In a recent report to the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) said Beijing was ready to hold talks on political and military issues in pursuit of ending hostilities across the Taiwan Strait.
However, Wen failed to mention any specific confidence-building measures (CBMs), even though Beijing, Taipei and Washington have all recently expressed some interest in this proposal.
Some China specialists have suggested that Wen may be hesitant about cross-Strait CBMs because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has little interest in improving relations with Taiwan, particularly as preparations for a possible conflict with Taiwan are central to PLA’s annual double-digit budget growth in military spending and its role in Beijing’s decision-making process.
In addition, many Chinese military analysts firmly believe that: “Because there is still a certain market for ‘Taiwan independence’ on the island, at the same time that China expresses goodwill toward Taiwan, it must also continue to maintain sufficient strategic deterrence,” especially as “in recent years, the mainland’s missiles have clearly played a very important role in the struggle to deter ‘Taiwan independence.’” (Editor’s note: These quotes are from the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, Volume 8, Issue 15, July 17, 2008, which translates quotes from the Chinese-language Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], June 5, 2008).
China may find it difficult to understand Taiwan’s perception of its CBMs because such an understanding may conflict with China’s image of itself. China on the one hand promotes cross-Strait CBMs, but on the other has deployed 1,500 missiles targeting Taiwan even as Beijing and Taipei continue working toward a more stable and constructive cross-Strait relationship.
It is thus only natural that Taiwan perceives China’s CBM proposal as duplicitous and continues to regard China’s military posture as an obstacle to realizing the full potential of the thaw in cross-strait ties. This reflects the fact that the foundation of “mutual trust” or “confidence” essential for CBMs does not yet exist across the Taiwan Strait. Logically, without mutual trust, both sides will constantly take into account the possible danger that the other side is trying to deceive them.
For China and Taiwan to solve this “mutual mistrust,” both may need to first struggle to demonstrate that their long-term intentions are benign. Both sides and Beijing in particular may need to engage in Strategic Reassurance Measures (SRMs).
The SRMs concept was first introduced by Banning Garrett, director of Asia programs at the Atlantic Council, in his article “The Need for Strategic Reassurance in the 21st Century” published in the March 2001 issue of the journal Arms Control Today. There he defines SRMs as “measures seeking to address the deeper causes of mistrust among nations, especially suspicions about the perceived long-term political, military and economic objectives.”
Garret said that traditional CBMs such as military hotlines, pre-notification of key military exercises and military exchanges are only tactical measures aimed at preventing an accidental war or providing a means to prevent the escalation of hostility.
“They were not designed, however, to address the core values and strategic interests of nations,” Garrett said.
“Through strategic dialogue or other means, the leadership of each state should try to determine the basis of the other side’s strategic mistrust and which of its policies and actions are perceived as especially threatening, as well as what new steps could be taken to reassure the other side. Simply seeking to understand the basis of strategic mistrust on both sides might be in itself an SRM, though it might only be the beginning of a long, tortuous process,” he said.
As far as China is concerned, “Taiwanese independence” and Taiwan’s military capabilities, including arms procurements from the US, are the major threats to China’s territorial integrity.
Responding to these concerns, Taiwan has taken steps to reassure China. These include renouncing the pro-independence policy, scrapping plans for developing long-range cruise missiles, downsizing military troops, cutting the frequency of war games, decreasing its military outlays, planning to phase out the conscription system by 2014 and even working on a think tank to coordinate strategic dialogues with the Chinese military.
In contrast, in response to Taipei’s major concern — the 1,500 missiles pointed at Taiwan — Beijing has so far done nothing at all, let alone shown any benign gestures regarding military CBMs. Beijing simply keeps ignoring that Taiwan has frequently pointed out the missiles are a significant threat to the island.
To Taiwan’s chagrin, China has not only increased the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan by more than 100 since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) entered office last May, but it has also increased its annual military outlay this year by 14.9 percent, launched its plans to acquire aircraft carriers and prepared its first massive forces parades at sea to demonstrate its military might in return.
China should be aware that continuing to modernize and build up its military signals a threat not only to Taiwan, but all of China’s neighbors. This is clearly at odds with China’s claim that it seeks a “peaceful rise” and could also increase the chance of mistrust and real damage to other relations.
Recent events are evidence that China fails to see that its neighbors are reacting out of fear. Russia turning down its order for 50 Su-33 fighters; the US Impeccable surveillance vessel incident, which prompted South Korea and Australia to warn against an arms race are examples. China’s failure to see that fear could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy: The more China flexes its military muscle, the more neighbors react in fear, then the more defiant China may become, producing ever more spiraling mistrust and hostility.
“Strategic mistrust can exacerbate problems that might have been more easily resolved had they been dealt with on their own merits,” Garrett said.
Now is the perfect time for China to withdraw the missiles it points at Taiwan. Taipei has reiterated that China must reduce its military threat before peace talks can be held, specifically calling for China to remove the missiles. The world would extend a hand if China were willing to unclench its fist by removing the missiles in line with its statement that its peaceful development and rise pose no threat to any country. Such a benign gesture would also greatly reduce the worry and mutual mistrust in the region.
Recently, Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of the US Pacific Command, has offered to host face-to-face talks between Chinese and Taiwanese military officials at his headquarters in Hawaii. Some China analysts in Washington have said that Keating’s offer would be a great opportunity for cross-strait dialogue and that it was now up to the Chinese to take it or leave it.
For the benefit of all sides, now is the right time for cross-strait SRMs.
Yu Tsung-chi is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
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