Mon, Aug 09, 2010 page8

• Wu reveals ‘one China’ weakness

  • By Nathan Novak 李漢聲
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  Is trouble brewing in the “one China” relationship? One would think so after comments made by Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) on Saturday.

  In response to Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman Geng Yansheng’s (耿雁生) comments on Friday regarding the possibility of conducting negotiations based on the “one China” principle to remove the missiles China has aimed at Taiwan, Wu stated: “We cannot agree to that.”

  According to the premier, any such issues should be discussed under the principles of “no unification, no independence, no use of force” and Beijing’s acceptance of the sovereignty of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.

  One has to wonder who exactly Wu thinks he’s fooling. President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration has already accepted the definition of “one China” under the “1992 consensus.” In the “consensus,” both sides agreed to the “one China” principle without agreeing on what that “one China” was.

  The report given at the eighth meeting of the National Unification Council on Aug. 1, 1992, says: “Both sides of the [Taiwan] Strait adhere to the principle of ‘one China,’ but each side attaches different meaning to it. The Chinese Communist regime regards ‘one China’ to be ‘The People’s Republic of China’ [PRC] and [holds that] after unification, Taiwan would become a ‘Special Administrative Region’ under [the PRC’s] jurisdiction. [The Taiwan] side feels that ‘one China’ should mean the Republic of China, which has existed from its founding in 1912 to the present day; its sovereignty extends to the whole of China, but its present governing power only extends to Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Quemoy [Kinmen], and Matsu. Taiwan is indeed part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.”

  It is under this “consensus” that the current administration has negotiated and made numerous economic, cultural and social agreements. The Ma administration and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-led government has clung to this “consensus,” which former administration officials have called a “consensus without consensus,” using it to justify its interaction with China.

  However, suddenly this “consensus” is found to be lacking when it comes to improving Taiwan’s security.

  First, no one is fooled by China’s overtures. Most, if not all, of the 1,300 or so short to medium-range cruise and ballistic missiles the Chinese have pointed at Taiwan are highly mobile. Move them out of range and within days — perhaps even hours — they can be moved back into range.

  Second, the major issue is that of the Chinese refusing to renounce the use of force in dealing with the “Taiwan issue.” Without that commitment, all else is futile.

  Neither the missiles nor the use of force was an impediment to past negotiations and agreements. Both sides were happy working with each other under the “one China” principle as defined under the “1992 consensus.”

  Could it be that when discussing Taiwan’s security and sovereignty, the “one China” principle as defined by the “1992 consensus” is too vague? Is it that Taipei is too apprehensive about agreeing with Beijing on the “one China” principle as defined by the “1992 consensus” when Taiwan’s security and sovereignty are in question because the administration itself is too unclear what Beijing means by the “one China” principle?

  If Beijing and Taipei cannot agree under what circumstances the issues of Taiwan’s security and sovereignty can be discussed, what has Ma actually accomplished?

  Economic ties were already growing in the late 1980s. Even under the “separatist,” former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) administration, economic ties were robust. In the area of Taiwan’s international space, even though Beijing has granted Taipei observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA), such status is subject to annual approval and is an issue that is far from solved. Moreover, Beijing still blocks Taiwan from participating in other organizations, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

  Ma’s substantive achievements have been very small. Even though the change of tone in cross-strait dialogue has lowered the chance of a PRC attack in the near future, Taiwan is still extremely vulnerable politically and militarily.

  And what Wu’s statements betray is a lack in the Ma administration’s faith in its own agreements. The “one China” principle as defined by the “1992 consensus” is not a reliable enough platform from which to even begin to solve the problems most concerning Taiwan: security and sovereignty.

  Thus, the question remains: If the “one China” principle as defined by the “1992 consensus” is so weak and vague that it cannot be used to even begin discussing Taiwan’s core concerns of security and sovereignty, what good is the “1992 consensus?”

  Nathan Novak is a student of China and the Asia-Pacific region with particular focus on cross-strait relations.

  [Editor’s note: The “1992 consensus” is a term former National Security Council secretary-­general Su Chi admitted inventing in 2000 in a bid to describe the KMT claim that Taiwan and China had agreed on the existence of “one China,” but with different interpretations.]
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