Faleomavaega’s fuzzy history
The latest letter from Eni Faleomavaega, Representative from American Samoa and Chair of the US House Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment, shows the kind of champion chutzpah that separates the truly pathetic from the happily ignorant.
In his revisions to the language of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) resolution, and his first letter to the Taipei Times, Faleomavaega wrote: “The following language, which I added, is also straight from the TRA: It is the policy of the United States ‘to preserve and promote extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland.’”
Note how this construction makes it look as if the TRA exists to promote China-Taiwan relations. Not! In his second letter, he included the entire line without the misleading ending: “This is why the TRA plainly states that it is the policy of the United States ‘to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area.’”
That language clearly includes China with all the other peoples of the western Pacific, something his original edit of the TRA did not make clear.
Unfortunately, this is not the first time Faleomavaega has displayed an unseemly ignorance on the TRA, Taiwan and US policy toward Taiwan. Last year, as the Taipei Times noted in an earlier editorial, he attempted to have language that said China threatens Taiwan removed from a resolution on the last Taiwan presidential election. In 2007, Chris Nelson of the well-known Washington insider sheet The Nelson Report said that “Faleomavaega stated that it was US policy to agree to ‘one China,’ and he stated it in ways that tracked the PRC [People’s Republic of China] position. In fact, the official US position does not accept China’s definition, but rather straddles the issue with deliberate ambiguity.” Nelson was one of the Democratic staffers on the drafting of the TRA.
Eighteen months later, as this latest tiff shows, Faleomavaega still has not learned that Washington and Beijing have different “one China” policies.
Nelson was referring to a letter dated Sept. 26, 2007, in which Faleomavaega displayed an astonishing ignorance of history. In it he recorded: “One of the two major parties advocates peaceful coexistence with the PRC. The other major party and its leaders keep pushing the envelope to the point of forcing Beijing’s hand, which led to [former US] President [Bill] Clinton having to send two naval battle groups to the Taiwan Straits [in 1996] and almost led to a nuclear confrontation with Beijing.”
Of course, the president at that time was Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who was of the party that Faleomavaega implied “advocates peaceful coexistence with the PRC.” The DPP wasn’t an issue in that incident. Observe also that Faleomavaega simply regurgitates Beijing’s propaganda on the DPP — a party that also desires peaceful coexistence with Beijing, just not as a vassal of the Communist giant, as the KMT desires. Also, Faleomavaega’s construction of the incident leaves out the vital fact that Beijing fired off missiles to intimidate Taiwan, an obvious pro-China omission.
In that same letter Faleomavaega wrote: “... millions of Taiwanese have also been able to freely travel to Beijing to be reunited with their families and friends.” Yes, in Faleomavaega-world, “millions” have been reunited with their families: in Beijing.
That was in a letter in which Faleomavaega was arguing that House Resolution 676, resolving that the US should sell arms to Taiwan under the TRA (in conjunction with a request for F-16s last year), was completely unnecessary and may influence Taiwanese elections. Even in the unlikely event that it could influence the elections, it could only help the DPP. It is thus clear which side Faleomavaega is supporting: the same side as Beijing.
It is high time that the US had for itself a Chair of the Asia Subcommittee who evinces a robust and nuanced understanding of US commitments in Asia, US policy toward China and who can tell the difference between an ally and an opponent of the US.
MICHAEL TURTON
Tanzi, Taichung County
Samoa mirrors Taiwan
The insular territory of American Samoa is a very conservative and proud culture in the Pacific. US Representative Eni Faleomavaega, from American Samoa, has stated his public dissatisfaction with the Taiwan lobby and has also sought to protect US soldiers from becoming the political pawns of Taiwan independence politicians. American Samoa has enjoyed a high degree of political autonomy under the US’ Insular Cases of 1900 and the Pacific island has not been forced into the melting pot of US culture on the US mainland. It is a multicultural defense mechanism that has been very successful for the residents of American Samoa. The repressive tools of imperialism were retooled by the US government to protect the island’s culture from the assimilative pressures of US culture.
American Samoa is even allowed to control its own immigration policy, including exclusion of other US citizens, if so desired. American Samoans are also allowed to travel on US passports, but they must eventually naturalize under laws like any US permanent resident if they wish to vote in the elections of the US federal government.
The people of Taiwan are entitled to an “enhancement” of their TRA human rights protection. The San Francisco Peace Treaty is the legal basis of these “undefined” civil rights, which are the very same civil rights enjoyed by the people of American Samoa. The federal case of Roger Lin v. United States of America is a pending legal challenge to secure these “undefined” civil rights. The people of Taiwan are entitled to their inalienable civil rights under the treaty.
The Washington court must determine if Taiwan is an insular territory under the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and Insular Cases of 1900. The 23 million people of Taiwan are stateless persons under the TRA, and they deserve US government protection. This case is a very grave issue and exposes the lies of the Republuc of China on Taiwan.
Thank you for your continued interest in our effort to secure these civil rights for the people of Taiwan.
JEFF GEER
Chief Financial Officer, Taiwan Civil Rights
Litigation Organization,
Olympia, Washington
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