It has only been days since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took over as chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), but it is already clear that he faces many obstacles.
Despite much opposition, Ma insisted on taking the position with an eye to regulating the behavior of mischievous party members.
Many Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators opposed then president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) “four noes and one without” pledge made in his inauguration speech in 2000 and the concept of “a future one China.” “Four noes” referred to not declaring Taiwanese independence, not changing the national title, not including the special state-to-state doctrine in the Constitution and not promoting a referendum on unification or independence. “One without” referred to not abolishing the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines.
Chen then took over as DPP chairman in 2002 to discipline those legislators. The method seemed effective and helped force the legislature to pass the bill to halve the number of legislative seats. Last year, as KMT legislators slashed a batch of Ma’s nominees for the Control Yuan and Examination Yuan, Ma decided to emulate Chen by doubling as KMT chairman to discipline misbehaving party members.
The problem is that wielding the party whip and playing it tough is not enough to make party members behave. A party chairman that is capable and has a lot of prestige does not need to establish authority by resorting to disciplinary measures. On the other hand, if a party chairman is unpopular and everyone fears being an ally during elections, relying on party regulations is impractical. Unfortunately, this is the situation Ma is currently facing.
Moreover, top-down leadership is not sufficient to win support; people must also feel that they are participating in the decision-making process. Now that neither the premier, deputy premier, key Cabinet members, Ma’s close advisers and even senior legislators attend the KMT’s Central Standing Committee (CSC) meetings, it is clear that the committee is a place for policy promotion, not debate, and it is questionable to what degree it serves any use in mobilizing legislators.
Additionally, some members are only interested in using their position to do business with China, while others use it to launch attacks in the media. CSC meetings appear boisterous and they certainly must give Ma a headache. He may be emulating Chen in wanting to use the committee to control legislators, but the results will be very different.
KMT Legislator Lo Shu-lei (羅淑蕾) is another challenge for Ma. If he restrains her, Ma will be accused of suppressing dissent and breaking his promises that the party will not direct the government and to reform the KMT. If, however, he lets Lo off the hook, he won’t be able to bring other legislators into line, forfeiting the reason for doubling as party chairman in the first place.
Ma’s promise during his first term as KMT chairman in 2005 to rid the party of its ill-gotten assets — selling assets with the left hand, while directing the money into the Central Investment Holding Co (CIC, 中央投資公司) Co with the right hand — was a ruse that damaged his reputation. The solution he has proposed this time is not any better. Although CIC will be sold, Ma said the proceeds from the sale will be used to pay for pensions, party operational costs, party think tanks and scholarships. The remainder will be donated to charity and future election campaign funds will mainly come from public donations.
By saying that future election campaign funds will be based on donations, Ma seems to be implying that previous election campaigns were funded by the party’s assets. In fact, with the exception of the presidential elections and in extreme emergencies, KMT campaign subsidies for candidates are very low. Although party assets should not have been used to fund election campaigns, the main harm from using these assets occurred in other areas — the assets were used to sustain the party’s enormous Leninist organizational structure, to co-opt private enterprise and to control the media. This completely destroyed commercial and political competition.
In many democracies, election campaign funds mainly come from donations as do operational costs. Apart from income from research, party think tanks also rely mainly on donations. The KMT’s plan to use the proceeds from the sale of CIC to maintain party operations, the think tanks and donations to charities such as the China Youth Corp is nothing short of another swindle and is no reform at all.
Ma thought it would be enough to send shock waves through the party to revoke the elected status of KMT Central Standing Committee members Yang Chi-hsiung (楊吉雄) and Chiang Da-lung (江達隆), who were found to have bribed party delegates, but the public protested that the two greenhorns were being sacrificed for giving away salted fish, while the party failed to go after the big fish.
In the evening before Ma took office as KMT chairman, the DPP released the results of an opinion poll indicating that more than 50 percent of respondents opposed Ma taking the position. A majority did not think that Ma would improve his ineffective rule, eliminate the KMT’s black gold politics or solve the party asset issue. In response, the KMT claimed that the results were not credible. Surveys by Chinese-language newspapers the Apple Daily and the China Times, however, also showed that nearly 50 percent of respondents opposed Ma taking over the chairmanship and more than 50 percent of respondents of Global Views monthly magazine’s poll were against it as well. This means that a majority of the public did not think Ma doubling as KMT chairman would help solve the party’s problems.
Ma has already lost his dominant role in the KMT, but what is most worrying is his ambition to centralize power. Past experience shows that Chen’s aggressiveness in controlling the party was disastrous. Ma’s maneuvering and governing capabilities are inferior to Chen’s and his attempt to show strength by doubling as KMT chairman seems to be the beginning of yet another disaster.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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