Print

Mail

wiki links

Ma’s year in the pressure cooker

In his first anniversary press conference, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) reacted to the May 17 demonstration by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other social organizations by reiterating that “Taiwan is the Republic of China [ROC]” and pledging to bring Taiwan’s fragile economy back on track during the remainder of his term.

After taking office, Ma pressed the reset button by introducing an “ABC” policy — Anything But Chen — to forge an immediate rapprochement with China.

Cross-strait dialogue resumed, “functional” exchanges were fast-tracked, people-to-people visits increased, cross-strait diplomatic competition was suspended, Taiwan’s international image seemed to improve and “Chinese Taipei” got into this year’s World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting as an observer.

There is no need to deny these changes are progress.

What truly matters is the challenges and uncertainties underlying such quick cross-strait detente. Ma faces at least four such challenges.

The first lies in insufficient policy evaluations and an opaque policy-making process that bypasses legislative oversight, opposition checks and balances, and public approval. The KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan was nothing but a “rubber stamp” when reviewing the nine agreements reached at three meetings between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

Furthermore, the government failed to come up with a pros and cons evaluation before Ma promised to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China.

Most importantly, the Ma administration owes Taiwanese a clear explanation of how sovereignty is not sidelined in those negotiations and how Taiwan’s economy will benefit from economic integration with China.

Second, despite Ma’s formulation of “mutual non-denial” as the basis for dealings with his Chinese counterpart, the controversy over whether Beijing accepts the principle of “one China with individual interpretations” remains ambiguous.

Ma says that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) agrees with the principle that each side defines its own “one China” — Ma defines it as the ROC. However, there is no sign that the leadership in Beijing accepts the KMT’s definition of “one China.” Hu has rejected any formula of “two Chinas” when it comes to Taiwan’s international status.

Now, Ma was forced by the opposition to reclaim the notion that “Taiwan is the ROC.” Do the leaders in the People’s Republic of China also accept Ma’s definition that “one China means Taiwan?”

Even if Ma downplays issues of sovereignty when engaging with the PRC, there is an international impression that Taiwan is moving toward the “one China” principle as defined by Beijing. Taiwan’s sovereignty has been not only eroded but also twisted.

This is what worries the opposition and the majority of Taiwanese.

Third, Beijing clearly has the upper hand when it comes to cross-strait negotiations. Its concessions are limited and conditional.

While the PRC has temporarily stopped bribing Taiwanese allies into switching diplomatic recognition, some of them are getting impatient, which means that Beijing clearly controls the game.

Beijing’s consent was essential for Taiwan’s WHA accession, and its observer status will be reviewed on an annual basis. Beijing retains its leverage on Taiwan’s participation.

Finally and most importantly, Ma faces growing internal pressures. There are three internal constraints on the implementation of Ma’s cross-strait policy. These are KMT’s infighting, the extent to which cross-strait opening will improve Taiwan’s economy and the opposition’s checks and balance.

Ma used the KMT’s old guards to forge the first-stage of cross-strait opening but now he wants to control the party, paving the way for his re-election and his team of successors.

Nevertheless, this backfired when the media ran stories on his plan to replace SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) with KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄). The KMT’s infighting became a stumbling block for Ma.

Furthermore, Ma has played all his economic bets on an ECFA, increasing numbers of special charter flights and Chinese tourists, which he hopes will bring direct and immediate economic gains to Taiwan.

However, whether these policies will result in a temporary economic bounce or produce a long-term boost in Taiwan’s economy remains to be seen. Ma faces severe unemployment of nearly 6 percent.

Further opening Taiwan to Chinese capital and markets may jeopardize some industrial sectors in Taiwan.

Again, Beijing controls the quantity of economic input. Even if both sides signed an ECFA, Taiwan would not be guaranteed the right to sign free trade agreements with other countries. Beijing would have the final say.

Overshadowed by the corruption scandal and lawsuits surrounding former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), as well as a potential internal split, the DPP used Sunday’s demonstration to rejuvenate party morale and rebuild a social force to oppose Ma’s policies.

This will serve as a strong balanced role to Ma’s hasty cross-strait policies.

In light of complicated and sensitive cross-strait relations, Taiwanese democracy needs a strong opposition to counteract the governing party.

There have been signs of democratic backsliding after Ma took office.

For example, police abused their power against protesters during ARATS Chairman Chen Yun-lin’s (陳雲林) visit last November. The investigation and inappropriate detention of former DPP officials, including former president Chen, is also controversial.

In the latest report from Freedom House, Taiwan dropped 11 spots in its press freedom ranking for last year.

All these facts show that hasty cross-strait rapprochement cannot be pushed forward without hurting democratic procedures, public consent and Taiwan’s sovereignty.



Liu Shih-chung is a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
This story has been viewed 1285 times.