Campaigning for January’s presidential election is gradually getting under way. President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday publicly criticized the cross-strait policies of his rival, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), saying that her proposals were flashy, but dodged key issues, and that the things she has so far said have been abstract and lacking in content.
Democratic Taiwan has no enemies, and it would never commit aggression against neighboring countries. The only threat to Taiwan’s security is that of annexation by China. Anyone who aspires to be the president of Taiwan must present the public with a clear account of his or her policies regarding relations across the Taiwan Strait. If this entails sharp debate and finger-pointing between the rival candidates, then so be it.
To judge whether the candidates’ cross-strait policy proposals are the right ones, it is necessary to see whether they measure up to reality. There are a number of situations that have underpinned relations between Taiwan and China for many years that cannot be overlooked.
The first of these is that there are two nations facing one another across the Taiwan Strait. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never had sovereignty or governing authority over Taiwan, which, no matter whether we call it Taiwan or the Republic of China, has no such ambitions with regard to China.
The second point is that China has consistently insisted on the “one China” principle, under which it claims Taiwan as one of its provinces, but Taiwanese people have made it clear through elections and opinion polls that they absolutely reject this idea.
Third, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both claim that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait arrived at the so-called “1992 consensus” under which both sides agree that there is one China, while each side interprets “one China” in its own way, or in other words, that both sides adhere to the “one China” principle. This claim is often reiterated by Ma himself.
However, the late Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫), who represented Taiwan at the bilateral talks in Hong Kong in 1992, denied that any such consensus was reached, and Su Chi (蘇起) of the KMT admitted that it was he who invented the term “1992 consensus.”
Besides, cross-strait relations are not solely a matter for Taiwan and China; they are international in nature because they are related to such key factors as security in Southeast Asia. That the US has for many years sold arms to Taiwan, in accordance with its own law, is proof of this.
Tsai’s recent cross-strait policy proposals can be found in speeches she has made and interviews she has given. Among them, the main things that have drawn criticism from Ma are her emphasis on the need to “establish a peaceful and stable mechanism for interacting with China” and her belief that “it is in our best interest to deal with China in a multilateral framework, where international rules and regulations help to balance China’s increasingly asymmetrical leverage and influence.”
As she has said: “We must be practical as our business community takes advantage of the growing economic opportunities in China, but at the same time we must be vigilant in guarding our most cherished values, mainly democracy and human rights.”
Tsai’s proposals stress peace and stability. As she put it, cross-strait relations should be “peaceful, but recognize differences” as well as “peaceful and seek commonality.” No doubt Tsai will further clarify these ideas in the process of her election campaign, but there can be no doubt that her stated purpose of taking Taiwanese identity as her starting point and Taiwanese values as her core values are in keeping with the realities detailed above.
In Ma’s view, however, all this talk of sustainable interaction across the Taiwan Strait is doomed to failure if the DPP does not recognize the “1992 consensus,” that there is “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” To back up his contention, Ma takes pronouncements made by China’s Taiwan Affairs Office about differing interpretations by each side of “one China” as proof that the “1992 consensus” really exists.
In fact, China for a long time described the “1992 consensus” as a “faulty generalization.” The phrase “1992 consensus” emerged after the event to fit in with China’s united front strategy as the KMT and CCP joined forces to keep Taiwan under control, but Beijing has all along given greater weight to its “one China” principle, the purpose of which is to “work toward national unification.” Evidently “one China” is an unshakable first principle for Beijing, so what room can there be in practice for “each side having its own interpretation”?
Made-up phrases are little different from lies; however many times you repeat them, they still remain untrue. In the course of the bilateral talks in Hong Kong in 1992, the most the two sides did was to exchange views verbally on the subject of “one China” and what it meant, and on their different understandings and interpretations. Since no written record exists of these exchanges, there is no way they can possibly be endorsed through the democratic process in Taiwan.
Ma continues to talk about the “1992 consensus,” but when one examines his actions, one cannot but shake one’s head in dismay at his propensity to say one thing and do another. In the three years since he took office, during Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin’s (陳雲林) visit to Taiwan and countless other instances, the public has witnessed the willingness of Ma and his government officials to trample on this country’s flag, anthems and songs, official ranks and national symbols to ingratiate themselves with the emissaries of Beijing. Ma himself found it acceptable to be addressed as simply “Mr Ma” and even as just plain nameless “you.”
In the latest example of this trend, yesterday Albania listed Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei,” but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted with delight. How can a government that keeps letting Taiwan down like this have the gall to claim that it is putting “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” into practice, and at the same time criticize its rival for not recognizing the “1992 consensus?” Clearly, these people take the public for fools.
“One China, but we don’t dare to interpret it our way” would be a more accurate description, and this is just one example of how far the Ma administration has leaned toward China in its cross-strait policies, bringing Taiwan close to the point of surrender.
Another is the question of arms procurement. When it was in opposition, the KMT used its legislative majority to block the purchase of advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons from the US. Since Ma took office, his administration has put the arms procurement issue on the back burner, while cutting the defense budget well below what is needed. There is good reason to doubt this administration’s willingness to maintain our national defense, and that constitutes a threat to national security.
As to Ma’s “diplomatic truce” with China, given his adherence to “one China” without daring to voice his own interpretation, all that is left as far as the international community is concerned is the PRC, with Taiwan downgraded to the status of a Chinese province.
Speaking in Taipei on June 24, former American Institute in Taiwan director Richard Bush said that everyone in Taiwan, no matter whether they support the pan-blue or pan-green political camps, needs to form a consensus on how to deal with the challenge of China’s efforts to make Taiwan unite with it. Ever since he took office, Ma has been on extremely friendly terms with China, but he has hardly had any friendly interaction with other parties, be they his pan-blue allies or the pan-green opposition, still less formed a consensus with them. Ma’s ideology is one of eventual unification, so of course he has no intention of marshaling various shades of public opinion in Taiwan to counter the pressure coming from China.
Given that our government leaders are moving in the direction of surrendering to Beijing, the only way for Taiwan to save itself is to make sure January’s elections bring back into government a party and a president who are willing to stand up for this country.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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