The fifth plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 17th Central Committee adopted the country’s 12th five-year plan. However, the communique issued after the meeting only mentioned political reform in passing, saying “stability” was important. Although a little bit more was said about reducing the poverty gap, the “increased tolerance” touted by Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) received no mention.
Industrial transformation was the only thing that was emphasized as the communique did not stray from the view that growth is the nation’s paramount concern.This was very disappointing.
Given the failure of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) to promote democratic reform, some people have begun to pin their hopes for political reform on Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Indeed, there is some evidence to support these hopes, making them not entirely farfetched. Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun (習仲勛), is an old party member and a reformer who suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution. He also supported then-premier Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽) during the 1989 democracy movement. In other words, Xi Jinping’s family background looks promising.
He is also one of the “princelings,” the children of senior party leaders with the most impressive CCP pedigree, although he is known to be low-key and mild-mannered.
Finally, Xi Jinping has so far given the impression of being open-minded in his dealings with China-based Taiwanese businesspeople.
However, while he is deemed to be low-key domestically, he has been impulsive and assertive on the international stage, as he showed by securing an -audience with the Japanese emperor against all protocol. During a visit to Mexico, he sharply rebuked “the Western world” and he once gave a strong showing in New Zealand’s parliament.
This dual personality might seem paradoxical, but the crucial point is his military background. Xi Jinping differs from former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民), Hu and Wen, not only because he is one of the princelings, but because he has a military background. His father belongs to the generation that fought the revolution, and just like Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), he was involved in the military and undertook propaganda work.
More important, however, Xi Jinping’s first job after graduating from university was in the Central Military Commission (CMC) where he received his officer’s rank. He now has much experience as a member of the CMC and the standing committee of the politburo.
Furthermore, although Jiang’s recommendation was one reason Xi Jinping was elevated to the standing committee, his military background was equally important.
The Chinese Civil War was an example of how political power emanates from the barrel of a gun, but the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has always played a crucial role in the CCP’s internecine power struggles.
That is why PLA members were given more than half the seats on the crucial politburo at the party’s ninth national congress in 1969 and at the 11th national congress in 1978. Today, they still control more than 20 percent of the seats.
Jiang and Hu lack a military background and only became secretaries general of the CCP because Deng, who decided that Hu should succeed Jiang, had total control over the military.
During Jiang’s time as CCP secretary-general, Deng controlled China from his position as chairman of the CMC, thus creating a situation where the military directed both party and government. Jiang and Hu will now be followed by Xi Jinping, who once again is someone with a military background.
During the Mao and Deng era, the line between the CCP and the military was blurred, and both men held power as bureaucrats and military men.
Following the Korean War, reforms were initiated to separate the military from the government. As time passed, the bureaucrats became further and further removed from the military, but the more the PLA was kept at arms length from the party and government, the more it developed into a kingdom of its own.
Jiang reduced PLA participation in domestic politics in exchange for increasing the military budget from 37.7 billion yuan (US$5.7 billion) in 1992 to 141 billion yuan in 2001 and, with national security given as the key consideration, opening the door for PLA participation in international diplomacy and relations with Taiwan.
At that time, one crucial reason for strengthening military intervention in external affairs was a desire that China should develop into a major power based on its size, both economically and militarily.
However, excessive dependence on the military to become a big power, resulted in the military gaining more political influence.
The second factor was that in the wake of the Tiananmen incident the government sought to promote social cohesion through radical nationalist education. This created a new generation with anti-imperialist tendencies even stronger than during the War of Resistance against Japan.
The increasing ideological radicalization of the public presented the military with a social foundation from which to promote a tougher stance on international issues.
As a result, beginning with combat exercises in 1996, the military and other political hawks adopted a more important role in the formulation of foreign policy, a situation that has proven incompatible with the harmonious foreign policy promoted by Hu.
When economic and trade-related friction developed, that radicalism grew even stronger and ultimately resulted in the series of military exercises that have taken place in East Asia since this spring.
The situation has temporarily cooled following the ASEAN defense ministers Meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, in May, but nothing has been done to resolve the structural factors behind the tension.
If China is this aggressive under Hu, who claims to prefer harmonious diplomacy, what will happen in two years’ time when Xi Jinping, with his military background and track record of assertiveness in the international arena, takes over as head of the country? The international community is already worrying.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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