Fri, Jul 09, 2010 page8

• A ‘social defense’ strategy is needed

  • By Wu Jieh-min 吳介民
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  There is nothing all that new about cross-strait political or commercial alliances, which are more often than not special interests clothed in some form of rhetoric about being in the public interest. That is surely what we have come to expect of globalization, with its emphasis on deregulation.

  During the June 26 march organized by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to protest the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) said that China’s offers of concessions to Taiwan were misleading, as they were only going to help big business, and not workers or small and medium enterprises. Things always flow the way of powerful vested interests; the big question is how to put an end to this kind of thing. Who is going to be there to protect the weak and the vulnerable, the little guy? Who is going to fight to protect the democracy and freedom that the Taiwanese struggled long and hard to achieve? The DPP has been out in the wilderness for a while. The time is now right for it to come back with a China policy that is both substantial and effective, by which I mean it needs to look beyond election results. Lee knows this very well, so once again, the question is how?

  China has already replaced the US as Taiwan’s biggest trading partner, but despite the importance of the relationship, there remain many tensions between the two sides. We see eye to eye on trade, but not on politics. There is a charged feeling in the air similar to what it must have felt like between the major European nations in the run up to World War II. The biggest difference between the current cross-strait dynamic and that in Europe back then is the respective strengths of the nations involved. In its tussle with China, Taiwan is always going to be at a disadvantage.

  In the year 2000, the DPP took power, and some of the old guard of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) started to become more sympathetic to the idea of dealing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After the latter passed an “Anti-­Secession” Law, providing Beijing with a legal basis for the use of military force against Taiwan should it make any moves toward independence, there was a swift reconciliation between the KMT and the CCP. When President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office he was quick to further solidify ties with Beijing. At this point, tactical disengagement went out of the window and the two sides began talking about economic cooperation. Beijing took the initiative in this, magnanimously granting us “concessions.” The more they did so, however, the more suspicious the pro-­independence lobby became.

  The DPP’s China policy for the last 20 years or so has had something of a conceptual blind spot. That is, how is Taiwan to get this monkey off our back once and for all? Is relying on the US to guarantee our national security, the preferred policy of the government during the presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), still the best way forward? If we agree to purchase a large consignment of weapons from the US, will that necessarily guarantee their intervention should things get a little sticky in the Taiwan Strait?

  As far as the US is concerned, Taiwan still constitutes an important market for its arms sales. It’s a market that the Americans have a virtual monopoly over. Beijing may well object, but they still do not have the wherewithal to challenge the US. What Beijing is most intent on preventing is the US both selling arms to Taiwan and subsequently coming to its aid should that be required sometime in the future. Back in May, Ma told CNN that the government would continue to purchase arms from the US, but would “never” ask it to go to war on Taiwan’s behalf. This clearly plays right into China’s hands.

  Let us take an objective look at how things would likely play out if the US does, indeed, sell Taiwan the arms but not provide any, shall we say, “after-sales service.”

  The consequences of the likely future decline of US global hegemony will force it to re-evaluate previous commitments to maintain security in East Asia. When this happens, Beijing will have more freedom to pursue its ultimate goal in terms of its ambitions concerning Taiwan. What’s more, the rising influence of the China lobby in Taiwan would render any further saber-rattling redundant.

  History is often a good teacher. Nazi Germany’s unobstructed annexation of Czechoslovakia back in 1939, possible due to the policy of appeasement which allowed Hitler to take control of Austria as well, serves as a good example. Taiwan stands to learn something from this turn of events. Namely, if one takes China as comparable to the ascendant Germany of the 20th century, the trick is how to make Taiwan, in strategic terms, similar to the Netherlands or Belgium of the time, places of strategic importance caught between two major powers, rather than Czechoslovakia or Austria, pawns that other nations were willing to sacrifice. The pro-independence lobby in Taiwan are calling for us to prevent Taiwan from becoming another Czechoslovakia or Austria, to stop it from being annexed. Again, the same ­question applies. How?

  Capital knows no borders. In the past 20 years even national capitalists have moved over to China, whether reluctantly or quite happy to fall into line and play Beijing’s game. Our question therefore becomes, “What if Taiwan cannot get China off its back? What then?” Well, let’s not hold out for some kind of patriotic “national capitalist” to save the day. Such an idea brings to mind Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot and the dubious wisdom of waiting around for something there is no good reason to suppose will ever materialize.

  To my mind, it is far better to deal with, and as soon as possible, vulnerable industries and the working class, the most obvious casualties of the coming era of cross-strait deregulation. There is another concept I would bring up, that of social defense as a form of resistance, with the resistance of the Czechs to the 1968 Soviet invasion as an example. Every regime requires a degree of legitimization or acquiescence from the population if it is to remain in power. Social defense involves the securing of widespread public participation to deny such support. I say we take the initiative and make connections with civil society in China, with a view to mobilizing some form of social defense network. This would be preferable to relying on the continued protection of US hegemony, for such time as it still exists. The KMT/ CCP leadership elites have no time for “society.” What about the DPP?

  The new watchwords for the coming cross-strait reality are to be “working class” and “social defense.”

  Wu Jieh-min is a sociology professor at the National Tsing Hua University Institute of Sociology and Center for Contemporary China.

  TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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