In his book Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, published in 1999, US political scientist Arend Lijphart analyzes the forms of government of 36 democracies and divides democratic systems into two main categories — majoritarian and consensus democracies.
The principal difference between the two, according to Lijphart, is that “the majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise.” More importantly, consensus democracy emphasizes the process by which consensus is formed, whereas majoritarian democracy stresses the conclusion drawn by the majority, and then forces everyone to accept it.
Following Democratic Progressive Party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) proposal to establish a “Taiwan consensus,” the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has repeatedly attacked the idea as being void of content. If one understands the spirit of consensus democracy, one can see why Tsai has not responded to the KMT’s criticisms by making more specific proposals.
That is because the spirit and content of a “Taiwan consensus” are not to be formed according to the pattern of majoritarian democracy, whereby Tsai would propose them and then, once everyone had accepted them, they would decide by voting. Rather, they must be the product of a certain procedure whereby the Taiwanese public would first discuss the issue and make compromises among themselves. Only such a Taiwan consensus — one tempered by public opinion and discussion — can form a stable and durable basis for interaction with China.
In the movie Warriors of the Rainbow: Seediq Bale, which describes conflict between the Sediq and the Japanese colonial authorities, Dakis Nomin, a Sediq who worked as a policeman and teacher for the Japanese, advised the rebellious Mona Rudao to put up with the situation for another 20 years, but Mona Rudao’s reply was that in 20 years there would be no Sediq anymore.
From 1992, when Taiwan held its first-ever election for all legislative seats, to 1996, when the nation held its first direct presidential election, Taiwan completed its first wave of democratization under the temporary structure of the Additional Articles of the Republic of China Constitution. Next year’s presidential and legislative elections will mark 20 years after the start of this democratization process.
There would be no point in denying the contribution that this temporary structure has made to Taiwan’s democratization and peace, but two decades have passed and we are now faced with a rising China and international realities that have greatly restricted Taiwan’s foreign relations. President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) continued groveling to China has whittled away Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity. Faced with an environment that is likely to get even worse, we can’t ask Taiwan to wait any longer.
We cannot think of going back to the way things used to be, like Ma does, and instead of arguing about whether there ever was such a thing as a “1992 consensus,” we should go forward in accordance with the spirit and structure of a Taiwan consensus.
Only a thorough review of the ways in which Taiwan interacts with China, including the Constitution, can ensure that Taiwan keeps developing vigorously.
Lee Ying-yuan is a former Cabinet secretary-general.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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