There has been considerable talk in the US recently to the effect that Washington will, and even should, end its role as Taiwan’s protector. A lot of the talk is serious.
There is good reason for this. In 2009, when US President Barack Obama visited China, he concurred that Taiwan is a Chinese “core interest” and has subsequently delayed and limited arms sales to Taiwan. The US Congress seems to have no interest in Taiwan these days with so many other issues to deal with. The US public does not want another war. A number of former top officials have suggested the country let China have Taiwan.
The central concern is that the US is suffering from strategic overstretching and debilitating debt. Thus, Washington finds it impossible to sustain its role as the world’s policeman. Many say cut back now. In fact, Obama has already sliced the US defense budget considerably.
In contrast, China has trillions of US dollars in foreign exchange and its economy is roaring ahead with a 9 or 10 percent growth rate, compared with the US’ 1 or 2 percent. The US will go broke if it engages in an arms race with China. In fact, some say China could cause the US to collapse as the US did to the Soviet Union a couple of decades ago.
Anyway, some in the US say the government and ruling party in Taiwan want unification with China, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would pick a fight with China to suit its own objectives and draw the Washington into another war. Taiwan’s supporters in the US are understandably perplexed.
However, is this really the situation?
Starting with Taiwan, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) hardly wants to trade his position as head of state of what is for all intents and purposes a sovereign country for a lesser position in China.
Most of the top leaders of his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) would prefer to be where they are and cannot be optimistic about their future in a Chinese government. Hence, they do not really want unification except as an ideal or in the distant future.
DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) is not supporting independence, at least not as former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) did, which angered Washington. Chen is in prison and his influence in the party is almost gone. Tsai is the DPP’s candidate for the presidential election next year and has an agenda that focuses on other issues.
Then there is the question of whether China wants to incorporate Taiwan. Of course it does. But now? China’s paramount foreign policy objective is to keep its economic expansion on track. Taiwan contributes to that. Incorporation would not improve the situation; in fact it would likely have the opposite effect as it would anger and/or scare many of China’s commercial partners.
Another reason China probably does not want Taiwan immediately is that unification would likely be seen as a victory for the military; civilian leaders want to keep the military under control. (Many think it has become a loose cannon of late.) Chinese leaders feel that Taiwan will eventually want unification because of China’s economic attraction and that would be a better way of solving the problem.
Though some say Taiwan has no real value to the US in today’s new strategic climate, this is not the case. In control of Taiwan, China would use its west coast ports, especially Suao (蘇澳), as a submarine base. Its subs would enter deep water where they could not be tracked and could appear without warning off the coast of California where US cities would be in range of its missiles.
Just as important, if it appeared that Washington had abandoned Taiwan, or China achieved unification through pressure, the US’ credibility would be lost and so would its Asian allies.
Taiwan is also an indispensible source of intelligence on China, intelligence which the US needs. Add to this the fact that Taiwan is a democracy and became such under US tutelage. Abandoning Taiwan would clearly undermine Washington’s call for democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Finally, it appears (at least when realist voices are heard from the Obama administration) that the US is pursuing a balance of power strategy in Asia to deal with China’s military expansion. It has been shoring up its relationship with Japan, ASEAN nations and India. Japan and India are fearful of China’s rise and want to balance it and ASEAN countries want to keep US influence in the region.
What is nice about a balance or equilibrium system is that it can be fairly inexpensive for the balancer — the US. Thus, the US may be able to maintain some presence in Asia, the center of the world’s economic and military growth.
Most US policymakers also realize that opting out of Asia means the US can no longer claim to be a great power. Geopolitically it would appear that Taiwan has a role to play in such a system. At least Washington needs to think of this as an option.
John Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman professor of international studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee.
Having lived through former British prime minister Boris Johnson’s tumultuous and scandal-ridden administration, the last place I had expected to come face-to-face with “Mr Brexit” was in a hotel ballroom in Taipei. Should I have been so surprised? Over the past few years, Taiwan has unfortunately become the destination of choice for washed-up Western politicians to turn up long after their political careers have ended, making grandiose speeches in exchange for extraordinarily large paychecks far exceeding the annual salary of all but the wealthiest of Taiwan’s business tycoons. Taiwan’s pursuit of bygone politicians with little to no influence in their home
In a recent essay, “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” a former adviser to US President Donald Trump, Christian Whiton, accuses Taiwan of diplomatic incompetence — claiming Taipei failed to reach out to Trump, botched trade negotiations and mishandled its defense posture. Whiton’s narrative overlooks a fundamental truth: Taiwan was never in a position to “win” Trump’s favor in the first place. The playing field was asymmetrical from the outset, dominated by a transactional US president on one side and the looming threat of Chinese coercion on the other. From the outset of his second term, which began in January, Trump reaffirmed his
It is difficult not to agree with a few points stated by Christian Whiton in his article, “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” and yet the main idea is flawed. I am a Polish journalist who considers Taiwan her second home. I am conservative, and I might disagree with some social changes being promoted in Taiwan right now, especially the push for progressiveness backed by leftists from the West — we need to clean up our mess before blaming the Taiwanese. However, I would never think that those issues should dominate the West’s judgement of Taiwan’s geopolitical importance. The question is not whether
In 2025, it is easy to believe that Taiwan has always played a central role in various assessments of global national interests. But that is a mistaken belief. Taiwan’s position in the world and the international support it presently enjoys are relatively new and remain highly vulnerable to challenges from China. In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush Administration had plans to elevate bilateral relations and to boost Taiwan’s defense. It designated Taiwan as a non-NATO ally, and in 2001 made available to Taiwan a significant package of arms to enhance the island’s defenses including the submarines it long sought.