To the excitement of democracies and democracy activists around the world, Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波), the well-known, currently imprisoned Chinese dissident, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last week. In democratic Taiwan, however, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) merely offered a hollow statement saying the award was of historic significance.
In contrast to the US president, the German chancellor, the Japanese prime minister and others who called on the Chinese government to free Liu and allow him to receive the prize in person, Ma needed more than 24 hours to consider his response. Not until the evening after the prize was awarded did he issue a statement expressing a “hope that Liu Xiaobo will be released and allowed to regain his freedom as soon as possible.”
He also said: “I believe the Taiwanese public would be highly appreciative of the Chinese initiative” if Liu were to be released.
What he didn’t say in that strange statement was that if Taiwanese were not highly appreciative of such a move, they would probably also be unlikely to accept Ma’s “eventual unification” or to re-elect him in the 2012 presidential election.
Ma’s response has been met with criticism from all quarters and former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) called the statement a case of testing the wind because Ma is always sensitive to which way the wind blows for fear of offending his masters in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Another of Ma’s sensitive spots is that he is probably angling for the same award. In November last year, Control Yuan President Wang Chien-shien (王建煊) said that if the cross-strait relationship, which has made such improvements under Ma’s leadership, continues to improve, it would just be a matter of time before the Nobel Peace Prize found its way to Taiwan. Of course he was talking about Ma.
With the prize going to Liu this year, Ma’s chances are obviously deteriorating. In addition, he is trying to use the positive fallout from the cross-strait detente to build political momentum toward winning the prize. Unfortunately for Ma, the fact that the committee gave the prize to Liu makes it obvious that they continue to base their decisions on the universal values of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law rather than on the positive fallout from cross-strait detente aimed at surrendering Taiwan to the CCP.
This insight clearly touched another of Ma’s sensitive spots and rendered him incapable of coming up with a quick response. After regaining his balance, Ma hurried to praise Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) for his comments about political reform, saying he found them “exciting” because they marked an “historical turning point.”
Tellingly, he did not feel that it was “exciting” that Liu was awarded the peace prize. Maybe he was excited because Wen had touched another of his sensitive spots. Many Chinese, however, feel Wen is just a great actor. Closer observation shows that Wen and Ma are quite similar in their adeptness at superficial displays of mild-mannered, respectful and benevolent behavior aimed at covering up their pretentiousness and insincerity.
Because China is blocking out all news about Liu and the peace prize, Chinese Internet users are coming up with ingenious ways to go around their government censors to spread the news. For example, one user said “Liu Xiaobo has won the Oscar Peace Prize,” thus playing on the similarity between the names of Liu Xiaobo and Chinese actress Liu Xiaoqing (劉曉慶) and replacing “Nobel” with “Oscar.”
After Ma’s latest moment of testing the wind, he delivered an example of bold decisiveness by announcing that he was restoring the presidential advisory human rights commission. I say “restore,” because former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) had established such a commission during his presidency, only to have it dismantled by the pan-blue camp in 2006. Now, however, Ma is joining the tribute to human rights because he is trying to accumulate enough political capital to pave the way for his own Nobel Peace Prize.
Given Ma’s concern over Beijing’s reaction, the logical question to ask is whether Ma’s commitment to human rights is merely for show. Liu Xiaobo remains imprisoned and it doesn’t seem as if China is planning to release him any time soon, which is why the Taiwan Youth Anti-Communist Corps has decided to invite another internationally known human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize nominee, World Uyghur Congress president Rebiya Kadeer, as an observer to the five special municipality elections next month. Taiwan’s road to democracy is of practical value as a reference for the East Turkestan democracy movement. One can only speculate as to whether this is yet another of Ma’s sensitive spots.
Paul Lin is a Taipei-based political commentator.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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