Toward the end of this year, the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be convened to oversee a transfer of power from the party’s present leadership to the next generation.
Just as people were expecting to see the names of the new leaders emerge, we had the curious events of earlier this month, in which Chongqing Deputy Mayor Wang Lijun (王立軍) turned up at the US consulate in Chengdu, reportedly seeking political asylum.
The incident was met with a strong reaction in China and keen interest from abroad, as a conflict almost broke out between police officers from the two cities. The symbolic significance of all this and the tantalizing glimpse it affords of what is happening behind the scenes is indeed noteworthy.
The incident and the response should serve as a wake-up call to the few people in Taiwan who still view China through rose-tinted spectacles. It should help them face the fact that China is still a society on the edge, both politically and economically.
Ever since it was founded, transfers of power within the People’s Republic of China have been mired in the power struggles that are the necessary product of communist dictatorships. In the early days these power struggles were particularly ferocious, often going beyond internal party struggles to involve mass movements and even intervention by the army. They were enough to send the entire country to the brink of civil war.
In ancient times, transfers of power in China took the form of dynastic change in which imperial power was wrested from the incumbent. Not much changed when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over, although it did so under the banner of putting an end to feudalism. Indeed, power transfers under this new regime were every bit as barbaric and violent, if not more so, than under the old system. With every transfer of power the contenders sought not just to topple their opponents, but to wipe out any trace of dissent, often getting ordinary people involved and leading to the imprisonment, or even death, of millions.
Following the death of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東), party, political and military power became consolidated in the hands of former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), who had very few, if any, serious challengers. Deng instigated a path of economic reform and opening up to the outside world and, under the name of socialist market economics, started China on the road of state capitalism and long-term growth. Where the economic system may have changed, however, the political system did not. There is a well-established system for the exercise and transmission of power, but it is exclusively controlled by a small, powerful elite.
The system of power transfer in the CCP operates in a way we might find difficult to conceive. The party’s second-generation leader, Deng, not only chose his successor, Jiang Zemin (江澤民), but also decided in advance who was to be Jiang’s successor: Hu Jintao (胡錦濤). Now that Hu is president, his own successor is all but decided, as Hu is presumed to have nominated Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平) to follow him.
This invention of the Chinese communists, these Chinese-style politico-economic development models that they call “socialist democracy” and “socialist market economics,” are just veils. In essence they are completely in line with Chinese communist ideology.
Market economics is a misnomer, as everything is still controlled by the state, not the market. State-run companies and the government call the shots in any given industry, including matters such as where domestic economic growth is to be concentrated, as well as overseas acquisitions, all of which are decided according to the CCP’s instructions. Notably, the Chinese government still lays out one five-year plan after another, through which it guides and controls the direction of economic development.
In politics, too, there is nothing that the CCP does not control. The party controls the government, and the party itself is under the control of a small political elite. Because the party leads the government, it is the ultimate source of power. It is in command of all executive, legislative, judicial and military affairs. Consequently, the National People’s Congress, which is supposed to be the equivalent of a parliament or congress in a democratic country, is really little more than a rubber stamp for the political institution that holds the real power, which is the CCP.
The core of power in the country as a whole is the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, or politburo, while the Politburo Standing Committee is a core within a core. Each member of the politburo is responsible for a certain area or areas of business, and the general secretary is the one with the final say.
Although democracy often appears to be disorganized, it is actually quite a stable framework, especially as it allows change to come through the ballot instead of the bullet.
Compare this with the situation in China, where the state apparatus is in the hands of a tiny, unelected elite. Being unelected, the members of this elite have no mandate and no legitimacy. In addition, many disparate voices and interests are forcibly suppressed so that their needs and demands cannot be resolved within the system, and this sows the seeds of conflict and division. As a result of this long-standing suppression, China is riddled with internal contradictions, rather like a nuclear reactor that is weakened by cracks.
When someone as important as Wang presents himself, amid a power struggle, at the US embassy in Chengdu seeking political asylum, it shows that China’s political crisis is getting to a point where it could explode.
Translated by Paul Cooper
Because much of what former US president Donald Trump says is unhinged and histrionic, it is tempting to dismiss all of it as bunk. Yet the potential future president has a populist knack for sounding alarums that resonate with the zeitgeist — for example, with growing anxiety about World War III and nuclear Armageddon. “We’re a failing nation,” Trump ranted during his US presidential debate against US Vice President Kamala Harris in one particularly meandering answer (the one that also recycled urban myths about immigrants eating cats). “And what, what’s going on here, you’re going to end up in World War
Earlier this month in Newsweek, President William Lai (賴清德) challenged the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to retake the territories lost to Russia in the 19th century rather than invade Taiwan. He stated: “If it is for the sake of territorial integrity, why doesn’t [the PRC] take back the lands occupied by Russia that were signed over in the treaty of Aigun?” This was a brilliant political move to finally state openly what many Chinese in both China and Taiwan have long been thinking about the lost territories in the Russian far east: The Russian far east should be “theirs.” Granted, Lai issued
On Tuesday, President William Lai (賴清德) met with a delegation from the Hoover Institution, a think tank based at Stanford University in California, to discuss strengthening US-Taiwan relations and enhancing peace and stability in the region. The delegation was led by James Ellis Jr, co-chair of the institution’s Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region project and former commander of the US Strategic Command. It also included former Australian minister for foreign affairs Marise Payne, influential US academics and other former policymakers. Think tank diplomacy is an important component of Taiwan’s efforts to maintain high-level dialogue with other nations with which it does
On Sept. 2, Elbridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development, wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal called “The US and Taiwan Must Change Course” that defends his position that the US and Taiwan are not doing enough to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from taking Taiwan. Colby is correct, of course: the US and Taiwan need to do a lot more or the PRC will invade Taiwan like Russia did against Ukraine. The US and Taiwan have failed to prepare properly to deter war. The blame must fall on politicians and policymakers