In the past few days, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) reiterated her stance that dealings with China should not be based on the so-called “1992 consensus,” but rather on what she calls a “Taiwan consensus.” President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has also said he wants to eliminate the differences that exist between pan-blue and pan-green politicians, and forge a consensus.
Even former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) said a “Taiwan consensus” should be based upon “special state-to-state relations,” a statement that caused a public outcry at the time. Everyone is saying what a consensus should and should not be, but nobody has yet come up with any ideas about how to forge one, nor have they identified the root cause of why a consensus cannot be reached.
Is it really the case, as director of the “red shirt” protests Shih Ming-te (施明德) once said, that the reason there is no consensus between the pan-green and pan-blue camps is because no great leader capable of bringing about a political “grand reconciliation” has appeared? Instead of discussing idealistic theories about the way things ought to be, we would be better off looking underneath the surface of things.
Cross-strait relations are one form of relationship. Communication between pan-blue and pan-green political factions are also a form of relations, internal to Taiwan. “Objective” observations — essentially the acceptance of pre-existing opposing or contradictory superficial appearances — are useless in correctly framing discussions about the aforementioned relations or in understanding their true nature.
Instead, we need to reduce these relations to their most basic form so we can see the mistaken preconditions and assumptions these impressions are based upon and then further examine the real reasons that lie behind the formation of these superficial observations. This is the only way we can be free of preconceived theoretical frameworks and superficial appearances that we would otherwise leave unquestioned. Until then, we will keep coming to the same conclusions, no matter how differently they might be expressed.
This is a phenomenological approach — one that has been developed for 100 years — and not an extreme stance advocated by any one thinker. Devoid of political or ideological baggage, it enables us to see things as they really are, not some kind of reality that has been constructed and manipulated to fit specific principles.
Utilizing this approach, ideas such as “one China,” “one Taiwan,” “two nations” and “two governments” are all based on fabricated and fantastical ideas about de jure sovereignty: They are far from the inevitable or logical conclusions regarding the nature of relations between Taiwan and China. In terms of cross-strait and domestic relations, many theorists insist that because de jure sovereignty is a prerequisite of nationhood, it is also a necessary and inevitable part of the structure of cross-strait relations and relations between the pan-blue and pan-green camps. This is a half-baked, vacuous supposition.
Some might say I am being naive and that I am guilty of being the pot that calls the kettle black. They might be right.
However, the fact of the matter is that the ideas we are constantly discussing are clearly little more than fatuous constructs proposed by bureaucratic bullies — whether individuals or groups — who never listen to reason, who think nothing of suppressing dissent, who love to engage in clever rhetorical arguments, such as the “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” principle and who insist on repeating things that are theoretically correct, such as that international law prohibits the use of military force. It is at times like these that we have to look to what is actually happening and let the reality of the situation inform our approach.
During the 2008 US presidential election, when some candidates who were running for their party’s nomination — in particular then-US senator Hillary Rodham Clinton — gave a speech, they were invariably asked why they had voted while in the US Congress to support sending US troops to the Middle East — a decision that had become a divisive political issue.
Many hopefuls said their decisions were reflective of the anger felt at the time following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and it was fruitless to try and blame, in hindsight, the vast majority of those in Congress who had voted for sending troops because at the time of the vote any dissent would have been ignored. In the end, Clinton responded by saying that if people were going to judge whether she was qualified to be president based on her vote to send troops to the Middle East, then she hoped people would still vote for her, but they didn’t have to.
When former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened then-US president John Kennedy with the possibility of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy responded with a simple: “So be it.” When Taiwanese get bullied, many of them will say: “Bring it on” because this is the only thing they can say under such circumstances. Given the same situation, Americans might say: “Come and get it.”
This is not a deliberate provocation, but rather an expression of honestly facing up to and accepting reality. It also shows that while eloquence might bring some consolation, it will not change how things are. This line of thinking is even more applicable to the never-ending — and unsupported by history — disputes between China and Taiwan and the pan-blue and pan-green camps over the issues of “sovereignty”and “independence.”
“Bring it on” is not some form of wishful thinking used to embolden. It is a fundamental realization and assertion that regardless of whether all these big ideas such as “supreme, independent sovereignty,” “an inalienable part of the inviolable territory of China,” “national identity” and “membership of international organizations” have any basis to them, these are abstract concepts far divorced from our everyday lives and while some people might uphold such views, these are not what we are most concerned about or should be concerned about anymore.
The only way to build a basis for a consensus is to discard ideas about sovereignty, such as “one China” and “two countries,” that are contradictory and cannot coexist. Any talk of “one China” or “one Taiwan” means there is no possibility for dialogue. We need to focus our energy and attention on the real nature of cross-strait relations and on the very pressing issues we now face here in Taiwan, such as the DPP’s 10-year party guidelines, Ma’s talk of a “golden decade” and especially anything pertaining to national security. This is the only way we can assure Taiwan’s future and the happiness and the well-being of our people.
There is a Chinese saying that states: “When Heaven sends down calamity, it is still possible to avoid it; when we occasion the calamity ourselves, it is no longer possible to live.”
We have brought disaster on ourselves by talking and arguing about “unification” and “independence” for more than two decades. Are we really supposed to believe that embracing and discussing a bunch of empty, mutually exclusive, but self-assured theories about sovereignty can save lives and contribute to further development? I don’t buy it, and you shouldn’t either.
Thomas Weishing Huang is a lawyer.
Translated by Drew Cameron
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