Deng and so there is opportunity for strong ambitions, which Bo probably tried to take advantage of.
Bo is likely getting punished because he saw that a significant amount of the power was up for grabs. There are significant reasons this could be true: First, Deng only set the big picture until Hu; second, the CCP is not really communist anymore, as the market has become “god,” and finally, the unintended consequences of Deng’s reforms have made the world a much less certain place for decisionmakers within the CCP.
The result is that there is no clear heavenly sanctioned political roadmap in place within the party at the moment. Deng is less real than he once was. He is now more myth and legend, although his apostles still live. His stabilizing presence is weakening and there is likely less trust among China’s important actors. Will we be seeing the search for a new deity made in the image of Deng?
Stability is the mantra of the CCP. There is likely a real need for a stable roadmap within the leadership as there are no public mechanisms to decide China’s future leaders. There are only closed doors. The result is likely a purge that goes far beyond this year and Bo’s immediate circle.
To understand Bo’s actions, we need to recognize that they are the result of the CCP using Deng’s legacy as a crutch, of communist ideology being at a crossroads and, more importantly, of him not recognizing that political ambitions are never best served when action is unrestrained — something the justice system seems to be structured to facilitate rather than constrain.
Bo will probably not be executed because of Deng’s distaste for this type of purge and Bo’s family legacy within the CCP. That is only if the CCP frames his crimes as political rather than exploiting his office for criminal activity, which is unlikely.
However, Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai (谷開來), is dead even before being executed. In China, like in most male-dominant societies, Gu’s gender renders her inferior from the start and works against her, especially as she displays ambition, power and influence.
Her husband will probably receive a degree of mercy, but Gu will likely be framed in a manner similar to how Jiang Qing (江青), Mao’s fourth wife and leader of the Gang of Four, was framed in the 1970s.
Philippe Mckay
Pingtung
Jan. 1 marks a decade since China repealed its one-child policy. Just 10 days before, Peng Peiyun (彭珮雲), who long oversaw the often-brutal enforcement of China’s family-planning rules, died at the age of 96, having never been held accountable for her actions. Obituaries praised Peng for being “reform-minded,” even though, in practice, she only perpetuated an utterly inhumane policy, whose consequences have barely begun to materialize. It was Vice Premier Chen Muhua (陳慕華) who first proposed the one-child policy in 1979, with the endorsement of China’s then-top leaders, Chen Yun (陳雲) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), as a means of avoiding the
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
A recent piece of international news has drawn surprisingly little attention, yet it deserves far closer scrutiny. German industrial heavyweight Siemens Mobility has reportedly outmaneuvered long-entrenched Chinese competitors in Southeast Asian infrastructure to secure a strategic partnership with Vietnam’s largest private conglomerate, Vingroup. The agreement positions Siemens to participate in the construction of a high-speed rail link between Hanoi and Ha Long Bay. German media were blunt in their assessment: This was not merely a commercial win, but has symbolic significance in “reshaping geopolitical influence.” At first glance, this might look like a routine outcome of corporate bidding. However, placed in
China often describes itself as the natural leader of the global south: a power that respects sovereignty, rejects coercion and offers developing countries an alternative to Western pressure. For years, Venezuela was held up — implicitly and sometimes explicitly — as proof that this model worked. Today, Venezuela is exposing the limits of that claim. Beijing’s response to the latest crisis in Venezuela has been striking not only for its content, but for its tone. Chinese officials have abandoned their usual restrained diplomatic phrasing and adopted language that is unusually direct by Beijing’s standards. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the