There has recently been much in the news about the comments of certain academics and strategists in senior positions in the US about minimizing commitment to Taiwan in the light of Chinese growth. Perhaps we should not be too influenced by this. It is likely to be just a phase set against the backdrop of a very long period of Chinese economic growth, a performance that cannot have gone unnoticed by US strategists from the 1990s.
However, neither must we preach complacency. Within Taiwanese party and presidential politics any premature radicalism in relations with China or on the official status of the nation could undo what we might call the “Three Great Works.”
The first of these is the measurable development of US capability and determination that still acts as a deterrence to China. The second is the slow, tortuous development of meaningful relations across the Taiwan Strait (the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or ECFA, being the most obvious example) and is not subject to the whims of short-term electoral politics in Taiwan. The third is the equally slow and even more unsure evolution of genuinely critical, non-regime thinking and interests within China, based around the growth of a large, youthful middle class. The failure to detach the global information system from the fingertips of this high-consuming class — with its rising expectations concerning consumption, lifestyle and political liberty — and the economic need to draw more resources (especially labor) from the less developed areas of China have destabilized old ways of life just as it has spread growth, income and employment way beyond the original growth areas of the special economic zones and coastal regions.
As the world recovers from financial recession, witnesses civil outbreaks against a clutch of North African and Middle Eastern regimes and seeks to manage the global impact of strong economic and trade growth in China and India, any sudden policy changes in Taiwan based on emotionalism could well trigger sudden changes, with the same power to impact cross-strait relations as the sudden return to power of the old military wing in China.
We may not have any control over the latter, but in a young, democratic, thoughtful society like Taiwan, we do still have power over the former.
This is all very well, but what is the optimal strategy for Taiwanese politicians in Taiwan and around the world?
A first task might be to discuss the possible combined impact of the Three Great Works (US capability, improved commercial links across the Taiwan Strait and the growing weight of a critical Chinese middle-class) on Taiwan and our relationship with China. For instance, if we focus on improved commercial links, how might that affect US attitudes and actions? If we publicly attack China on major issues, how might that influence the attitudes of potential allies within the new Chinese middle-class?
This may seem unduly academic, but Taiwanese are increasingly thoughtful democrats and need some critical meat to feed on.
When every electoral race is limited by emotional blinkers then no one, including the electorate, can see the bigger picture or they forget it in the heat of the moment.
A second point of public discourse in Taiwan should be the potential uses of “soft power” (cultural and social suasion across the Chinese diaspora and in China) to encourage progressive thought within China, without in any way joining the US-led anti-China clamor over such issues as political freedom or environmental degradation — with its scandals and its international isolation in various global forums, the US has always appeared hypocritical on both issues.
The promotion of middle-class lifestyles should come naturally enough to Taiwan and there is a plethora of pathways to pursue this through exchanges, education and training programs, cultural exhibitions and exchanges, language and communication improvements, etc.
Using soft power in this way is not to be soft, it is to be sensible and protective of existing linkages, but in a manner that gives space for China to change without losing face.
In this way, Taiwan might become one of several Chinese windows into the future, a role that can be played without being subservient to the broader Chinese cultural system, which does, after all, embrace very important, sometimes powerful, groups in the US, Europe, Australia, Indonesia, as well as the immediate East Asian diaspora.
Public discussion at this level might well provide Taiwanese with their own democratic check list. When a politician proposes overthrowing, say, the ECFA, in the heat of nationalist discussion, check. When another politician suggests curtailing cultural relations with Chinese groups or institutions on flimsy grounds, check. When a third politician supports US-led anti-Chinese environmental policies, check. When anyone damns the US for not defending the inalienable right of Taiwan to independence, check.
Ian Inkster is professor of international history at Nottingham Trent University in the UK and professor of global history at Wenzao Ursuline College, Kaohsiung.
Two sets of economic data released last week by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) have drawn mixed reactions from the public: One on the nation’s economic performance in the first quarter of the year and the other on Taiwan’s household wealth distribution in 2021. GDP growth for the first quarter was faster than expected, at 6.51 percent year-on-year, an acceleration from the previous quarter’s 4.93 percent and higher than the agency’s February estimate of 5.92 percent. It was also the highest growth since the second quarter of 2021, when the economy expanded 8.07 percent, DGBAS data showed. The growth
In the intricate ballet of geopolitics, names signify more than mere identification: They embody history, culture and sovereignty. The recent decision by China to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as “Tsang Nan” or South Tibet, and to rename Tibet as “Xizang,” is a strategic move that extends beyond cartography into the realm of diplomatic signaling. This op-ed explores the implications of these actions and India’s potential response. Names are potent symbols in international relations, encapsulating the essence of a nation’s stance on territorial disputes. China’s choice to rename regions within Indian territory is not merely a linguistic exercise, but a symbolic assertion
More than seven months into the armed conflict in Gaza, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take “immediate and effective measures” to protect Palestinians in Gaza from the risk of genocide following a case brought by South Africa regarding Israel’s breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The international community, including Amnesty International, called for an immediate ceasefire by all parties to prevent further loss of civilian lives and to ensure access to life-saving aid. Several protests have been organized around the world, including at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and many other universities in the US.
In the 2022 book Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, academics Hal Brands and Michael Beckley warned, against conventional wisdom, that it was not a rising China that the US and its allies had to fear, but a declining China. This is because “peaking powers” — nations at the peak of their relative power and staring over the precipice of decline — are particularly dangerous, as they might believe they only have a narrow window of opportunity to grab what they can before decline sets in, they said. The tailwinds that propelled China’s spectacular economic rise over the past