In his first anniversary press conference, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) reacted to the May 17 demonstration by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other social organizations by reiterating that “Taiwan is the Republic of China [ROC]” and pledging to bring Taiwan’s fragile economy back on track during the remainder of his term.
After taking office, Ma pressed the reset button by introducing an “ABC” policy — Anything But Chen — to forge an immediate rapprochement with China.
Cross-strait dialogue resumed, “functional” exchanges were fast-tracked, people-to-people visits increased, cross-strait diplomatic competition was suspended, Taiwan’s international image seemed to improve and “Chinese Taipei” got into this year’s World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting as an observer.
There is no need to deny these changes are progress.
What truly matters is the challenges and uncertainties underlying such quick cross-strait detente. Ma faces at least four such challenges.
The first lies in insufficient policy evaluations and an opaque policy-making process that bypasses legislative oversight, opposition checks and balances, and public approval. The KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan was nothing but a “rubber stamp” when reviewing the nine agreements reached at three meetings between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).
Furthermore, the government failed to come up with a pros and cons evaluation before Ma promised to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China.
Most importantly, the Ma administration owes Taiwanese a clear explanation of how sovereignty is not sidelined in those negotiations and how Taiwan’s economy will benefit from economic integration with China.
Second, despite Ma’s formulation of “mutual non-denial” as the basis for dealings with his Chinese counterpart, the controversy over whether Beijing accepts the principle of “one China with individual interpretations” remains ambiguous.
Ma says that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) agrees with the principle that each side defines its own “one China” — Ma defines it as the ROC. However, there is no sign that the leadership in Beijing accepts the KMT’s definition of “one China.” Hu has rejected any formula of “two Chinas” when it comes to Taiwan’s international status.
Now, Ma was forced by the opposition to reclaim the notion that “Taiwan is the ROC.” Do the leaders in the People’s Republic of China also accept Ma’s definition that “one China means Taiwan?”
Even if Ma downplays issues of sovereignty when engaging with the PRC, there is an international impression that Taiwan is moving toward the “one China” principle as defined by Beijing. Taiwan’s sovereignty has been not only eroded but also twisted.
This is what worries the opposition and the majority of Taiwanese.
Third, Beijing clearly has the upper hand when it comes to cross-strait negotiations. Its concessions are limited and conditional.
While the PRC has temporarily stopped bribing Taiwanese allies into switching diplomatic recognition, some of them are getting impatient, which means that Beijing clearly controls the game.
Beijing’s consent was essential for Taiwan’s WHA accession, and its observer status will be reviewed on an annual basis. Beijing retains its leverage on Taiwan’s participation.
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