How far are Taiwan and China from each other? On a map, the distance is only about 125km from Hsinchu to Pingtan Island in China’s Fujian Province, but the controversy between the two sides over the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone makes it obvious that the psychological gap is far greater than the physical gap.
The Pingtan zone was established by China to experiment with its “Taiwanese compatriots” on the “five commons” — common planning, common development, common operation, common management and common benefits. China’s Fujian Governor Su Shulin (蘇樹林) says that some areas in Pingtan have been designated for shared development with Taiwanese cities, counties and institutions, that “Taiwanese compatriots” will handle management in those areas and that “Taiwanese compatriots” will also be invited to participate in the management of other areas. Essentially, the zone will experiment with a management model in which China calls the shots and Taiwan is the deputy.
In addition to economic experimentation, there will also be political experiments in the zone. Taiwanese officials suspect that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will want to carry out “one country, two systems” experiments in the zone. This has been flatly denied by Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), which — in a rare example of conflict between it and the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) — criticized the MAC by saying the council’s attitudes toward cross-strait development were much too negative.
China officially defines the development of the zone as a pilot model for cross-strait exchanges and cooperation. Beijing says it is a cooperative mechanism aimed at exploring peaceful development, mutual benefits and shared gains and that it is of strategic significance in the promotion of “the great undertaking that is the unification of the motherland.”
In addition, Fujian officials repeatedly say almost a half-million Pingtan residents “are looking forward, with great expectations, to the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone playing an important role in the promotion of the great undertaking that is the peaceful unification of the motherland.” The strategic thinking of Chinese officials concerning the zone clearly includes the political goal of promoting peaceful unification. The council’s suspicion that the zone is part of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” strategy is thus in line with what Chinese officials are saying themselves.
However, some Taiwanese are echoing the TAO and a few political parties are fervently marketing the zone. These people think that even if China is trying to promote its “one country, two systems” strategy, “it is doing it in China, not in Taiwan, so what is there to be afraid of?” They also say the opportunity to bring the Taiwanese experience to Pingtan and oppose China’s united front strategy should not be passed up.
China is trying to use the minuscule zone to “release” land, power and benefits to Taiwanese as a political and economic experiment. If it is a failure, it would not affect the overall situation, but if it is a success, it could eventually be expanded. If Taiwanese capital and talent were lured away, it would have a devastating effect on the long-term dynamics of the Taiwanese economy.
There is no such thing as a free lunch. When buying Taiwanese agricultural products, signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and launching the experimental zone, Beijing has always had thinly veiled political motives. Chinese officials have made the motives behind the experimental zone loud and clear, and now that their plot has been exposed, they are complaining that Taiwan is “too negative.” There is no other word than “shortsighted” to describe the fact that although Taiwanese clearly understand that the whole situation is a setup, they are wilfully falling for it anyway.
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