In his first interview with an international news agency after taking over as chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said “he does not rule out the possibility of meeting Chinese Communist Party [CCP] General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡錦濤).”
Ma also announced in his national day address that “although this year’s Double-Ten Day celebration was canceled because of the Typhoon [Morakot] disaster, [his] government will spend the next year celebrating the centennial anniversary of the Republic of China.”
Some pro-Beijing Hong Kong media published a message immediately after Ma became KMT chairman showing that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would invite all major Taiwanese political parties to China in celebration of the 100 year anniversary of the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty.
The report said the event would help push forward political reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait, allowing the highest leaders of both sides to meet and laying the groundwork for a peace agreement.
Contrary to conventional wisdom that Ma will hold off meeting Hu until (and if) he is re-elected in 2012 and before Hu steps down as CCP general secretary in the same year, both the KMT and the CCP have floated the idea an earlier Ma-Hu meeting, most likely in 2011.
Despite Ma saying that during his term he would not discuss political issues — including unification — with Beijing and would only try to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), his pledge does not mean that both sides cannot “create an atmosphere” for negotiation on political matters such as a peace agreement before Ma wins re-election.
Ma will play the “cross-strait relations card” — as his government has done since he was inaugurated in May last year — to cultivate an image that once (and if) he is re-elected, he will engage with his Chinese counterpart on political issues such as demanding that the PRC remove the more than 1,400 ballistic missiles it points at Taiwan, strengthening military confidence-building mechanisms and signing a peace agreement.
An earlier meeting with Hu would boost his campaign for re-election if Ma handles it with political skill and caution. Beijing would also like to see Ma re-elected so that it won’t have to face a new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president in 2012.
Beijing’s political calculation is to continuously frame cross-strait relations under its “one China” unification scenario. Most importantly, to eliminate the possibility of the opposition DPP winning back power, Beijing will help Ma’s re-election by playing along with his agenda.
The thinking behind the Ma administration is to use the celebration of the ROC centennial to consolidate the alleged legitimacy of its “one China” vision. Even if cross-strait relations become problematic, Ma can still advocate ROC sovereignty to appeal to middle-of-the-road voters. And if both sides agree to a Ma-Hu meeting in 2012, Ma could use his capacity as KMT chairman to downplay the political sensitivity of meeting Hu as president of Taiwan.
This strategy has a precedent. When Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) visited Taiwan in November, both the KMT and the CCP agreed not to highlight Ma’s title as president of Taiwan.
Since Beijing would have final say over a potential Ma-Hu meeting in 2011, the Ma administration could suggest a third place for such an encounter. The APEC leaders’ summit in 2011 — scheduled to be held in the US — presents an opportunity for the Ma administration to persuade the administration of US President Barack Obama to facilitate a “KMT-CCP chairmen” meeting.
Although there are risks associated with such an agenda, it is hard to image why Ma would not seek such a historic meeting in the run-up to his re-election campaign. Ma could highlight the importance of a “diplomatic breakthrough” and “cross-strait peace” to minimize DPP criticism if he attends APEC summit and meets Hu as KMT chairman. A Ma-Hu meeting would also dominate the presidential campaign and distract media and public attention away from his administration’s poor governance.
The DPP presidential candidate will have to come up with a stronger and more constructive cross-strait policy alternative to counterbalance the impact of a potential Ma-Hu meeting in late 2011. A consensus on how to face the rise of China and to engage the PRC, encompassing both a feasible policy and hedging tactics, is essential for the DPP.
A debate on the party’s China policy would be helpful early next year to forge internal consensus. Adhering to the principles of letting the Taiwanese public decide any possible deals with the PRC also constitutes the most important strategy for avoiding the negative impact of an early Ma-Hu meeting.
Liu Shih-chung is a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.
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