As the impasse in the legislature over various versions of an amendment to the Assembly and Parade Act (集會遊行法) continues, rhetoric is heating up and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is resorting to alarmism. Although its opposition to the Cabinet’s draft — the version most likely to pass — is most justified, DPP statements to the effect that the government will soon reinstate martial law are foolish. If anything, they risk detracting from legitimate concerns about the Executive Yuan’s proposal.
The amendment, originally to be put to a vote last week, remains embroiled in controversy that has led to a deadlock. The proposals were again put on the agenda for yesterday’s plenary session but no progress was made.
“The proposed [amendment] is a prelude to martial law,” DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said on Friday. Other DPP lawmakers, including Wong Chin-chu (翁金珠) and caucus whip Lee Chun-yee (李俊毅), have offered similar assessments, saying the amendment harkened back to the Martial Law era.
The opposition’s frustration is genuine and its vigilance toward an objectionable proposal welcome, but the question is whether this rhetoric helps the DPP’s case or makes it easier to dismiss. The Cabinet’s amendment is most disturbing not because there is any indication that the government is plotting a return to martial law, but because it fails to resolve undemocratic aspects already embedded in the assembly act, despite claiming to do just that.
There is plenty of room for abuse in the act as it stands, which civic groups have long attacked as a remnant of the nation’s authoritarian past — and the Cabinet’s amendment is no remedy. Human rights campaigners have roundly rejected the proposal as a show: Rather than removing restrictions on demonstrations, it would merely tweak the controls to give a semblance of improvement. At the same time, the threat of a fine of up to NT$50,000 would be added for rally organizers who fail to report details of a demonstration to police in advance.
The Cabinet’s proposal also leaves key questions unanswered. Police would be able to nix a demonstration if they feared a negative impact on “national security, social order or public interests,” it says, yet fails to offer an adequate clarification of these terms. Potentially, their ambiguity would allow police, or the government, to wield the clause against peaceful protests they find unpalatable.
Just six months after the nation witnessed police seizing Republic of China and Tibetan flags from demonstrators during Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin’s (陳雲林) visit, the concern sparked by this provision is understandable. Amnesty International Taiwan has further raised the question of recourse in cases where rally organizers suspect the clause is being abused, arguing that the amendment fails to guard against this eventuality.
The list of problems with the Cabinet’s amendment is long, yet the DPP does itself the disservice of peppering its criticisms with threats that martial law may soon be upon us. It should be sufficient to note that the Cabinet’s proposal is a sham, and that the DPP, civic groups and the public have every reason to be angered by this charade.
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