China has set up the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone (平潭綜合實驗區) in Chinese-controlled Fujian Province and has suggested that Taiwan participate in its development under the rubric of “five commons”: common planning, common development, common operation, common management and common benefits. However, both the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) have moved to prevent any rush by Taiwanese businesspeople to invest. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is also opposed to the zone because it believes that not only is investing in Pingtan risky, but that the political purpose behind the “five commons” is to promote China’s “one country, two systems” (一國兩制) as a paradigm for cross-strait relations.
The ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) at first seemed to share the opinions of the DPP about the zone, but on March 16, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian (高孔廉) visited the zone to see the infrastructure construction going on there. This contradictory behavior by President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration will not win the public’s confidence.
China’s every move has a political motive, and the separation between politics and business that the Ma administration claims to believe in is non-existent. It is a good thing that the MAC and CEPD have stepped on the brakes, but we will have to wait and see if that will be enough to stop Taiwanese professionals and investors going to Pingtan. Still, if the two sides of the Taiwan Strait want to create space for new dialogue and future possibilities, perhaps we should be a little more active.
Despite its political goals, the proposed “five commons” is still a matter of economic cooperation. However, China has long implemented “one country, two systems” economically speaking, without the smallest sign of being willing to experiment with this approach. Shenzhen, Hong Kong and the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region in North Korea — which is directed by China — are all special economic zones and they all share the same characteristic: Political power is always concentrated in Beijing’s hands.
The “five commons” do not imply any sharing of political power. Simply put, China wants to use Taiwanese talent and capital to build a new special economic zone. However, it sees this zone the way developmental states did in the 1970s, or in the way special zones had a role in the opening up and deregulation process in the 1980s.
In the past, China conducted many experiments with special economic zones, but never with a special political zone. Taiwan should take the initiative to demand that China elevate the status of the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone and turn it into a provincial-level unit, and that China and Taiwan not only manage, but also govern the zone together. Taiwan should also demand that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remove its party organization from the management of Pingtan and allow it to become a force for political diversity.
The chief executive of the zone should be popularly elected, and a representative body and independent courts should be established and allowed to effectively monitor policy implementation. China is certain to have many misgivings, but Taiwan should make it clear that politics and business cannot be separated, and that one party cannot have its way on every issue under discussion.
Looking at past experience, a developmental state is a transitional stage on the way from authoritarianism to a free economy. Freedom, democracy and the rule of law are the only effective ways to protect private property rights.
Neither the KMT nor the CCP are democratic parties by nature, so it is difficult for them to come up with democratic ways of cooperating. Self--deceiving talk of a separation between politics and business will only force businesspeople to look for loopholes, and the gains of cross-strait exchanges will only accrue to a few people, rather than the public as a whole. These vested interests are mostly the rich and powerful inside the KMT and CCP.
That we cannot pin our hopes on the KMT and the CCP means the DPP still has a chance. By being more active on the Pingtan issue, the DPP would not only be able to alter its image as an “anti-China party,” it would also be able to propose thinking on the cross-strait issue from a new strategic vantage point. If the two sides could cooperate on the development of a “Pingtan Democratic Experimental Zone” and establish a Chinese domestic pilot project for “one country, two systems” where the two systems are democracy and authoritarianism, they might be able to duplicate the experience of reform and opening up from the 1980s. Of course, if other areas emulated such a special zone it would not be very special anymore: A good system will naturally attract followers.
Sadly, this scenario is almost certain to remain a fantasy — neither the KMT, the CCP nor the DPP are likely to be so creative.
Lee Tuo-tzu is a legislative assistant.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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