In July 1982, the US government informed Congress of the “six assurances,” a clarification of the Taiwan Relations Act that would serve as guiding principles for continued US-Taiwan relations.
Washington and Beijing then signed a communique on arms sales to Taiwan in August after a period of intense negotiations. Taiwan was increasingly worried about the implications of the US rapprochement with China, and the six assurances were proposed to reassure Taiwan’s authorities that US support would continue.
One of the assurances agreed to by the US was: “The United States will not consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan.”
However, if recent media reports are to be believed, US and Chinese officials did exactly that in talks in Beijing and Washington this week.
It is no secret that Taiwan has wanted to buy 66 F16C/D fighter jets from the US for several years, and recent signs from Washington indicate that support for a deal is gathering pace.
Such a sale would be anathema to Beijing, and Chinese officials must have made their objections loud and clear during this week’s talks. If it were just a case of the usual Chinese protestations then it would be nothing to worry about, but the problem for Taiwan is that over the past few years the US has found itself increasingly reliant on China, both financially and diplomatically.
This is a problem the US has brought on itself by relying heavily on the Chinese government for help in dealing with North Korea, an approach that has been of questionable value.
With Washington under such pressure, it would come as no surprise to discover that arms sales to Taiwan had been affected by the relentless efforts of Beijing.
That would tally with the gradual erosion of US policy toward Taiwan over the decades, a slip embodied by former US president Bill Clinton’s “three noes” declaration in Shanghai in June 1998. He shattered the US government’s ambiguity on the issue of Taiwan’s status by saying “no” to Taiwanese independence and saying that Taiwan wasn’t qualified to be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement.
The joint communique signed between Beijing and Washington in 1982 advocated a gradual reduction in the amount of arms the US would sell Taiwan. But writing in 2007, late US ambassador Harvey Feldman said that after signing the communique, former US president Ronald Reagan was so concerned over “its possible effect on Taiwan” and put so little trust in Chinese promises, that in addition to the six assurances he also filed a secret memorandum in the National Security Council files.
The memorandum said that the reduction in arms sales would be predicated on Beijing’s continued commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, adding that, “it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by [China]. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of [China] will be maintained.”
In light of this week’s meetings and given Beijing’s continued military buildup, which is largely focused on settling the Taiwan issue in its favor, a public reiteration of these assurances from Washington would be more than welcome.
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