When it comes to China’s threat to use force against Taiwan, Taiwanese policymakers are no less prone to wishful thinking than are some of their US counterparts.
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) recently said: “Faced with the rise of the mainland and its growth in military power, it is impossible and unnecessary to engage in military competition.”
If Ma means that Taiwan cannot compete dollar-for-dollar and man-for-man and match weapon systems with China, he is of course correct. For reasons that do not reflect well on Western foresight regarding Chinese capabilities and intentions, the days when Taiwan enjoyed a qualitative military edge over China are long past.
Yet it is not at all “impossible” for Taiwan to develop the kinds of defensive systems and practices that would greatly complicate and even deter Chinese planning for aggressive action against Taiwan. The 3 percent share of the budget that Ma promised as a presidential candidate in 2008 to devote to Taiwan’s defenses was supposedly intended to achieve that level of defensive capabilities.
The idea behind this so-called “hedgehog” approach was that it would stave off a Chinese attack long enough for the US to deploy its forces in the Pacific Ocean to assist in Taiwan’s defense.
During the push for Taiwan’s enhanced defense spending by the administrations of former US president George W. Bush and former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislator also invoked the “impossibility” argument. He told a Washington think tank audience that since Taiwan could never equal China’s defense budget, there was no point in acquiring the weapons systems then under consideration.
However, the more intriguing part of Ma’s statement is that a robust Taiwanese defense capability is not only unfeasible, but “unnecessary” because of his “three noes” policy: no independence, no unification, no use of force.
“We should work to systematize the ‘no use of force’ part, so that Chinese leaders would be reluctant to solve cross-strait issues via wars,” Ma said.
What would make China “reluctant” to resort to force against Taiwan? Either -Taiwanese-US deterrence that imposes too high a cost for China — or Taiwanese and US concessions that make force “unnecessary” for China to achieve its ends.
Ma seems to believe that the so-called “1992 consensus” on the meaning of “one China” offers a solution to the cross-strait dilemma by deferring and finessing the political issues. However, that is not at all Beijing’s expectation.
China’s 2005 “Anti-Secession” Law said Beijing intends to use force against Taiwan not only if Taipei declares independence, but also if it were simply to take an unacceptably long time to submit to “peaceful reunification.”
Ma’s remarks earlier this year about a possible peace agreement with China stirred Taiwanese concerns regarding the kinds of political negotiations he envisioned.
Though the 2005 law was adopted during the Chen administration, it has not been repealed since Ma became president, nor has Beijing renounced the use of force or removed the 1,500 ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan.
However, if Taiwanese leaders seem somewhat confused regarding China’s intentions, they are not alone. Some in Washington share the view that if only all thought of political independence for Taiwan were to be banished, the “status quo” could go on indefinitely.
That would probably be true if the US’ own intentions regarding the defense of Taiwan were clear, particularly to Beijing. Instead, Washington adheres to the doctrine of “strategic ambiguity,” which tells China that there are some “circumstances” under which a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be allowed to succeed.
In reality, Americans and the US Congress would never tolerate such an outcome and any administration of either party would vigorously defend Taiwan. However, do the Chinese understand that or are they willing to gamble on US acquiescence as North Korea mistakenly did when it attacked South Korea in 1950?
It does not enhance US deterrent credibility when any administration essentially endorses Beijing’s view of how Taiwan’s elections should turn out, as both the administrations of Bush and US President Barack Obama have done. There is clear present evidence of Washington’s preference for Ma’s re-election.
However, the assumption underlying that bias might be unfounded and even dangerous because Beijing’s expectations for a second Ma administration would surely be higher than for a government under Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) — and greater than Ma’s ability to deliver the kinds of political concessions China wants. Chinese disappointment and anger at a suddenly non-cooperative Ma could trigger precisely the hostile reaction Washington seeks to avoid.
As Confucius (孔子) might have said, be careful what you wish for.
Joseph Bosco served in the office of the US secretary of defense as a China country desk officer in 2005 and 2006. He previously taught China-Taiwan-US relations at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is presently a national security consultant.
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
RSS