The debacle surrounding Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS) is getting more out of hand. After edging out TBS chairman Cheng Tung-liao (鄭同僚), the government then forced two excellent managers from office — former Public Television Services (PTS) president and chief executive Sylvia Feng (馮賢賢) and Chinese Television System (CTS) general manager Chen Jen-ran (陳正然). Worst of all, TBS remains under the control of the government.
The Public Television Act (公共電視法) clearly stipulates that PTS belongs to the public and that it should be independently and autonomously run, without any political intervention. However, the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has pulled all sorts of stunts to interfere with TBS, which includes PTS, CTS, Indigenous Television Service and Hakka Television Service.
First, it increased the number of board members, thus diluting the power of the original members, and mobilized biased legislators to the review committee, a blatant breach of the legal regulations that stipulate the board should be made up of disinterested community members.
Second, it used the legislature to freeze the PTS budget and come up with regulations stating that programs must be submitted for review and censorship before broadcasting. It also tried to force the management team to step down.
Until these actions can take effect, the authorities can amend related laws, greatly increase the number of board members and use human-wave attack methods to control the board.
Because of the highhanded methods used, the Government Information Office (GIO) was pulled up by the Control Yuan, but the administration has not stopped its attempts to take over the board, causing constant legal action by board members, the supervisory committee and the GIO, eventually also involving CTS. The main reasons the government failed to take over PTS is that it came up against an unusually determined chairperson, it underestimated the professional skills and determination of the supervisory committee and it used highhanded methods that caused a great deal of public indignation.
Nevertheless, the Ma administration remains hell-bent on forcing its way in and doing everything it can to get rid of those with dissenting opinion.
Control of the media is a reflection of the vicious nature of a one-party state. Two good examples are how the media was not deregulated as fast as the rules on forming political parties, and how the Chinese government continues to ban the public from establishing broadcast media.
After Ma came into power, his administration changed the national news agency, the Central News Agency, so it now gives preference to the KMT’s party-state. It also forced out the chairperson and the management team of Radio Taiwan International and used placement marketing to gain total control over the media. It has also planned to curtail the independence of the National Communication Commission.
The power struggles within TBS are just one example of how Ma’s party-state controls the media. Taiwan’s press freedom ratings by Freedom House and Reporters without Borders plummeted due to Ma’s party-state control, a sure sign of a deteriorating democracy. This deterioration was initiated by the authorities’ control of the media.
The public must stand up to stop these evil goings-on, especially with the review process for a new PTS chairperson just around the corner. We must expose those guilty of media manipulation. We cannot afford to sit around and watch as the press freedom we have worked so hard to achieve, for so many years, is taken away.
Lu Shih-hsiang is an adviser to the Taipei Times.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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